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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is DefendantlRespondentiCross-Appellant Valley County's (the "County") response
brief. It responds to Appellant's BrieJ(hereinafter "Appellants' Brief') filed by Appellants
Buckskin Properties, Inc. and Timberline Development, LLC (collectively, "Buckskin,,).l It also
serves as the County's opening brief on cross-appeal.

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Buckskin seeks to frame this case as being about illegal impact fees, but it is more
accurately described as a collateral attack on a permit issued by the County for real estate
development. Buckskin seeks the return of money it paid years ago toward road improvements
pursuant to its agreement with the County in connection with Phases 2 and 3 of a residential
project known as The Meadows at West Mountain ("The Meadows"). The County used that
money, along with funds from other developers, to construct roads serving the developments,
without which The Meadows and other projects probably could not have been built. Having
received the benefit of its bargain, Buckskin now contends that the money it agreed to pay was
an illegal tax under Idaho law and, therefore, was a per se taking under state and federallaw. 2
Buckskin also seeks declaratory relief to the same effect in an effort to bar future payments on
the remaining three phases of the project. It seeks this despite the fact that the County adopted a
resolution foregoing such fees.
At the time of Buckskin's application for a conditional use permit ("CUP"), the proposed
project was located within a rural area served by gravel roads that were not intended for urbantype residential development. The County could have denied the application outright, Idaho

I Buckskin Properties, Inc. was the initial developer of the property. Timberline Development, LLC is the
assignee/successor in interest of Buckskin Properties, Inc.

2 Buckskin has not alleged an independent basis for a regulatory taking. Instead, its state and federal taking
claims are entirely dependent on its allegation of an illegal tax in violation of Idaho Const. art. VII, § 6.
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Code § 67-6512(a), or controlled the timing ofthe development, Idaho Code § 67-6512(d)(2), on
the basis of inadequate transportation infrastructure. Instead, at the behest of many developers at
the time who were clamoring to move forward with projects in areas underserved by road
infrastructure, the County developed a Capital Improvement Program ("CIP"). The CIP gave
developers whose projects would otherwise have been denied or delayed the opportunity to move
forward based on a program in which they contributed their fair share to fund road improvements
serving their developments.
Buckskin, like many others, took advantage ofthis program and benefited from it.
Indeed, Buckskin included in its own CUP application a proposed agreement for it to contribute
toward road improvements based on the CIP program. The County approved Buckskin's
application with a condition that it enter into such a development agreement for each phase. On
the same day, Buckskin executed the first of these agreements, the Capital Contribution
Agreement, covering Phase 1 of the project. In it, Buckskin agreed to convey right-of-way to the
County as its contribution toward its share of road construction costs. The value of the right-ofway exceeded the amount due, so it obtained a credit for future phases. It later entered into a
Road Development Agreement for Phases 2 & 3, providing for payment of $232, 160. These are
referred to collectively the "Development Agreements.,,3 Herrick Aff., Exhs. 1 and 2.4
Buckskin is not seeking return ofthe conveyance it made for Phase 1, acknowledging
that this occurred outside of the statute of limitations. Instead, its lawsuit seeks (1) damages for
the money it paid in connection with Phases 2 & 3 and (2) declaratory relief, partiCUlarly as to
future phases.

3 There is no significant functional difference between the Capital Contribution Agreement and the Road
Development Agreement. The different names merely reflect an evolution in naming convention.
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The County seeks dismissal of the action for a variety of jurisdictional, procedural,
substantive, and equitable reasons. Most notably, the lawsuit is too late (both as to the 28-day
appeal clock and the four-year statute oflimitations). In addition, Buckskin failed to exhaust its
remedies and entered into the Development Agreements voluntarily. Other defenses apply
specifically to the federal takings claim (failure to plead 42 U.S.C. § 1983, special ripeness tests
under Williamson County Regional Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank ofJohnson City,473
U.S. 172 (1985), and the two-year statute oflimitations). Finally, the County has raised
equitable defenses to both state and federal claims.
While this case was pending (but after the District Court had ruled in the County's favor),
the County enacted Resolution 11-6. This resolution declared in section 2: "In order to avoid
litigation costs and uncertainty, the Board of County Commissioners will no longer enter into
Road Development Agreements calling for the payment of fees or other contributions for off-site
road improvements until such time as the County adopts an IDIF A-compliant ordinance, unless
the permit holder voluntarily and expressly waives any objection thereto."s R. Vol. III, pp. 55253. Although the County believes it is on firm constitutional footing with its actions, it sought
through the resolution to avoid further controversy and conflict.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

The District Court granted the County's summary judgment motion. First, it dismissed
Buckskin's federal taking claim for failure to plead § 1983. It then dismissed Buckskin's
remaining claims as untimely under the four-year statute oflimitations. In dictum, the District
Court rejected some of the County's other defenses. Other defenses were not addressed.

4 The Affidavit of Cynda Herrick in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment ("Herrick Aff. ") is an
exhibit to the Clerk's Record on Appeal.

5

IDIFA refers to the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act ("IDIFA"), Idaho Code §§ 67-8201 to 67-8216.
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In response to Buckskin's Motion/or Reconsideration/Amendment (R. Vol. III, p. 513),
the District Court explained that The Meadows is one project subject to a single CUP governing
all phases, that the substantial impairment of Buckskin's property was apparent as to all phases
from the outset, and that the cause of action for all phases therefore accrued at once when this
obligation first became apparent. The District Court further ruled that, in any event, Buckskin's
request for declaratory relief as to future phases 4, 5, and 6 was mooted by Resolution 11-6. The
District Court did not comment on the County's alternative argument that claims as to such·
future phases are not yet ripe. R. Vol. III, p. 577.
The merits of Buckskin's lawsuit (whether the Development Agreements were a
permissible means of addressing inadequate infrastructure or illegal taxes) is not now before the
Court. 6 Indeed, the County has been careful to reserve that question. 7 This case was disposed of
on the County's motion which was limited to specified defenses. Valley County's Brie/in

Support o/Motion/or Summary Judgment (R. Vol. I, p. 38). Notwithstanding anything the
District Court may have said in its decision, the merits of this case have never been briefed,
argued, or presented. If the County's statute of limitations and other defenses are rejected, the
County is prepared to, and must be afforded an opportunity to address the legality of its actions.
The County is not hiding from the merits. The County should prevail on the merits. The
County simply elected to frame its summary judgment motion on the basis of defenses that it

6 The "merits" were addressed by the County only in the context of its argument that the payments were
voluntary and therefore were not a taking. The "merits" of whether the road fees were an illegal tax in the ftrst place
has never been presented or addressed by the County until this brief.
7 "But there is no need to determine whether the Conditional Use Permit ('CUP') or the preliminary
Development Agreement, proposed Capital Contribution Agreement, [mal Capital Contribution Agreement, and/or
Road Development Agreement (collectively 'Agreements') at issue here imposed illegal taxes. The question
presented in the pending motion is whether Plaintiffs proposed and/or entered into the Agreements without
objection, accepted the CUP without complaint, avoided opportunities to raise the issue administratively, and waited
too long to challenge." Valley County's Reply Brief in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment at 1 (R. Vol. III, p.
449).
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thought would more easily dispose of the matter. Notwithstanding the County's reservation, the
District Court commented on the merits. Accordingly, it is now wise for the County to address
the subject, as it has in section VIII at page 40. We leave it to the Court to determine whether it
is necessary or appropriate to reach those merits now.
III.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

For the convenience of the Court, the key facts are set out in a time1ine attached to this
brief as Appendix A. The appendix notes where each of the key documents may be found in the
record. It also explains some minor discrepancies as to dates, none of which are of consequence.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON ApPEAL

In addition to the issues identified in Appellants' Brief, the County identifies these issues:
1. Was Buckskin's federal claim properly dismissed?
2. Was there no taking in any event because Buckskin's action was voluntary?
3. Did Buckskin fail to exhaust its administrative and judicial remedies?
4. Should attorney fees be awarded to Valley County?
ATTORNEY FEES ON ApPEAL

The County seeks reversal of the denial of attorney fees by the District Court. It also
seeks attorney fees on this appeal. The basis of the County's claims and its objection to
Buckskin's claim for attorney fees is set out in section X at page 46.
ARGUMENT

I.

BUCKSKIN'S FEDERAL TAKING CLAIM WAS IMPROPERLY PLED, UNRIPE UNDER
WILLIAMSON COUNTY, AND, IN ANY EVENT, UNTIMELY.

Buckskin pled its takings claim under both the federal and state constitutions. Buckskin's
federal claim is not properly before the Court because (1) Buckskin failed to bring the claim
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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 8 and (2) even if it had done so or were excused from doing so, the
federal claim is subject to a two-year statute oflimitations,9 which it clearly missed. 10 In
addition, Buckskin's suit fails both ofthe specialized ripeness tests established by Williamson
County.II

81t is well settled in the Ninth Circuit that so-called Bivens actions (after Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents ofFed. Bureau ofNarcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971» brought directly under the U.S. Constitution are
impermissible where a § 1983 action is available. Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City ofLos Angeles, 973 F.2d 704,705 (9th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1081 (1993); Martinez v. City ofLos Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1382 (9th Cir 1998);
Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City ofMorgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651,655 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S.
1041 (2004 and 2005) (two petitions for certiorari denied).
9 Federal law dictates which statute oflimitations is applicable to federal claims and when that statute will
begin to run. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387-88 (2007); McCabe v. Craven, 145 Idaho 954, 957, 188 P.3d 896,
899 (2008). All § 1983 actions are subject to the state's statute oflimitations for personal injury (aka torts). Wilson
v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985). On numerous occasions, Idaho courts have applied Wilson and held that
Idaho's two-year statute oflimitations (Idaho Code § 5-219(4» applies, regardless of the nature of the § 1983 claim.
McCabe v. Craven, 145 Idaho 954, 957, 188 P.3d 896,899 (2008); Osborn v. Salinas, 131 Idaho 456, 458, 958 P.2d
1142,1144 (1998); Idaho State Bar v. Tway, 128 Idaho 794, 798, 919 P.2d 323,327 (1996); Mason v. Tucker and
Assoc., 125 Idaho 429, 436,871 P.2d 846,853 (Ct. App. 1994); Herrera v. Conner, 111 Idaho 1012, 1016, 729 P.2d
1075, 1079 (Ct. App. 1987); Henderson v. State, 110 Idaho 308, 310-11, 715 P.2d 978,980-81 (1986).
Moreover, courts have held that even if a Bivens action were available, the personal injury statute of
limitations applies in any event. Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 864 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1988) (direct takings claim
subject to two-year statute); Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Bieneman in Ninth Circuit
in non-takings case). Thus, application of the two-year statute oflimitations to the federal claims is inescapable.
10 Under federal law, the statute of limitations begins to run when the constitutional wrong becomes or
should have become apparent. "Federal law, however, determines when the state limitations period begins for a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A federal claim is generally considered to accrue when the plaintiff 'knows or has
reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action. '" Norco Construction, Inc. v. King County, 801 F .2d
1143,1145 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). Ignorance of the right to sue is no excuse. "Her tardiness therefore
was due not to the lack of a viable cause of action, but rather to an ignorance of her right to sue. Such ignorance is
not a legally sufficient excuse for a delay in filing a claim." Moore v. Exxon Transportation Co., 502 F. Supp. 583
(E.D. Vir. 1980) (dealing with tardy amendment of complaint; statute oflimitations applied by analogy; not barred
by laches due to lack of prejudice). "The phrase 'reasonably should have been discovered' refers to knowledge of
the facts upon which the claim is based, not knowledge of the applicable legal theory upon which a claim could be
based." BHA Investments, Inc. v. City ofBoise ("BHA 11"),141 Idaho 168, 174, 108 P.3d 315, 321 (2004) (in
context of notice required under Idaho Tort Claims Act). Although the federal claim would not have yet been ripe in
federal court under Williamson County, it was plainly ripe in state court under San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and
County ofSan Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 346 (2005) ("With respect to those federal claims that did require ripening
[that is, those claims barred from federal court under Williamson County], we reject petitioners' contention that
Williamson County prohibits plaintiffs from advancing their federal claims in state courts."). If the federal claim is
ripe in state court, it follows that the statute of limitations is running-and has now run.
II These are not traditional Article III or prudential ripeness tests, by the way, but special tests for federal
takings claims. Frankly, they sound more like exhaustion, but the Supreme Court has made clear that they are not.
Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 193.
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First, the claim must be ripe in the sense that the would-be plaintiff has availed itself of
all opportunities to obtain relief at the administrative level. This is referred to as the "final
decision" requirement. 12 Second, the plaintiff must utilize available state judicial remedies for
inverse condemnation. By failing to bring a timely state inverse condemnation action, the
plaintiff forfeits its federal taking claim. 13 For the reasons set out in the footnotes, Buckskin fails
both the "final decision" and the "state remedies" tests. The District Court dismissed the federal
claim on the basis of failure to plead § 1983, without addressing the others. Memorandum
Decision at 4 (R. Vol. III, p. 489).
II.

BUCKSKIN'S STATE LAW CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY BUCKSKIN'S FAILURE TO
SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW.
A.

The County's decisions concerning Buckskin's application were
appealable under LLUPA.

Since 1975, the Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA") has authorized judicial review
of certain permitting decisions-including CUPs and final plats-identified in Idaho Code
§§ 67-6519 and 67-6521(1).14 LLUPA, in tum, references and relies on the judicial review
provisions of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act ("IAPA"), Idaho Code § 67-5279(3).

12 While Williamson County dealt with the failure to seek a variance, the holding is equally applicable to
Buckskin's failure to question the County's CIP or request approval without a development agreement. In other
words, plaintiffs must raise and press their objections with the local government in a timely and meaningful way in
order to set up their claim that the exaction is involuntary. Buckskin did just the opposite. It actually proposed these
conditions in its own CUP application. Accordingly, there is no "final decision" in the sense of Williamson County.
13 Although Buckskin filed a state inverse condemnation action (this very lawsuit), it filed too late. It
should have appealed under LLUP A within 28 days. Idaho Code §§ 67-6519(4) and 67-6521(1)(d). Even if a
collateral action outside of LLUP A is permissible, it should have filed its collateral action within four years. By
failing to file a timely takings action under state law, it forfeited its federal taking claim, too. "[W]hile the
Williamson County requirements typically reveal a claim to be premature, they may also reveal that a claim is barred
from the federal forum. The Williamson County 'ripeness' requirements will never be met in this case, because the
state statute of limitations has run on Pascoag's inverse condemnation claim. By failing to bring its state claim
within the statute of limitations period, Pascoagforfeited its federal claim." Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v.
Rhode Island, 337 F.3d 87, 95 (1st Cir. 2003) (citations omitted, emphasis original).
14 References in this brief will be made to the language of the statute in effect at the relevant time prior to
its amendment last year, 2010 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 175. Neither the 2010 amendment nor the Court's decision in
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As a result, Buckskin was required to file a petition for judicial review within 28 days of
the final decision ofthe County. Idaho Code §§ 67-6519(4), 67-6521 (1)(d). Instead of
appealing, Buckskin signed the Capital Contribution Agreement on the same day the CUP was
issued.
B.

Judicial review is the exclusive means to challenge a decision under
LLUPA.

This Court has held repeatedly that judicial review under LLUP A is the exclusive
procedure for challenging a decision to grant or deny a permit where review is provided under
LLUP A. In Bone v. City ofLewiston, 107 Idaho 844, 693 P.2d 1046 (1984), the plaintiff brought
a petition for declaratory judgment and an application for a writ of mandate instead of filing an
appeal from the denial of rezoning application. The Court admonished the plaintiff for trying to
"bypass" the statute declaring that LLUP A "is the exclusive source of appeal for adverse zoning
actions." Bone, 107 Idaho at 848, 693 P.2d at 1050. The Court explained:
We find § 67-5215(b-g) [the former judicial review
provisions of lAP A incorporated by LLUP A] to be a complete,
detailed, and exhaustive remedy upon which an aggrieved party
can appeal an adverse zoning decision. We also find that the
legislature's intent in outlining the scope of review and the bases
upon which a court may reverse a governing body's zoning
decision to be clear.

Bone, 107 Idaho at 847-48,693 P.2d 1049-50.
The Court reached the same result in Curtis v. City o/Ketchum, 111 Idaho 27, 720 P.2d
210 (1986). There, a subdivision applicant missed the deadline for filing a LLUP A appeal and
instead brought an inverse condemnation action against the City. The Court rejected the
collateral action, noting that Curtis' constitutional arguments could have and should have been

Giltner Dairy v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 633,181 P.3d 1238, 1241 (2008) changed the availability of
judicial review for CUPs and fmal plats. Both were reviewable before and remain reviewable today under LLUP A.
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raised in a timely judicial review under LLUPA. Curtis, 111 Idaho at 32-33, 720 P.2d at 215216 (the reference to the former 60-day deadline corresponds to today's 28-day deadline).
Similarly, this Court held in Regan v. Kootenai County, 140 Idaho 721, 725, 100 P.3d
615, 619 (2004), that the Regans "had improperly bypassed the exclusive source of appeal" by
suing the county for declaratory judgment concerning the interpretation of the county's land use
ordinance. This Court went on to hold that "[t]he Regans' failure to exhaust their administrative
remedies deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over their claim for declaratory
relief." Regan, 140 Idaho at 726, 100 P.3d at 620.
The exclusivity of judicial review also arises in areas of the law besides land use
decisions under LLUPA. In Cobbley v. City of Challis, 143 Idaho 130, 133-34, 139 P.3d 732,
735-36 (2006), this Court held that a petition for judicial review pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 40-208 (the public road statute) is the exclusive means to challenge a county's decision
concerning the validation of a road. Citing Bone, this Court reiterated that, when provided,
statutory judicial review proceedings are exclusive remedies.
We are not aware of an Idaho case applying this principle in the context of impact fees,
but courts in other jurisdictions have done so. In Sold, Inc. v. Town of Gorham, 868 A.2d 172
(Maine 2005), the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine considered a declaratory judgment action
brought by developers who had paid impact fees under an allegedly unconstitutional and illegal
ordinance. The Court held that the action was barred by the plaintiffs' failure to challenge the
city's approval oftheir subdivisions, which included the payment of the impact fees as a
condition, within 30 days as provided under state law. "When the time to file an appeal expired,
the conditional approvals, including the impact fee requirements, became final, and were not
subject to challenge." Sold Inc. at 176 (citation omitted).
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Similarly, in James v. County ofKitsap, 115 P.3d 286 (Wash. 2005), the Washington
Supreme Court addressed claims from developers who sought refunds of impact fees paid during
the time that the county's ordinances were not in compliance with state law. In James, the
county appealed from a summary judgment that awarded the developers more than three million
dollars in refunds arguing, inter alia, that the developers' claims were barred by their failure to
challenge the fees within 21 days of when the permits were issued, as required under
Washington's Land Use Petition Act ("LUPA"). The James Court agreed with the county.
"[W]e find that the imposition of impact fees as a condition on the issuance of a building pennit
is a land use decision and is not reviewable unless a party timely challenges that decision within
21 days of its issuance." James at 292. The Court rejected the developers' argument that the
superior court had original jurisdiction to hear their claims:
The Developers here were provided, by statute, with
several avenues to challenge the legality of the impact fees
imposed by the County and comply with the procedural
requirements under chapter 82.02 RCW and LUP A. ... However,
rather than complying with either of these procedures provided by
statute, the Developers waited almost three years before
challenging the legality of the impact fees imposed by the County.
The Developers have not complied with the procedures provided
under LUP A and RCW 82.02.070(4) and are barred under LUPA
from challenging the legality of the fees imposed.
James at 293-94. The James court went on to describe the public policy considerations that
supported limiting challenges to land use decisions to the procedures available under the statute.
As we stated in [Chelan County v.] Nykreim, this court has
long recognized the strong public policy evidenced in LUP A,
supporting administrative finality in land use decisions. 146
Wash.2d at 931-32,52 P.3d 1. The purpose and policy of the law
in establishing definite time limits is to allow property owners to
proceed with assurance in developing their property. Additionally,
and particularly with respect to impact fees, the purpose and policy
of chapter 82.02 RCW in correlation with the procedural
requirements of LUP A ensure that local jurisdictions have timely
notice of potential impact fee challenges. Without notice of these
RESPONDENT/CRoss-ApPELLANT'S BRIEF
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challenges, local jurisdictions would be less able to plan and fund
construction of necessary public facilities. Absent enforcement of
the requirements under chapter 82.02 RCW and LUP A, local
jurisdictions would alternatively be faced with delaying necessary
capacity improvements until the three-year statute oflimitations
for challenging impact fees had run.

James at 294. Buckskin's lawsuit is the perfect illustration of why this policy is needed.
Based upon these authorities from Idaho and elsewhere, the rule is indisputable-if a
procedure for judicial review of a decision has been created by the legislature, then that
procedure is the exclusive means to challenge that decision (absent exceptions not applicable
here), and a court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over a collateral attack. Because
judicial review under LLUPA was Buckskin's exclusive means of challenging the County's
decisions, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Buckskin's civil action.
C.

Buckskin may not avoid LLUPA judicial review by contending that it
is not challenging the approvals themselves, or that this lawsuit is a
challenge to LUDO.

Buckskin may argue that its collateral attack is permissible because it is not challenging
the approvals themselves. Yet a simple review of the Complaint and undisputed facts shows that
the claims arise from, and are a direct challenge to, the decisions made by the County with
regard to the approval of Buckskin's applications for development. 15 The Court cut through a
similar diversionary fog in Curtis, 111 Idaho at 32-33, 720 P.2d at 215-16: "The heart of
appellant's case is that the city's application of its zoning ordinances to appellant's property has

15 Buckskin specifically refers to the condition of approval imposed by the County that required a written
agreement to mitigate traffic impacts. Complaint, ~ 10, R. Vol. I, p. 3. Buckskin alleges ill the Complaint that the
County "illegally required Buckskin to enter illto a Capital Contribution Agreement and Road Development
Agreement solely for the purpose of collectillg an impact fee." Complaint, ~ 22, R. Vol. I, p. 5. Further, ill the
prayer for relief, Buckskin asks the Court to declare that "Valley County's use of the Capital Contribution
Agreement and Road Development Agreement as a condition of approval to collect monies from Plailltiffs for their
proportionate share of road improvement costs attributable to traffic generated by their development is a disguised
impact fee and is therefore illegal." Complaint, R. Vol. I, p. 6. The staff reports, meetillg minutes, and the CUP
itself all reflect that a condition of approval is that the Development Agreements receive approval from the Board of
County Commissioners. Herrick Aff., Exhs. 5,6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11.
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resulted in a taking of his property by inverse condemnation.... Appellant's arguments are
nothing more than a challenge of the city council's quasi-judicial action denying his subdivision
application. As such, the express provisions ofl.C. §§ 67-6519, -6521(d), limit appellant's
remedy to seeking judicial review of the city council's action pursuant to I.C. § 67-5215(b)-(g)."
Nor can Buckskin credibly contend that its lawsuit is really a constitutional challenge to
the Land Use Development Ordinance ("LUDO"). First, such a claim is not found in the

Complaint. Second, LUDO itself does not mandate (or even address) the fees contemplated
under the CIP and the Development Agreements. Buckskin points to a sentence in the ordinance
containing the words "impact fees." But the ordinance is talking about something entirely
different. LUDO states: "The Commission may recommend to the Board impact fees as
authorized by Idaho Code Section 31-870 for any PUD proposal." Appellants' Brief at 4
(referencing R. Vol. II, p. 298). Idaho Code § 31-870 authorizes the imposition "fees for
services" in which the "fees collected pursuant to this section shall be reasonably related to, but
shall not exceed, the actual cost of the service being rendered." This describes the ordinary,
garden-variety service fees that, as the Court held in Brewster v. City ofPocatello, 115 Idaho
502,505, 768 P.2d 765, 768 (1988), fall within the police power and are not illegal taxes. Thus,
the County's actions challenged by Buckskin were "as applied" actions, not ones mandated by
LUDO's reference to "impact fees." In short, LUDO has nothing to do with this lawsuit.

D.

Exceptions to the exhaustion requirement do not apply here.

Buckskin may also seek to hide behind the two exceptions to the requirement of
administrative exhaustion: "(a) when the interests of justice so require, and (b) when the agency
acted outside its authority," KMST, LLC v. County ofAda, 138 Idaho 577, 583, 67 P.3d 56, 62
(2003). Neither applies here.
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By the way, the law of exhaustion requires litigants to utilize available administrative
remedies before seeking judicial relief. This is codified in the lAP A at Idaho Code § 67-5271.
What we are talking about here is Buckskin's obligation to utilize judicial remedies under
LLUP A. However, the law of administrative exhaustion is sometimes applied in the context of
failure to pursue available judicial review. E.g., Regan. Accordingly, to be on the safe side, we
address the exceptions here.

(1)

Exhaustion exception 1: Plaintiffs cannot meet the "interests
of justice" exception.

The "interests of justice" exception requires Buckskin to demonstrate that it will suffer
irreparable harm if exhaustion is required. Park v. Banbury, 143 Idaho 576, 581, 149 P.3d 851,
856 (2006). Buckskin fails this test. Buckskin could have raised these same issues in a timely
petition for judicial review of the County's actions. Instead, Buckskin waited for years, only
objecting after the money was spent for its benefit and it is too late to reverse course. No public
policy is served by encouraging such delinquent behavior. Likewise, Buckskin's claims as to
future phases of The Meadows are mooted by Resolution 11-6. Simply put, there is no showing
of any potential irreparable harm and therefore no reason to excuse Buckskin from the
requirement to seek judicial review.

(2)

Exhaustion exception 2: The "outside the agency's authority"
exception does not apply.

A review of the cases shows that this exception typically applies only to facial challenges
to ordinances and statutes l6-which this action is not. Even if the "outside the agency's

16 "Our disposition of this case makes it unnecessary for us to address appellant's constitutional claims.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies!§ generally required before constitutional claims are mised." Service
Employees Int'l Union, Local 6 v. Idaho Dep't ofHealth & Welfare, 106 Idaho 756, 762, 683 P.2d 404, 410 (1984)
(emphasis supplied). Although the opinion does not say what constitutional claims were mised, the dissent shows
that they involved fact-based, "as applied" equal protection claims, not facial challenges. Likewise, the Court noted
in Palmer v. Bd. of County Comm 'rs ofBlaine County, 117 Idaho 562, 564, 790 P.2d 343,345 (1990): "This Court
has frequently announced that except in unusual circumstances parties must exhaust their administrative remedies
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authority" exception does apply to "as applied" challenges like this one, however, it does not
matter because the County acted within its planning and zoning authority. This is illustrated by
the decision in American Falls Reservoir Dist. No.2 v. IDWR, 143 Idaho 862, 872, 154 P.3d
433,443 (2007).17 Thus, if an agency acts entirely outside its regulatory authority (for instance,
if a county sought to rule on the validity of an applicant's water rights) then the action could be
challenged without exhaustion. But where the governmental entity has regulatory authority over
the subject matter and the only question is whether it has exercised that authority lawfully, then
exhaustion is required.
The Sold, Inc. court considered this same issue. Maine law recognizes the same
exception to the exhaustion requirement for government actions that are "beyond the jurisdiction
or authority ofthe administrative body to act." Sold, Inc., 868 A.2d at 176. In that case, the
court found that the imposition of impact fees as conditions of approval was within the
jurisdiction and authority of the city, even in the face of statutory and constitutional challenges.

before seeking judicial recourse." No exception applied because "[hJere, there is no challenge to the validity of
Ordinance 77-5." This, too, suggests that the exception applies only to facial challenges. Another example is found
in White v. Bannock County Comm'rs, 139 Idaho 396, 80 P.3d 332 (2003). In White, the Court rejected an end run
around LLUP A's judicial review requirements by a neighbor challenging approval of an asphalt plant. Rather than
appeal, White filed suit raising various "as applied" due process challenges. The county sought dismissal for failure
to exhaust. The Court stated: "We also conclude that the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine do not
apply to the present case where the question of a conditional use permit 'is one within the zoning authority'S
specialization and when the administrative remedy is as likely as the judicial remedy to provide the wanted relief. ",
White, 139 Idaho at 402, 80 P.3d at 338 (citing Fairway Development Co. v. Bannock County, 119 Idaho 121, 124,
804 P.2d 294,297 (1990». The obvious conclusion is that when parties to a land use matter wish to challenge an
"as applied" decision of a governing board (as opposed to the ordinance itself) they must first utilize the
administrative procedures including judicial review.
17 In American Falls, the Court explained that trying to figure out whether an agency acted outside its
authority is essentially a circular argument (except in those rare cases where the agency had no authority over the
subject matter at all). Thus, a plaintiff may not avoid the exhaustion requirement merely by alleging that the
agency's action is unlawful and therefore beyond the scope of its authority. That would be circuitous, and
exhaustion would never be required when challenging agency action. Rather, for the exception to apply, the agency
must have acted on a matter entirely outside of its bailiwick. In such cases, no circuitous analysis is required to
determine it acted outside the scope of its authority. The American Falls Court concluded: "Thus, the exception for
when an agency exceeds its authority does not apply unless the CM Rules are facially unconstitutionaL" American
Falls, 143 Idaho at 872, 154 P.3d at 443.
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Here, there is no dispute that the Planning Board had
authority to consider, approve, and attach conditions to approvals
of subdivisions. Plaintiffs only challenge one condition of the
subdivision approval as inconsistent with statutory and
constitutional requirements. Such challenges are the essence of
matters that must be brought pursuant to Rule 80B to question
whether the particular action of a municipal administrative agency
is consistent with the requirements oflaw.

1d. Here, the County had authority to issue CUPs and to impose conditions, so exhaustion is
required and Buckskin's collateral attack is barred.

III.

BUCKSKIN'S STATE CLAIMS ARE UNTIMELY UNDER IDAHO'S FOUR-YEAR
STATUTE OF LIMITATION.

Even if this Court were to determine that Buckskin was not bound to seek judicial review
within 28 days and could instead bring a collateral challenge to the County's action, such a claim
would be subject to the statute oflimitations. Lawsuits alleging inverse condemnation or other
fonus of relief involving an alleged taking are subject to Idaho's residual four-year statute of
limitations. Idaho Code § 5-224; Harris v. State, ex reI. Kempthorne, 148 Idaho 401, 404, 210
P.3d 86, 89 (2009). The only question is when the clock starts to run. Ifthe cause of action
accrued before December 1, 2005, the state claims are barred.

A.

Buckskin's cause of action accrued and the statute began to run when
it became apparent that Buckskin would be required to contribute
toward road improvements.

Buckskin contends the statute did not begin to run until it wrote a check on December 15,
2005, thus beating the statute by a few days. But the statute was triggered well before that.
This Court has consistently explained that a claim for a regulatory taking accrues and the
statute of limitation runs from "the time that the full extent of the plaintiff s loss of use and
enjoyment of the property becomes apparent," that is, when the plaintiff "was fully aware of the
extent to which Canyon County interfered with his full use and enjoyment ofthe property."

McCuskey v. Canyon County Comm'rs (HMcCuskey 11"), 128 Idaho 213, 217, 912 P.2d 100, 104
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(1996) (quoting Intermountain West, Inc. v. Boise City, 111 Idaho 878,880, 728 P.2d 767, 769
(1986) and citing Tibbs v. City o/Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 671, 603 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1979)18)
(emphasis supplied).
In Harris, 147 Idaho at 405, 210 P.3d at 90, this Court ruled that the statute oflimitations
on inverse condemnation ran from the day the plaintiffs were compelled to enter into a mineral
lease with the state, not the time they made payments to the state under the lease. "We affirm the
district court's determination that the full extent ofthe Harrises' loss of use and enjoyment of the
property became apparent when they entered into the Mineral Lease. At that point in time, the
impairment constituted a substantial interference with their property interest because they signed
an agreement promising to pay royalties and rents on the sand and gravel. Therefore, the
Harrises are barred from recovering under their inverse condemnation claim by I.C. § 5-224."

Harris, 147 Idaho 405, 210 P.3d 90 (emphasis supplied).
Similarly, this Court has said that the statute begins to run "when the impairment was of
such a degree and kind that substantial interference with Wadsworth's property interest became
apparent." Wadsworth v. Idaho Department o/Transportation, 128 Idaho 439, 443, 915 P.2d 1,
5 (1996) (emphasis supplied).
The County's alleged substantial interference with Buckskin's property interests was
apparent at each of the following events:

18 The Tibbs case is often referenced in cases dealing with the statute of limitations and the date of accrual.
The Tibbs Court stated: "The actual date of taking, although not readily susceptible to exact detennination, is to be
fixed at the point in time at which the impairment, of such a degree and kind as to constitute a substantial
interference with plaintiffs' property interest, became apparent." Tibbs, 100 Idaho at 671,603 P.2d at 1005.
Curiously, however, the Tibbs case did not involve the statute oflimitations. The case was an action for inverse
condenmation involving an expansion of an airport, where the impact on the neighboring property was gradual. The
question in the case was how and when to value the decline in property value. The reference to accrual arose in the
context of fixing the dates for detennination of "the difference in the value of the property before and after the
destruction or impairment of the access." Tibbs, 100 Idaho at 670, 603 P.2d at 1004.
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•

On April 1, 2004, Buckskin filed its application for a CUP, which included as
Appendix C a proposed Development Agreement - The Meadows at West
Mountain ("Proposed Development Agreement") and a Proposed Capital
Contribution Agreement. The paragraph on "Road Improvements" in the Capital
Contribution Agreement says, "Developer agrees to pay a road impact fee as
established by Valley County. Currently this fee has been set by the Valley
County Engineer at $1,870.00 per equivalent single-family residential unit."
(Emphasis supplied.) Appendix D to the Application is an "Impact Report." It
states: "Currently this fee has been set by the County Engineer at $1,870.00 per
equivalent single-family residential unit. Road impact fees may be offset by
developer contribution of right-of-way or in-kind construction." (Emphasis
supplied.) Herrick AjJ., Exh. 3.

•

On May 17, 2004, the Valley County Planning and Zoning Commission ("P&Z")
recommended approval of the CUP. The minutes ofthat meeting recited that Joe
Pachner, speaking for applicant, said: "The traffic report completed by the
Tamarack Resort has been incorporated into the design of this project. The
impact ofthis project using this roadway is incorporated and they will pay their
proportional impact fees." Likewise, Pat Dobie, the County Engineer said: "[A]
fee of approximately $1,800 per residential unit will be required to construct the
roads." Herrick AjJ., Exh. 6.

•

On May 21, 2004, Buckskin submitted a revised application for CUP. It
contained the same proposed agreements as were included in the initial
application on April 1, 2004. Herrick AjJ., Exh. 4.

•

On June 10,2004, the P&Z issued Findings and Conclusions recommending
approval of the revised CUP application. The recommendation included this
condition number 12: "The Development Agreement and Capital Contribution
Agreement must receive approval from the Board of County Commissioners."
Herrick Aff., Exh. 7.

•

On July 12, 2004, the Board of County Commissioners voted to approve the
revised CUP. The minutes contain a discussion of Capital Contribution
Agreement and acceptance of the conveyance of right-of-way in lieu of cash.
Herrick Aff., Exh. 10.

•

On July 14, 2004, Buckskin's CUP was issued by the P&Z (following approval
by the County). Herrick Aff., Exh. 11.

•

On the same day, Buckskin signed the Capital Contribution Agreement setting out
the payment requirements (a right-of-way conveyance with a credit for future
phases). Paragraph 2 provided: "Currently this amount has been calculated by
the Valley County Engineer to be $461.00 per average daily vehicle trip generated
by the Project." As shown on Exhibit B, this equates to $1,844 per lot. Herrick
Aff., Exh. 1. Based on this, the District Court concluded that "the Plaintiffs
certainly knew the essential facts" by this date. R. Vol. III, p. 490.
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•

On September 9,2004, the P&Z approved the final plat for Phase 1. The minutes
state at page 3: "They also discussed the maintenance of private roads, the
dedication of public right of way, and that $1,844 per lot will be paid toward road
maintenance." Herrick Aff., Exh. 14.

•

On October 25, 2004, the Board of County Commissioners approved the final plat
for Phase 1. The County expressly accepted Buckskin's conveyance of the rightof-way as provided in the Capital Contribution Agreement. 19 Herrick Aff., Exh.
15. This is the date on which the District Court said the statute oflimitations ran
'[a]t the very latest." R. Vol. III, p. 490.

•

On September 26, 2005, the parties executed the Road Development Agreement
for Phases 2 and 3. One of the recitals states: "Developer has agreed to
participate in the cost of mitigating these impacts by contributing its proportionate
fair share of the cost of the needed improvements identified in the Agreement and
listed on the attached Exhibit A." The fee set at $247,096, less the credit from
Phase 1, requiring a cash payment of$232,160. This was based on $1,844 per
single family lot and $1,383 per apartment unit. HerrickAff., Exh. 2.

Buckskin's knowledge that it would be required to contribute toward road improvements
is evident in the very application it filed on April 1, 2004, which included a proposal to make
such payments. Indeed, Buckskin has admitted that it included the proposed agreements with its
application because it understood such mitigation was required. Pachner Aff., ~~ 4-8 (R. Vol. II,
pp. 281-84.). The admission is repeated in Buckskin's Appellants' Brief "The CIP requires that
developers pay a fee .... In this case, Buckskin was required to pay an impact fee for each
phase as each phase came up for final plat." Appellants' Briefat 6, 13.
If that were not enough, the substantial interference was apparent when the CUP was
issued on July 14, 2004, the same day that Buckskin signed the Capital Contribution Agreement.
Finally, as Judge McLaughlin noted, the substantial interference was apparent, at the very latest,
on October 25, 2004, the day the right-of-way was conveyed to the County. (This conveyance
was made for Phase 1, but carried over for Phases 2 and 3 via a credit.)

19 The minutes of the approval at page 2 recite as follows: "accept the dedication of public right-of-way
along Norwood Road and West Roseberry Road; ... agree that the Development Agreement that is [in] place
covers off-site road improvement costs for this phase; ...." Herrick 4ff., Exh. 15.
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In this case, the amount of the payment per unit set in the Development Agreements
signed by the parties was the same as called for in Buckskin's original application on April 1,
2004. But even if that were not the case, it would make no difference. The statute runs even
though plaintiff does not know "the full extent of his damages." McCuskey II, 128 Idaho at 217,
912 P.2d at 104. Indeed, in Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 79, 644 P.2d 1333,1338 (1982), the
Court said the statute ran on the date of a meeting between the parties at which time there was
"recognition ofthe severity of the problem." R. Vol. III, p. 490.
The fact that payment for Phases 2 and 3 occurred after December 1, 2005 (less than four
years before the Complaint was filed) does not change that fact that the impairment of
Buckskin's property was apparent long before that. Buckskin's insistence that the statute does
not begin to run until payment is made cannot be reconciled, for example, with Harris, 147
Idaho at 405,210 P.3d at 90, in which this Court ruled that the statute oflimitations on inverse
condemnation ran from the day the plaintiffs were compelled to enter into a mineral lease with
the state, not the time they made payments to the state under the lease.
Given this clear and unwavering line of authority, it is perplexing why Buckskin would
make a statement like this: "Merely being aware that a taking of one's property is imminent
does not rise to the level of 'substantial interference' nor is it sufficient to start the clock on the
statute of limitations." Appellants' Brief at 15. The opposite is true.

B.

Buckskin's cause of action arose simultaneously as to all claims and
all phases of the project.

Buckskin insists that "each payment should have been considered a separate taking with
separate accrual dates." Appellants' Briefat 12. It says the District Court's rejection ofthis
assertion "is in error because it flies in the face of the doctrine of ripeness." Appellants' Brief at
14. Here is the problem that Buckskin perceives: "When the impact fees were paid on Phase 1

RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF
1332095_34,10915·9

Page 25

no other payments were made and therefore no other takings had occurred. Had Buckskin sued
for 'just compensation' for all future fees it had yet to pay, that lawsuit would have been
dismissed because the claims would not have been ripe." Appellants' Brie/at 14.
This argument goes nowhere. First, Buckskin is not suing, even now, for reimbursement
(i.e., inverse condemnation) as to future fees it has yet to pay. That would be absurd. Instead, it

is suing, quite sensibly, for reimbursement as to past fees and a declaration that it is not required
to pay additional fees in the future.
This is how it always works in exaction cases. Exaction cases are different than physical
takings. In a physical taking, the plaintiff cannot stop the taking from occurring. Governments
have the right to take property for public purposes. Accordingly, the plaintiff must wait until the
property is taken and then seek just compensation. But when the exaction is illegal (e.g., where a
condition of approval is that the plaintiff is required to pay an allegedly illegal tax), the plaintiff
can sue at once to stop the exaction before it happens. (This is one reason the accrual date for
physical takings is different.)
In Buckskin's case, payments have been made on three phases, but not for the remaining
phases. Buckskin is free to plead its request for backward-looking relief and forward-looking
relief as separate "claims" if it likes. But that does not change the fact that these "claims" are
joined at the hip. Both "claims" arise out of the same CUP and the same alleged constitutional
vice-the imposition of illegal taxes. Accordingly, they became ripe (and therefore accrued) at
the same time.
Apparently Buckskin believes that its request for declaratory relief as to future fees was
ripe in 2009 when it filed this lawsuit. But if it was ripe in 2009, then it must have been ripe all
along. Nothing changed since 2004 to make it more ripe in 2009. (If anything, it is less ripe due
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to Resolution 11-6.) The fact is, this suit was ripe when Buckskin submitted its application
and/or received the CUP and executed the Development Agreements. It should have been filed
within four years of that (if not within 28 days of CUP issuance).
There are, by the way, occasions when a facial taking challenge can be mounted even
before an application for development is filed. Such was the case with Mountain Central Bd. of
Realtors, Inc. v. City ofMcCall, Case No. CV 2006-490-C (Idaho, Fourth Judicial Dist., Feb. 19,

2008) (reproduced in Appendix B). This case was filed by a group of affected realtors and
developers before any ofthem had any particular project in play. They had to show that they had
standing, of course, and that was an issue. But once standing is established, lawsuits such as
Mountain Central based on a facial challenge to an unconstitutional ordinance are certainly ripe.

This reference to Mountain Central should not be misunderstood as a suggestion that suit
necessarily must be filed the moment an illegal ordinance is enacted. This is the "absurd result"
that Buckskin warns of in Appellants' Brief at 36. But it will not occur. In order to establish
standing and to meet other threshold requirements, a plaintiff must establish that the ordinance
affects its property or legal interests in some concrete way resulting in particularized injury.
Martin v. Camas County ex reI. Bd. ofComm'rs., 150 Idaho 508, 512-13, 248 P.3d 1243, 1247-

48 (2011). In Buckskin's case, there was no facially unconstitutional ordinance, and Buckskin's
injury occurred on April 1, 2004, July 14, 2004, or "at the latest" October 25, 2004. 20

20 The Mountain Central case is different from the case at bar because it was a facial challenge. Despite
what Buckskin says, this case is an as applied challenge. The County may have had a practice of conditioning
approvals to require road fees, but that practice was not driven by or even authorized by ordinance. The CIP was not
adopted by ordinance, and LUDO's reference to "impact fees" was limited to lawful, statutorily authorized user fees.
(See discussion in section V.B at page 35). While the Mountain Central case arose in a different context, we
mention it here simply to show the plain error in Buckskin's assertion that a case challenging impact fees cannot be
ripe until payment is made on each phase.
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C.

The Court should not depart from precedent and apply a different
accrual standard.

Buckskin argues that the Court should depart from precedent because public policy
considerations favor a finding of separate accrual dates for each phase. Buckskin makes much of
the fact that the County updated its cost calculation for road improvements subsequent to the first
two Development Agreements. This is of no legal consequence, because it does not alter the fact
that it was apparent from the outset that Buckskin would have to pay something. Moreover, the
change in payment is moot, because of Resolution 11-6. Nor is there any basis for Buckskin's
contention that the County could raise the fees based on its "whim" (Opening Brief at 21). The
CUP and the agreements between the County and Buckskin are all premised on the CIP, which is
a highly technical, structured, and constrained approach to fee calculation upon which CUP
holders are entitled to rely. Buckskin could challenge any future final plat in the event the
County tried to impose a requirement inconsistent with the CIP framework (or with Resolution
11-6). In any event, the change in fees was no surprise to Buckskin. As noted in the bullet
points above in section IILA, Buckskin's own proposed agreement and the Development
Agreements it ultimately signed each contained a statement as to how the fee is "currently" set-

thus reflecting recognition that it could change. Everyone understood that the CIP was intended
as an ongoing, iterative process in which the status of infrastructure needs would be periodically
reviewed and the formula recalibrated reflecting the latest data.
As for public policy, the Legislature has expressed its view of public policy by enacting
the statutes of limitation (as well as time limits on judicial review). The public policy reflected
in that legislation, and in the Court's interpretation ofthose statutes, is a sensible one. This is
particularly so here where the local government has made substantial investments of resources.
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If reimbursements are ordered years after the fact, plaintiffs may receive something for nothing
while shifting the cost of their development to the taxpayer.
Next Buckskin urges the Court to scrap decades of settled law and adopt the "project
completion rule" from physical takings cases. Buckskin has switched course on appeal. Before
the District Court, Buckskin took the remarkable position that this is a physical taking case.
Plaintiffs 'Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 34. R.

Vol. I, p. 110. It has wisely abandoned that position on appeal, but nonetheless urges the Court
to change the law so that it may take advantage of the rules applicable to physical takings.
In C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. No.4, 139 Idaho 140, 143-44, 75 P.3d 194, 19798 (2003), this Court explained the simple policy reason for adopting the project completion
rule: "[T]he property owner was justified in waiting until the project was completed before
bringing suit for damages because until completion, there was no reliable method to determine
the extent of the damages." Obviously, that policy rule has no applicability here. Plaintiffs
certainly knew what their alleged "damages" were when they signed the Development
Agreements. Moreover, given that courts have the power to enjoin an unlawful exaction before

payment is made, there is no sense in waiting.
D.

Cases from other jurisdictions concerning payment of fees or taxes
are inapposite.

In support of its argument that its claims for refunds of the fees paid under the
Development Agreements did not accrue until such time as Buckskin actually tendered the funds

to the County, Buckskin discusses several cases from other jurisdictions in which the courts
ruled that the plaintiffs' claims accrued on the date that payment was made. These cases are
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unremarkable and inapplicable here. 21 The County recognizes that many claims arising from the
payment of allegedly unlawful taxes and fees accrue, for statute of limitations purposes, on the
date that the money is paid to the government. Buckskin stubbornly refuses to grasp that the
distinction between its claim and those cases is the date upon which the impairment became
apparent.

IV.

BUCKSKIN'S ACTION WAS VOLUNTARY WITHIN THE MEANING OF KMST.

The KMSTcase applied Williamson County in ruling that ACHD's action could not be
challenged under § 1983 because its decision was not a "final decision." This Court then went
on to say that even if ACHD's recommendation had been a final decision, it would not have
constituted a taking because the dedication was voluntary. In a pre-application meeting, ACHD
staff advised KMST that staff would recommend a requirement of a road dedication. In order to
move things along, KMST agreed to the dedication and included it in its application. This
proved fatal to KMST's taking claim.
KMST representatives included the construction and dedication of
Bird Street in the application because they were concerned that
failing to do so would delay closing on the property and
development ofthe property. KMST's property was not taken. It
21 In both Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County ofDuPage, 746 N.E.2d 254 (Ill. 2001) and Venture Coal Sales
Company v. u.s., 370 F.3d 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2004), the courts rejected plaintiffs' argument that the statute of
limitations did not begin to run until there was a court decision declaring the fee or tax to be illegal. That is
consistent with the holding in BHA II. In all three cases, the payments were actually made well beyond the
applicable statute oflimitations and there was simply no need to analyze whether the claim accrued any earlier.
Furthermore, all three of those cases, as well as Lowenberg v. Dallas, 168 S.W.3d 800 (Tex. 2005), Paul v.
City of Woonsocket, 745 A.2d 169 (R.I. 2000), and Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass 'n v. City ofLa Habra, 23 P.3d
601 (Cal. 2001), involved fees or taxes imposed via ordinance instead of a condition of approval of a land use
permit. As a result, in those cases there was no administrative process, no application of the ordinance, and no other
government action until such time as the fee or tax was actually paid. In the instant case, the impairment upon
Buckskin's property interest became apparent when the requirement to enter into the Development Agreements
(which Buckskin knew included contributions for road improvements) was imposed by the County.
The Howard Jarvis court distinguished a case nearly identical to this appeal, Ponderosa Homes, Inc. v. City
ofSan Ramon, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 26 (Ct. App. 2001), which involved a challenge to a traffic mitigation fee imposed in
connection with the approval of a subdivision. In Ponderosa, the claim accrued (both for purposes of the state
statute oflimitations and § 1983) when the fee was imposed rather than when it was paid, which was when the
development was conditionally approved by the city. The same result obtains here-Buckskin's claim accrued
when the impairment became apparent, which occurred more than four years prior to the filing of its action.
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voluntarily decided to dedicate the road to the public in order to
speed approval of its development. Having done so, it cannot now
claim that its property was "taken."

KMST, 138 Idaho at 582,67 P.3d at 61 (emphasis supplied) (internal quotations identifying
district court's language omitted). This language is significant because it shows that a
developer's action may be "voluntary" even when motivated by a desire to speed the processing
of its application. In other words, the Court was not talking about altruism. Rather, it spoke of
voluntary action in the sense of a calculated decision by the applicant to take the simplest path
forward even when that means paying money.
Buckskin's situation is indistinguishable from KMST's. Perhaps the developers of The
Meadows were not pleased with the idea of paying for road improvements benefiting their
property, but they did not say so and they certainly did not challenge the County's authority to
require such mitigation. One way or another, the County was responsible for ensuring that
adequate infrastructure would be in place to support the new development. Buckskin could have
simply waited until the County was able to raise the funds to build that infrastructure. Instead, in
order to speed the project forward, Buckskin elected to make contributions to the County
reflecting the project's proportionate share of the costs of the improvements. Having so elected,
Buckskin cannot now be heard to complain that the payments they agreed to make were illegal
taxes. This was the holding of the Idaho Supreme Court in KMST.
Buckskin attempts to distinguish its actions from those of the developers in KMST by
claiming that they believed that the County's ordinance (LUDO) mandated the Development
Agreements, and that County officials told them that road impact mitigation would be required.

R.Vol. I, p. 104. But that is no different from the situation in KMST. In that case, the developer
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agreed to the road dedication because he was told by ACHD staff that it would be recommended
as a requirement. KMST, 138 Idaho at 579,67 P.3d at 58?2
Buckskin's actions were plainly voluntary in this sense. Buckskin included an express
offer of mitigation contributions in its application and then agreed to slightly modified terms in
the Development Agreements. The terms of the Development Agreements are unambiguous.
They are plainly entitled "AGREEMENTS" and provide that the developer "agrees" to
participate in the cost of improving the roads near the proposed development. 23 Regardless of
what discussions mayor may not have taken place with County staff 24 and regardless of
Buckskin's understandings and assumptions, ifit were not true that the developer was voluntarily
agreeing to help pay for the improvement of the roads, then Buckskin should not have signed
documents saying that it agreed?5

22 Buckskin also claims that in 2004 it was "mislead [sic] into believing that Valley County could collect an
impact fee" by the LUDO Appellants' Briefat 20. Buckskin then quotes a statement from a Valley County
Commissioner in 2009 expressing concern over the legality of the road development agreements. These arguments
are specious. The LUDO plainly does not mandate contributions toward road improvements, and any debate
regarding the legality of the County's actions in 2009 only demonstrates the County's good faith efforts to address
this issue.
23 The Capital Contribution Agreement signed by Buckskin on July 14, 2004 contains this recital on page
1: "Developer has agreed to participate in the cost of mitigating these impacts by contributing its proportionate fair
share of the cost of the needed improvements .... " Herrick AjJ, Exh. 1. The Proposed Development Agreement
states at ~ 2.18 at page 4: "Development of the Property pursuant to this Development Agreement will also result in
significant benefits to Developer .... ", at ~ 2.19 at page 4: "Developer and the County have cooperated in the
preparation of this Development Agreement ....", and at ~ 2.20 at page 4: "The parties desire to enter into this
Development Agreement ...." Herrick AjJ, Exh. 3, Appendix C to the Application.
24 To the extent that Buckskin contends that entering into the Development Agreements was involuntary
because of alleged statements by County staff, this argument is without merit. Idaho case law and the County's
LUDO are clear that only the Board of County Commissioners has authority to make a final decision on such
matters. These facts are identical to the situation in KMST.

25 The recognition in KMST that voluntary actions do not give rise to takings is not undercut by the Court's
holding in BHA II, which held that plaintiffs are not required to pay under protest as a prerequisite to challenging an
unlawful tax. The BHA II case involved a transfer fee charged by the City of Boise on liquor licenses. The Court
ruled in a prior case, BHA Investments, Inc. v. City ofBoise ("BHA 1"), 138 Idaho 356, 357-58, 63 P.3d 482,483-84
(2004), that the City had no regulatory authority whatsoever with respect to the transfer ofliquor licenses. Only the
State has such authority. Id. BHA II involved two consolidated cases-the original BHA I case following remand
and a different case. In BHA II, the district court dismissed a claim by a different set of plaintiffs because they had
not paid the fee under protest. This was based on an old line of cases (e.g., Walker v. Wedgwood, 64 Idaho 285, 130
P.2d 856 (1942» holding that plaintiffs must pay taxes under protest to preserve the right to request a refund. The
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V.

BUCKSKIN'S REQUEST FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED.

A.

The claim for declaratory action is no different from the claim for
inverse condemnation and accrued at the same time

Buckskin believes that even if its inverse condemnation claim is barred as untimely, its
request for declaratory judgment on the same subject somehow survives. Buckskin says: "The
district court's ruling either ignores Count I of Buckskin's Complaint or it subsumes Buckskin's
illegal fee or tax claim within its inverse condemnation claim, and assigns to the illegal fee or tax
claim the same standard for accrual as for inverse condemnation." Appellants' Briefat 29. That
is exactly what the District Court did, and exactly what it should have done. Buckskin's
assertion that its request for declaratory relief is "wholly separate," Appellants' Brief at 29, from
its inverse condemnation claim is simply wrong. They are one and the same. Its assertion that it
"pleaded a claim for illegal fee or tax as an alternative to its inverse condemnation claim,"

Appellants' Briefat 30, makes no sense. If there has been a taking, the one and only reason is
that the contribution toward road improvements was an illegal tax. The "taking" and the "tax"
claims are one and the same. (See footnote 2 at page 7.)
An inverse "condemnation action" is nothing more than a handy description for this type

oftakings claim. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained:
The phrase "inverse condemnation" appears to be one that was
coined simply as a shorthand description of the manner in which a
landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property
when condemnation proceedings have not been instituted. ... The

Supreme Court reversed the district court on that point, ruling that the requirement that taxes be paid under protest
applies to lawful taxes, and is inapplicable in cases involving unlawful taxes. BHA II, 141 Idaho at 176, 108 P.3d at
323. In essence, the City of Boise tried to pull a fast one by saying, in essence, "OK, if our liquor license transfer
fee is really a tax as you claim, you should have paid it under protest." The Court did not buy it. The inapplicability
of BHA II is reflected in the fact that, in KMST, the Court noted one of the reasons that it was clear that plaintiff's
action was voluntary was because they did not pay the impact fees under protest. "[Plaintiff] did not request an
individual assessment of the amount of its impact fees; it did not appeal the calculation of the fees; and it did not pay
the fees assessed under protest. It simply paid the impact fees in the amount initially calculated." KMST, 138 Idaho
at 583, 67 P.3d at 62 (emphasis supplied).
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phrase "inverse condemnation," as a common understanding of
that phrase would suggest, simply describes an action that is the
"inverse" or "reverse" of a condemnation proceeding.
United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 255-57 (1980). Asking for declaratory relief in addition
to seeking recovery of money paid is simply a belt and suspenders form of pleading. They are
not separate causes of action. Ifno property has yet been taken, then the relief would corne
solely in the form of a declaratory judgment or perhaps an injunction. Whether you call this
"inverse condemnation" or a "duck" or a "goose" makes no difference. They all arise out ofthe
same facts and legal principles-the assertion the property has been taken or is about to be taken.
This Court has noted on more than one occasion that "[a]n inverse condemnation action
cannot be maintained unless an actual taking of private property is established." Covington v.
Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777, 780, 53 P.3d 828, 831 (2002). That may be, but in the case of
an allegedly unlawful exaction, the cause of action arises as soon as it becomes apparent that the
exaction will be imposed. Unlike physical takings, there is no need to wait for the money to be
paid and then seek a recovery. This is not a situation where the government has the authority to
take a person's property, and it is simply a question of paying for it. Here, Buckskin's allegation
is that the government had no authority at all to demand payments for road improvements. If
that is the case, it was a per se taking from the moment the County made clear that such payment
would be required as a condition of development. Indeed, this is why the district court declared
the City of McCall's impact fee ordinance invalid in Mountain Central.
Buckskin cites the case of Intermountain West, Inc. v. City of Boise, 111 Idaho 878, 728
P.2d 767 (1986) (whose facts are more fully explained in the prior case of Boise City v. Blaser,
98 Idaho 789, 572 P.2d 892 (1977)), noting that the Court evaluated two different accrual dates
for two claims. That is because there were two distinct claims. One was a tort claim based on
the City's failure to recognize that the developer was entitled to rely on a prior zoning certificate
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obtained from Ada County before the land was annexed. The second was a claim based on the
subsequent downzoning by the City after the annexation alleging that the downzone was so
severe as to constitute a regulatory taking. These are two entirely different governmental actions
by different governmental entities giving rise to two distinct causes of action. The case bears no
resemblance to the single CUP issued to Buckskin by the County.

B.

If the declaratory judgment claim is not otherwise barred, it is mooted

by Resolution 11-6.
As the District Court found, whatever right the County may have had under the CUP to
require road improvement payments for future phases was given away by the County when it
adopted Resolution 11-6. Buckskin notes that this was a resolution and not an ordinance.
Appropriately so. The CIP was not adopted by ordinance, it was not mandated by ordinance, and
no ordinance is required to abandon it. The resolution may not have the force and effect of a
law, and the County, presumably, could change it prospectively as to others. Nonetheless, the
resolution constitutes an unequivocal and binding waiver as to Buckskin. The County would
have no problem with the Court saying so in its opinion. Were the County to act inconsistently
with the assurances provided in the resolution, Buckskin could challenge such action under
LLUP A by appealing the final plat for future phases.
Buckskin insists that the threat of impact fees is still upon it because of the language it
quotes from the County's zoning ordinance, LUDO. This misrepresents the plain meaning of
that ordinance. See discussion in section ILC beginning on page 17. Despite having the words
"impact fee" appear in the ordinance, LUDO's reference to Idaho Code § 31-870 makes it clear
that there is nothing even arguably improper in the ordinance.

C.

If the declaratory judgment claim is not time-barred or moot, it is not

yet ripe.
Buckskin complains that Resolution 11-6 reserves the County's right to take into account
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its authority and obligation to consider the availability of adequate public services in considering
new applications for land developments. Rightly so, but in Buckskin's case the CUP has already
been issued arid the roads have now been built. Consequently, it difficult to see how anything
further could be required of Buckskin. 26 Nevertheless, Buckskin complains that "it is highly
questionable what, exactly, will be the subject of any such development agreement aside from
the payment of road impact fees." Appellants' Brief at 26. If that is so, it only demonstrates that
any claim based on future action by the County is not yet ripe. In the event that the County were
to insist on new exactions beyond its power, Buckskin would have a new, ripe, and timely claim
to make at that time. The law of ripeness makes clear that the Court should not entertain this
claim until facts develop showing that harm will be suffered. 27

VI.

COUNTIES HAVE AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS
OUTSIDE OF SECTION 67-6511A.

Buckskin raises an argument for the first time in its briefing on appeal that the County
lacked the authority to enter into the Development Agreements with Buckskin because Idaho
Code § 67-6511A provides the exclusive authority to enter into such agreements and it is limited
to agreements associated with rezoning actions. The simple answer is that section 67-6511A is
not the sole authority for local governments to enter into agreements respecting developments.
Development agreements have been around for a long time and are critical to implementing land

26 In another recent instance involving similar facts and a different developer, the County approved a new
phase with no development agreement at all in light of Resolution 11-6. This is too recent to be in the record, but
undersigned counsel represents this as true, and opposing counsel-who represents the developer-also knows it to
be true. We do not offer this observation as evidence, but merely illustrative of the fact that there is no telling what
may unfold, and that Buckskin is in no position today to claim harm is inevitable. Buckskin's statement that
"Resolution 11-6 essentially states that payment of such fees will be required for approval of any application due to
alleged impacts of the development," Appellants' Briefat 26, is simply not true, as the resolution shows.
27 Buckskin, by the way, makes a fair point in observing that if the County were to enact an IDIF Acomplaint ordinance, it may not apply that ordinance retroactively to previously filed applications for development.
The County has been so advised by its counsel, and there is no need for the Court to assume at this point that the
County will attempt to apply any future ordinance unlawfully. If and when that were ever to occur, affected parties
would have an opportunity to challenge it.
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use policy. For example, the development agreement in Sprenger, Grubb & Associates v. Hailey

("Sprenger Grubb 1"), 127 Idaho 576, 578-79, 903 P.2d 741, 743-44 (1995) had been in place
since 1973. The practical reality is that development agreements are used by local governments
and developers extensively throughout the State in virtually all contexts ofland use entitlements.
Buckskin's suggestion that the Legislature's recognition of development agreements in the
context of rezones thereby prohibits development agreements in any other context would tum the
world ofland use planning upside down.
In any event, this issue is raised too late. Buckskin never raised the issue with the
County. It does not appear in the Complaint or the Notice ofAppeal. It was not briefed below.
And it should not be considered by the Court. "[I]ssues not raised below but raised for the first
time on appeal will not be considered or reviewed." Whitted v. Canyon County Bd. ofComm'rs,
137 Idaho 118, 122,44 P.3d 1173, 1177 (2002).

VII.

BUCKSKIN'S CLAIMS ARE NOT CONTRACT CLAIMS AND ARE NOT SUBJECT TO
THE FIVE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

Buckskin tries to avoid application ofthe four-year limitations period by arguing that
Count 1 of its Complaint sounds in contract and is therefore subject to the five-year statute of
limitations in Idaho Code § 5-216. The allegations in the Complaint belie this assertion.
Nothing in Count 1 (or any other count) sounds in contract. Count 1 is entitled
"Declaratory Relief - Violation of State Law and State and Federal Constitutions." Paragraph 18
complains about the County's "practice" of imposing fees on developers. Paragraph 19
complains that the County has not complied with IDIF A and that money collected "amounts to
an unauthorized tax." Paragraph 20 also complains that monies collected "constitute an
unauthorized tax." Paragraph 21 complains that because of these violations, the County cannot
force "developers to pay monies under the guise of a Road Development Agreement and/or
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Capital Contribution Agreement." In other words, Buckskin's contention is the County's actions
are illegal in spite of the contracts, not because ofthe contracts. Moreover, none of the prayers
for relief involve either damages for breach or any request for invalidation of the agreements.
In sum, ignoring the words of its own Complaint, Buckskin now contends that Count 1

seeks declaratory relief that the development agreements are illegal and void. 28 This is simply
not so. Buckskin's contract theory is plainly an afterthought-an effort to re-cast the Complaint
in a way that was never intended solely to gain extra time under the statute oflimitations.
The District Court properly rejected such semantic gamesmanship and looked to the
nature of this case---which is plainly a takings case. It was on firm ground. "In determining the
nature of the actions for limitations purposes, it is the substance or gravamen of the action, rather
than the form of the pleading, that controls. In other words, in determining which statute of
limitations governs an action, the court looks to the reality and essence of the action, and not to
its name." 51 Am. Jur 2dApplication ofStatutes ofLimitation § 91 (2000)?9 Thus, the District
Court was correct in declining to apply the five-year statute because "this is simply not an action
based on a contract. It is an action based on inverse condemnation." Memorandum Decision (1)

Plaintifft' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (2) Defendant's Motion for Entry ofJudgment,
(3) Plaintifft' Motionfor Reconsideration/Amendment (4) Plaintifft' Motion To Disallow Costs

and Attorney Fees at 5 (R. Vol. III, p. 581).
Buckskin concedes that it has not pled breach of contract, but insists the statute is not

28 Buckskin similarly mischaracterized its Count 1 in its Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffi' Motion for
Reconsideration/Amendment at 6 (R. Vol. III, p. 520). This error was pointed out to Buckskin, yet Buckskin persists
in it before this Court.
29 Another example of the need to look past the plaintiff's characterization of the case to its true basis is
found in City ofMcCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009). In that case, the City sued its attorneys for
malpractice. It also included a claim for unjust enrichment, seeking return of the money paid to its attorneys. The
District Court dismissed the latter claim, stating, "Although styled as a claim of unjust enrichment, Count Six is
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limited to breach of contract. Yet it points the Court to not a single case supporting this
conclusion. What case law is out there does not support its position. The Idaho Court of
Appeals provided this helpful summary in 2008:
Pursuant to I.e. § 5-216, an action upon any contract, obligation or
liability founded upon an instrument in writing must be filed
within five years. A cause of action for breach of contract accrues
upon breach for limitations purposes.
Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 198 P.3d 740 (Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis supplied). This is
consistent with the black letter law on the subject:
The statute oflimitations begins to run in civil actions on
contracts from the time the right of action accrues. This is usually
the time the agreement is breached, rather than the time the actual
damages are sustained as a consequence of the breach.
51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation ofActions § 160 (2000) (emphasis supplied).
Buckskin's position is further weakened by the fact that it is alleging that there was no
valid contract. In Thompson v. Ebbert, 144 Idaho 315, 318,160 P.3d 754,757 (2007), the Court
found that the contract statute of limitations was inapplicable because the contract at issue was
void ab initio. In other words, if Buckskin's theory of the case is that there was no valid
contract, this is not an action "upon a contract." Instead, this is an action based on alleged
constitutional and statutory violations, and is therefore subject to the four-year statute.
Buckskin seems to believe that if a case's facts involve a contract, the lawsuit must be a
suit "upon a contract." Not so. For example, the case of Mason v. Tucker and Assoc., 125 Idaho
429,871 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1994), involved a single transaction (a court reporter's failure to
prepare an accurate transcript) and various claims based on that event: § 1983, fraud,
negligence, tortuous interference, and breach of contract. The Court carefully applied a different

clearly premised upon legal malpractice." Buxton, 146 Idaho at 663, 201 P.3d at 636. The Idaho Supreme Court
upheld that portion of the District Court's decision.
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statute of limitations to each claim, applying the contract statute of limitations only to the claim
for breach of contract. The fact that a contract governed the entire action of the court reporter
did not tum the rest of the case into a case "upon a contract."
An analogy might illustrate. If someone made a contract to kill another person and then

did so, the resulting homicide could give rise to a criminal prosecution and a wrongful death
action-but not a suit "upon a contract." The problem with the killing is not that the contract
was breached, but that it was carried out. In the case at bar, Buckskin's contention that this is a
case "upon a contract" is no less misplaced.
Even if the Court were to find the five-year statute applicable, this does not buy enough
time to save Buckskin's lawsuit. The cutoff date for the five-year statute is December 1,2004.
As detailed in Appendix A, numerous triggering events occurred prior to that date.

VIII.

THE COUNTY'S ORDINANCE WAS AUTHORIZED BY SECTION 67-6412 AND IS
THEREFORE NOT AN ILLEGAL TAX.

As the County noted in its trial brief, "Plaintiffs' lawsuit also fails on the merits." Valley

County's Brief in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment at 1 (R. Vol. I, p. 42). As noted
above, however, the question of whether the subject road payments constitute an illegal tax has
never been presented. Ifreached, however, Buckskin's claim fails on the merits.
Buckskin's lawsuit is based on the well-settled principle that Idaho is a Dillon's Rule
state. Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158, 160, 610 P .2d 517, 519 (1980). Accordingly, the power to
tax (found in Idaho Const. art. VII, § 6) is separate from the police power, is not self-executing,
and must be expressly conferred by the Legislature. Idaho Building Contractors Ass 'n v. City of

Coeur d'Alene (HIBCA "), 126 Idaho 740, 890 P.2d 326 (1995); Brewster v. City ofPocatello ,
115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765 (1988). If there is no express authorization, then the courts must
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determine whether the regulatory exaction is a legitimate fee or an illegal tax. If there is an
express authorization, then it is constitutionally permissible no matter what it is called. 3o
One instance in which the Legislature has granted the power to tax is IDIF A. IDIF A
authorizes local governments, if they so elect, to enact ordinances for the imposition of
development impact fees on new developments. IDIFA contains no mandate to do so, however.
The statute is complex and technical, and relatively few Idaho governments have undertaken the
expense of enacting an IDIF A-compliant ordinance.
The absence of an IDIF A-compliant ordinance is determinative of nothing, because not
all obligations imposed on developers outside of IDIF A are illegal taxes. Notably, LLUPA
expressly authorizes local governments to impose conditions on developers seeking a CUp.31
One type of expressly authorized condition is one "[r]equiring the provision for on-site or off-site
public facilities or services." Idaho Code § 67-6512(d)(6).32 That, of course, is exactly what
Valley County did in the condition it imposed on Buckskin and other developers.
In other words, Idaho Code § 67 -6512(d)( 6) is the express authorization that turns what
might otherwise be an illegal tax into a permissible conditional requirement, thus meeting the
constitutional standard articulated in IBCA and Brewster. In essence, Idaho Code

30 Buckskin's repeated references to IDIFA suggest that it may misperceive this as a statutory rather than
constitutional issue. But it is not IDIF A that causes some impact fees to be illegal taxes. If they are illegal, they
would be illegal even if IDIF A did not exist. The thing that makes them illegal, if they are illegal, is the non-selfexecuting nature of the grant of taxation authority in Idaho's Constitution. To put it differently, IDIFA does not
occupy the field for establishing legal taxes. There are numerous examples of legal taxes that are not imposed
pursuant to IDIF A, e.g., ad valorem taxes.
31 The terms "conditional use permit" and "special use permit" are synonymous under LLUP A. Idaho
Code § 67-6512(a).
32 Another type of condition expressly authorized by the Legislature is this: "Requiring mitigation of
effects of the proposed development upon service delivery by any political subdivision, including school districts,
providing services within the planned jurisdiction." Idaho Code § 67-6512(d)(8). In addition, governments may
impose fees for services. Idaho Code §§ 31-870 and 63-1311. All of these things may be done without enacting an
ordinance pursuant to IDIF A.
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§ 67-6512(d)(6) is a mini-IDIFA of very limited scope. 33
This makes sense. Local governments have a responsibility to ensure that development
does not proceed in the absence of adequate public facilities and services. Indeed, this is
fundamental to the land use planning process. As noted above, governments have the discretion
to deny or delay development approvals where there is inadequate infrastructure to support them.
Idaho Code §§ 67-6512(a), 67-6512(d)(2). Rather than bar all new development until funds for
infrastructure become available from general revenues, grants, or otherwise, section 67-6512
provides another option. It allows the local government to condition the development in a way
that allows that infrastructure to be provided by the developer.
This is nothing new. Section 67-6512 predates IDIFA (which was enacted in 1992) and
dates back to the enactment ofLLUPA in 1975. Nothing in IDIFA overrides this authority. One
might ask, however, if this authority predates IDIFA, why did the Legislature enact IDIF A? The
answer is simple. Section 67-6512 is very narrow. It is available only to developers who
approach the city or county seeking a CUP. IDIF A is far broader, authorizing local governments
to impose impact fees on anyone who subdivides property, pulls a building permit, or does
anything else requiring approval.
When the Legislature enacted IDIFA, it was cognizant ofLLUPA and took steps, where
it deemed appropriate, to ensure that governments did not use their LLUP A powers to sidestep
IDIFA. It amended LLUPA's provision dealing with subdivision to say: "Fees established for
purposes of mitigating the financial impact of development must comply with the provisions of
chapter 82, title 67, Idaho Code [IDIFA]." Idaho Code § 67-65l3. In contrast, it did not amend

33 Because section 67-6512 is limited to "public facilities and services," it would not save the affordable
housing ordinances overturned by districts courts in Mountain Central Ed. ofRealtors, Inc. v. City ofMcCall, Case
No. CV 2006-490-C (Idaho, Fourth Judicial Dist., Feb. 19,2008) (reproduced in Appendix B) and Schaefer v. City
of Sun Valley, Case No. CV-06-882 (Idaho, Fifth Judicial Dist., July 3,2007) (reproduced in Appendix C).
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or restrict the corresponding power to impose conditions on CUPs found in section 67-6512(d).
In short, the County's crp and the conditions it imposed on Buckskin and others are
expressly authorized by the Legislature in section 67-6512(d) and therefore are not illegal taxes.

IX.

EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES DICTATE DISMISSAL OF BUCKSKIN'S LAWSUIT.

Buckskin benefited substantially from its arrangement with the County. As a result of the

crp and the Development Agreements, Buckskin did not have to wait for the County to find the
money elsewhere to build roads. Those roads are now in place, and The Meadows continues to
benefit from an improved regional road network. Despite those benefits, Buckskin says it should
get its money back.
Equitable principles, however, prevent Buckskin from having its cake and eating it, too.
Buckskin should not prevail in its attempt to profit from what amounts to reneging on an explicit
agreement regarding a fair and reasonable way to finance the road improvements that enabled
The Meadows to be built. But for the Development Agreements, Buckskin and other developers
would most likely be sitting on undevelopable land served by dirt or gravel roads. To allow
them to enter agreements, receive their permits, make payments without objection or appeal,
watch the roads be built, sell lots, and then sue years later is inequitable.
First, equity abhors the unjust enrichment of one party at the expense of another, and it is
a general principle oflaw that one should be required to make restitution of benefits received,
retained, or appropriated from another. 66 Am. Jur. 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 8
(2001). Allowing Buckskin to recover the payment it made to the County would result in the
unjust enrichment of Buckskin at the expense of the County. See Barry v. Pacific West

Construction, Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 103 P.3d 440 (2004) (general contractor was unjustly
enriched by uncompensated work of subcontractor).
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Second, someone who perfonns substantial services for another without an express
agreement for compensation ordinarily becomes entitled to the reasonable value of those
services. 66 Am. Jur. 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 37 (2001). Even ifthere had been
no agreement between the parties, the fact remains that the County perfonned the substantial
service of designing, financing, and building the road network to serve The Meadows. Under
this theory of quantum meruit, the County is entitled to the reasonable value of the work and
material provided to Buckskin. The contributions under the Development Agreements represent
Buckskin's share of the reasonable value of this work, and should not be refunded.
Third, courts in equity can use "promissory estoppel" to enforce a promise made without
consideration when the following elements are present: (i) the detriment suffered in reliance on
the promise was substantial in an economic sense; (ii) the substantial loss to the promisee acting
in reliance was, or should have been, foreseen by the promisor; and (iii) the promisee must have
acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the promise made. Rule Sales and Service, Inc. v. Us.

Bank National Association, 133 Idaho 669, 674, 991 P.2d 857,862 (Ct. App. 2000). Put another
way, "the doctrine requires only that it be foreseeable to the promisor that the promisee would
take some action or forbearance in reliance upon the promise and would thereby suffer
substantial loss if the promise were to be dishonored." Rule Sales, 133 Idaho at 675,991 P.2d at
863. In this action, by trying to get its money back, Buckskin is essentially claiming a right to
take back its promise to pay. But the County already relied on that promise and, reasonably and
justifiably, suffered a substantial economic detriment in response. To allow Buckskin to
dishonor its promise now would be a great injustice.
Fourth, the equitable principle of laches provides that a plaintiff is estopped from
asserting the alleged invasion of his rights when: (i) the plaintiff delayed in asserting these rights;
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(ii) the plaintiff had notice and an opportunity to institute a suit; (iii) the defendant did not know
that the plaintiff would assert such rights; and (iv) the delayed suit would injure or prejudice the
defendant. Finucane v. Village o/Hayden, 86 Idaho 199,205,384 P.2d 236, 240 (1963). All
those tests are met here. Allowing Buckskin to recover the road construction costs will result in
a windfall to Buckskin and an unfair detriment to the County. The undisputed facts in the record
show that Buckskin did not raise any objection to any action of the County. Buckskin claims
that it did not object because it assumed the County's actions were lawful. That is, in effect, an
admission that it did not question the County's actions, and, in any event, it is insufficient to
overcome the equities favoring the County.
Finally, the equitable concept of "waiver" applies in an action for breach of contract and
states that "a party who accepts the other's performance without objection is assumed to have
received the performance contemplated by the agreement." 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 640
(2001). "A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage [and
the] party asserting the waiver must show that he has acted in reliance upon such a waiver and
reasonably altered his position to his detriment." Dennett v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21, 26, 936 P.2d
219, 224 (Ct. App. 1997). Here, Buckskin has breached its contract with the County by bringing
this lawsuit. The principles behind the concept of waiver instruct that Buckskin cannot now
complain that the terms of the Development Agreements were unacceptable. Until this suit was
filed, Buckskin did not characterize the Development Agreements as establishing an illegal
impact fee. Had Buckskin done so, the County could have taken Buckskin's arguments into
account and responded accordingly before committing resources. Waiver principles should
prevent Buckskin from backing out of its Development Agreements.
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Finally, the County's adoption of Resolution 11-6 demonstrates clearly its bona fides.
Given all of the County's defenses and the legitimacy of the actions under Idaho Code
§ 67-6512, it could have pressed Buckskin and other developers to continue making payments
under existing contracts. Instead, it took the high road and said it will not do so.
X.

THE COUNTY IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES; BUCKSKIN IS NOT.

A.

The standards under Idaho Code § 12-117 and 12-121 are functionally
identical.

The County seeks attorney fees under both Idaho Code § 12-117 and Idaho Code
§ 12-121.

34

Under Idaho Code § 12-117, prevailing parties in civil actions involving a state

agency or local government and a private entity as adverse parties may recover their costs and
attorney fees where they can show that the non-prevailing party acted "without a reasonable
basis in fact or law." Idaho Code § 12-121 reads like a pure prevailing party statute but is
modified by Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(1), which states: "Provided, attorney fees under section 12121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it,
that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation."
This Court has essentially equated the two standards. 35 Accordingly, the discussion of fee
awards under Idaho Code § 12-117 will include some case law arising under section 12-121.
B.

The County is entitled to fees under Idaho Code 12-117.

This case satisfies the threshold requirements in Idaho Code § 12-117: the case is a civil
action involving a governmental entity and private entities as adverse parties. If the County

34 There is a line of authority holding that, if section 12-117 is available, it is exclusive and section 12-121
is unavailable. Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch School Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 635, 226 P.3d 1277, 1282
(2010). On other occasions, the Court has applied both sections 12-117 and 12-121. E.g., Total Success I and Total
Success II. Therefore, we have included the claim under section 12-121 out of an abundance of caution.

35 Total Success Investments, LLC v. Ada County Highway Dist. ("Total Success II',), 148 Idaho 688, 695,
227 P.3d 942,949 (Ct. App. 2010); Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC ("Total Success
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prevails, all that remains to establish is that Buckskin pursued the matter without a reasonable
basis in fact or law.
Where parties ignore settled precedent, as Buckskin did here, they are subject to a
mandatory award of fees under section 12-117. Unlike other attorney fee provisions, section 12117 does not entail an exercise of discretion. Fischer v. City ofKetchum, 141 Idaho 349, 356,
109 P.3d 1091, 1098 (2005). This Court has ruled that failure to address controlling appellate
decisions and failure to address factual or legal findings of the district court equates to pursuing
litigation without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Waller v. State ofIdaho, Dep 't ofHealth and

Welfare, 146 Idaho 234, 240, 192 P.3d 1058, 1064 (2008). Other examples of parties paying the
price for ignoring settled precedent are found in Excell Construction, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of

Commerce and Labor, 145 Idaho 783, 793, 186 P.3d 639,649 (2008) (attorney fees awarded
against agency that failed to apply a case whose relevant facts were "virtually
indistinguishable"), and Gallagher v. State, 141 Idaho 665, 669, 115 P.3d 756, 760 (2005)
(attorney fees may be awarded when "the law is well-settled,,).36 In Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v.

County ofKootenai, 151 Idaho 405, 415, 258 P.3d 340, 350 (2011), the Court awarded attorney
fees against the plaintiff noting: "Allied misrepresented controlling precedent in its briefing, and
also presented multiple arguments in its briefing that it abandoned at oral argument. Further,
Allied unreasonably pursued this appeal even though it failed to comply with the notice
requirement of the ITCA and the bond requirement ofLC. § 6-610." Although the case at bar
does not involve the Idaho Tort Claims Act, Buckskin pursued this action and this appeal in

I"), 145 Idaho 360, 372,179 P.3d 323, 335 (2008); Jenkins v. Barsalou, 145 Idaho 202, 207,177 P.3d 949,954
(2008); Nation v. State, Dep't of Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 194, 158 P.3d 953, 970 (2007).
36 The same holds true under Idaho Code § 12-121. "Attorney fees are awardable if an appeal does no
more than simply invite an appellate court to second-guess the trial court on conflicting evidence, or if the law is
well settled and appellant has made no substantial showing that the district court misapplied the law." Johnson v.
Edward, 113 Idaho 660, 662, 747 P.2d 69, 71 (1987).
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defiance of settled authority on the statute of limitations, KMST, exhaustion, and a host of federal
defenses (which Buckskin challenged vigorously below but did not appeal).
This Court has often described the purpose ofthis statute as follows: "First, it serves 'as
a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency action; and [second, it provides] a remedy for
persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless
charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies never should have made.'" Reardon v. Magic
Valley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 118,90 P.3d 340,343 (2004) (brackets original).

In State ofIdaho v. Estate ofJoe Kaminsky, 141 Idaho 436, 439-40, 111 P.3d 121, 124-25
(2005), the Court quoted the dual purposes of the statute recited above and declared that both
were violated. "The action was groundless because the Department clearly waited too long to
present its claim.... It is appropriate to discourage such action. Further, the Department's
action placed an unjustified financial burden on the Estate." Id. The same can be said here.
Ironically, the very case that hung Buckskin on the statute oflimitations, McCuskey II,
also compels an attorney fee award. The McCuskey II Court dismissed the inverse condemnation
claim as time barred on the basis of prior precedent, concluding therefore that fees should be
awarded. 37 The precedent is now all the more settled and the basis for a fee award against
Buckskin is even more compelling.
C.

The County may also be eligible for an award under Idaho Code
§ 12-121.

For all the reasons cited above, the Court should award attorney fees under section
12-121 as well. The County acknowledges that, as a practical matter, the section 12-121 claim

37 The fee award in McCuskey II was made under Idaho Code § 12-121, not § 12-117, which, at the time,
was a one-way street and did not allow counties to obtain fee awards against private parties. As noted in section
X.A at page 46, however, the standards under the two statutes are essentially identical.
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does not appear to add anything to the analysis or to the relief. 38 The County includes this
seemingly redundant claim for purposes of completeness in the event that, for some reason,
section 12-117 were found to be unavailable.

D.

Buckskin is not entitled to attorney fees.

Even if this Court were to overturn the District Court, Buckskin would not be entitled to
fees because the County has defended this suit fairly and reasonably.
CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, the Court should affirm the District Court's dismissal of this suit.
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of December, 2011.
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38 The only difference between the statutes of which the County is aware is that section 12-121 entails an
exercise of discretion. Consequently, on appeal, the reviewing court reviews section 12-121 claims under an abuse
of discretion standard. In contrast, appellate courts freely review section 12-117 claims. Total Success II, 148 Idaho
at 695, 227 P.3d at 949.
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Appendix A TIMETABLE OF KEy EVENTS
Date
4/1/2004

Document or
Event
Buckskin's
Application for
CUP (all
phases)

5/17/2004

P&Z hearing on
CUP (all
phases)

5/21/2004

Buckskin's
revised
Application for
CUP (all
phases)
P&Z Findings
and
Conclusions (all
phases)

6/10/2004

Comments

Comments on Date

This application included as Appendix
C a Proposed Development
Agreement and a Proposed Capital
Contribution Agreement. The
paragraph on "Road Improvements" in
the Capital Contribution agreement
says "Developer agrees to pay a road
impact fee as established by Valley
County. Currently this fee has been
set by the Valley County Engineer at
$1,870.00 per equivalent single-family
residential unit. ... " Appendix D to the
Application is an "Impact Report." It
states: "The original estimated cost to
complete this roadway improvements
was $6,000,000.00. The development
is proposing in the Development
Agreement to a road impact fee as
established by Valley County.
Currently this fee has been set by the
County Engineer at $1,870.00 per
equivalent single-family residential
unit. Road impact fees may be offset
by developer contribution of right-ofway or in-kind construction."
P&Z voted to recommend approval of
CUP. Joe Pachner speaking for
applicant: "The traffic report
completed by the Tamarack Resort
has been incorporated into the design
of this project. The impact of this
project using this roadway is
incorporated and they will pay their
proportional impact fees."
Pat Dobie, County Engineer: "[A] fee
of approximately $1,800 per residential
unit will be required to construct the
roads."
This revision contained the same
proposed agreements as were
included in the initial application on
April 1,2004.

The application is dated
"March 2004" on the
footer. The cover letter
is dated 3-24-2004. The
acceptance by Jack
Charters is dated 3-292004. It is also signed at
the end by Jack Charters
on 3-29-2004.
According to the
County's planning staff,
it was actually filed on 41-2004.

Recommended Condition #12: 'The
Development Agreement and Capital
Contribution Agreement must receive
approval from the Board of County
Commissioners."

The date is unclear on
the copy in the record.
We have confirmed that
the correct date is 6-1004.
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Affidavit of
Cynda
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Support of
Motion for
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is an
exhibit to
the Clerk's
Record on
Appeal.)

Herrick
Aff., Exh. 6
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Date
7/12/2004

Document or
Event
County
Commissioners'
hearing on CUP
(all phases)

7/14/2004

CUP issued by
P&Z (all
phases)

7/14/2004

Capital
Contribution
Agreement Phase 1

9/9/2004

P&Z hearing on
application for
final platPhase 1

10/25/2004

County
Commission
hearing on
application for
final platPhase 1

12/1/2004

Cutoff date for
5-year statute
of lim itations

Comments
Voted to approve the CUP. The
minutes contain a discussion of Capital
Contribution Agreement and
acceptance of the conveyance of rightof-way in lieu of cash.
Although approved by the Board of
County Commissioners on 7-12-2004,
it is the P&Z which issued the CUP
document. Condition #12 reads: "The
Development Agreement and Capital
Contribution Agreement must receive
approval from the Board of County
Commissioners." The District Court
noted this in his decision, concluding
that "the Plaintiffs certainly knew the
essential facts" by this date. R. Vol. III,
p.490.
Applies to Phase 1. Fee set at
$79,292 (based on $1,844 per single
family lot). Paid via a conveyance of
right of way with a credit for
overpayment. One of the recitals
states: "Developer has agreed to
participate in the cost of mitigating
these impacts by contributing its
proportionate fair share of the cost of
the needed improvements identified in
the Agreement and listed on the
attached Exhibit A."
Approved final plat for Phase 1.
Minutes state at page 3: "They also
discussed the maintenance of private
roads, the dedication of public right of
way, and that $1,844 per lot will be
paid toward road maintenance."
Approved final plat for Phase 1.
Minutes state at page 2: "[A]ccept the
dedication of public right-of-way along
Norwood Road and West Roseberry
Road; ... agree that the Development
Agreement that is in place covers offsite road improvement costs for this
phase." This is the date on which the
District Court said the statute of
limitations ran '[a]t the very latest." R.
Vol. III, p. 490.
If the 5-year statute applies and the
cause of action accrued prior to this
date, the lawsuit is untimely.
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Comments on Date

Appeal
Record
Herrick
Aff., Exh.
10

The CUP is dated 7-142004.
It was recorded on the
same day as Instrument
#285115.
The text of the CUP
states that the effective
date is 7/13/2004.

Herrick
Aff., Exh.
11

Executed by Buckskin
on 7-14-2004. Executed
by County on 7-26-2004.
Recorded as Instrument
285976 on 8-4-2004.
The text of the
agreement gives the
date as 7-12-2004.

Herrick
Aff., Exh. 1

Herrick,
Aff., Exh.
14

Herrick
Aff., Exh.
15
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Date
9/8/2005

9/26/2005

9/26/2005

12/1/2005

12/15/2005

12/1/2007

12/1/2009

Document or
Event
P&Z hearing on
application for
final platPhases 2 & 3

County
Commission
hearing on
application for
final platPhases 2 & 3
Road
Development
Agreement Phases 2 & 3

Cutoff date for
4-year statute
of limitations
Check for
$232,160
payable to
Valley County
Cutoff date for
2-year statute
of limitations
Com plaint filed

Comments

Comments on Date

Approved final plat for Phases 2 & 3.
Minutes state at page 8: U[A] letter
from Parametrics, Valley County
Engineer, dated September 8, 2005,
stating that Valley County will require a
Road Development Agreement .... "
Approved final plat for Phases 2 & 3.
Minutes explain at page 5 that this was
originall presented as phase 2, but is
now for phases 2 & 3.

One of the recitals states: "Developer
has agreed to participate in the cost of
mitigating these impacts by
contributing its proportionate fair share
of the cost of the needed
improvements identified in the
Agreement and listed on the attached
Exhibit A." Fee set at $247,096, less
credit from Phase 1, requiring cash
payment of $232,160. Based on
$1,844 per single family lot and $1,383
per apartment unit. (The agreement
references Phase 2, but this was
renamed Phases 2 & 3. See Minutes
of 9-26-2005.)
If the 4-year statute applies and the
cause of action accrued prior to this
date, the lawsuit is untimely.
Payment made for Phases 2 & 3 per
Road Development Agreement.

Appeal
Record
Herrick
Aff., Exh.
17

Herrick
Aff.,
Exh.18

Executed by all parties
on 9-26-2005. Text
recites 9-26-2005 as
date of agreement.
Recorded as Instrument
#300816 on 9-27-2005.

Herrick
Aff., Exh. 2

Herrick
Aff., f[ 23

If the cause of action accrued prior to
this date, the federal claim is untimely.

R. Vol. I, p.
1

11/7/2011

Resolution 11-6

The resolution states in section 2: "In
order to avoid litigation costs and
uncertainty, the Board of County
Commissioners will no longer enter
into Road Development Agreements
calling for the payment of fees or other
contributions for off-site road
improvements until such time as the
County adopts an IDIFA-compliant
ordinance, unless the permit holder
voluntarily and expressly waives any
objection thereto."
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R. Vol. III,
pp.552-53
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lTNTAINCENTRAL BD. OF REALTORS V. CITY OF MCCALL

Appendix B MO (./,

a_No

,

l.

Inr.t.Mo~~_

F.""4 .<IO'Q'IM

IN 1'.BE DISTRICT COURT Ol' THE Fou.am JTJDICIAL DISTRICT OF

<1

THE STATB OP IDAHO, IN AND paR. 1l!5 COUN'tY OFVAlLBY
4

5

MODmAn-l CBNTRALBOARJ) OF
R.EALTOIlS. lNC., an Idaho N01'l .Pro:fit
ColpOn.tion.
N

7

PJa.!nti'f't

Case No. CV 2006-4g0..c

e
VB.

1.0

CITY OF MCCALL. I. rnunicl~al OOl'poration of
the Slate of Ids.hos

MBMORANDtlM t'lSCiSION
AND O.RDlm GIt.ANrINO
PLa'INl"lP.P'S MO'l'IONFOR.

ST.1MMA'RY 1Ul>GM2NT

11

1.2

l'

Dav.(d O:ranan. and Victor Villegas, 1br the PabJtiW
WUliam A. MolTOW. Cb:ia101'her D. Gabbert. mll~ Jm S. HoJlnica, for the Oefen&ut

;1'1

'rbi, matter came before the Court fo1' oral argument

1.*

Otl.

July 13. :!007, regarding 1?la.il\illr

Motion for Summlllj" Judgment. Oa.luly 14, 2007, Plail1tifftlled a Noth:o ofSuppJementaI A~lthoril:y.

:1.11

.FACTUAL AND PR.OCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The faats rand prccodutal hWOlY of this case were set fot1h in more detail in the Court's

:n.
22

p~ously .filed Memorandum

:u

-Summar)' Judgment on the issue ofstand

;)4

two ordintAnr;es passed ill liebnlluy of 2006 by thel City of McCall: Ordiqanee

DeOlSiQ.rt and Older DM)'inS the Defucbmt City oEMc;CaIl's Motlou

ill,. Bs9ant:ially. PhUutlffis challensm,g ~ cOIlstltll11onallty 0
~o.

819 whieh i6
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1
2

1I0llsing fee ordinance. I Such otdLnances were enacted to ensure a.Ild provide for at'J'oTdable houslng in
lile City ofMcCall.
Vnder Ord!naD.ce No. 8t9, aU appl!cstions for n~ sltbdiv~ioDS ere Yequhed to submit

1

iJ;JalUBionary housing plan Pl'oviding tl:I.t\t twenty petcellt (20%) of tots and houses be permanently cit;d-

restricted as affordable c:ommun1ty housing as a preco7ldition to plat approval. Spccifiar.lly, OrdiUl1IIlle
No. 819 is desigu.ed to prQVide for "COlm1Iunity ho\,JS!ng to bill affo~ble to City of McCall housobolds
7

with incomes In categorIes mand IV as definecun subseotloll 2, Commun1ty HousiJla by Income." C'

8

of McCall OtdilUltlCC No. 819, f !l,1.10(A). These eatcsortes define moderate to middle income.
10

C~SOry

mluclwies howeholds With incOllles greater than one h_ad peI'CCIlt (1000h) bllt not m01'

than Otte hund.rod twenty percent (120%) oftbc Valley Co'Ul'lty median b01.1Sehold In.cOll1e. Category 'N

includes hot.lsellolcls with incomes greater than one hundroci 1Want)' percent (120'*) but not UJ,ote than
one hundred sixty percent (160%) of the Valley CountymedUm housebold income.

There CU'C 10m' ways by which an. applicant for subdivWion approval may ll1eet the rcquireme.a:
of OrdiJ18llC1l No. 819: (1) the first priorlty is to pmnalleJ1tly deed .cestrlcc tWenty parcen1 (20%) of the
16

land. within \he Inlbdivisfon for aft'ol'dable holJll1q, called "C!n~sitetl housing; (2) the second priority ls to
coustrIlOt such holJ$ing "of.f-sitc" fi'om 1he proposed subQivisionf (l) the thi..td Plio:1ty is to COD,vey la.n

19

•

and (4) lbe fo\.1rthpriorlty is to pay a fee io.lieu of the previoUS three Op6QlUl.

20

a\

I AlthouQh o~~~nanae No. 8~9 ~s :a~erred to aa ~ne ~na1us1Qnary zQn~n9 op.d1nan~e ~n
Ordin!lnce No. 820 is Iohlll l~n~age O%I.UnanQ~, the Court gene:t'aJ,ly relie:t's ~fl t.h~$
aec1aiQn to both Qrdina~ce~ as ~~Qlu510fl~=Y lonin; o:t'QinaAc@s.

~ Xf cOIIlllI\UU.cy houBinq ;Ls ClOn!:ltlroot.ed of.E-s~t6, the re.qult:l!c:I percenta.91!1 or len
&lloo~~ed to
af~ordaDle
housln; ieareasee ft:om twen~y pe~cent (20~) of ~he
Jr~ndon l.eonlS 1:0 one hundl;ed twentr-Uve pel:'oel:lt. 1125t:1 if tbe hous.1na ~s baUt.
within tae oity of ~Cal1; or to one hundzaa fiEuy pe%c9n~ (150'1 ~f the "~~~1n, 1s
~u.1l1:

I'Iithin the oll:y ,loS.mitlS of anott\sr munLc1pa.l..!:l:y loeatea :in valhy 0,," Ad
or ~ t~o ~Uh~»ed PQ~cent (200~) 1£ the houA~n; iB ~u1Lt witnin

Count1e21

unlnco=po~atea

valley

Or Adam~
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Under Otdinatic~ No. 820, all appJieams 1W a building psnnit are requil~d to pa.y a communi

1
2

housing fee for each resid.enti.a1 dwelling unit thIt is proportiOllBl to the demand for community bou.·dng

3

creat=Q by the: dw&lJ.irIg unit OrdinaJlce No. 820 is desiped. to benefit employees of' low or modera

lncome in cateSOrles 1 aru:t II who are needed to .t'IUIitItlin and. se:mce the resi4ential c!wallillg ullit.3 Lo
5

iAcome ill dofitted in Category I

11$

households with incomes gyeater than ftfty petc02ll. (50%) but no

more tban eighty percent (80%) ofdle Valley COUl1ty medlan h01.lSchold inoOIJle. Income Category
7

inQludes housoholds with iDcomes

a
10

11

srea=- than eighty percent (80%) but IWt more t.ban one hUndred

percent (100%) of the Valley County mediaa. bOlllchold mc:ome. Certain residential development is
elCClhpted

1m.

OrdInance No. 820 S\'Ich as redevelopment, mnodeling 01 reTocatiM of i!.IlY I~gally pre-

exi6ting residentlal unit, expanJiloa up to SOO square feet, mobile: homE!,
retirement or

1Ul~

~lcillec;l .IlW'$il\g

facilities

living homes, !bater homes, ancl community housing Ul11b. City of McCall

Ordlna.a.ce No. 820, § 3.8.21(C).

Plaintiff filed a ve:r!fied Complaint 011 September 22. 2005, seeldng declaratory relief that tile
111

City ot'McCllIl's OrciiD.ance Numbers 81 9 and $20 violate both State ~ PeaCl;(I.1laws an4 constitutions,
and seck.lng a pennallent illjWl.t!tion ~ohung the City frOlU enfoteing SI.\;!J. 01'd.i'OtmCCS against its

17

1S
19

members. Defendallt filed an AnsWer on October 18, 2006, MSerting a number of afi'innative defeIlSe$
.lneludina no jUsUciablo case or oontroversy.

r!pene~s.

sta.n.c!ins, failure to JOw an indispensable party

20
~ O~d~nance

No. 820 defines the ccmmUn!ty

nO~Bing

fee as

fo~lon8:

=o~uni~y housinq
fee shall be aammenaurate with the ~urrGnt
cOIl1II\1anity housing .subSidy amoW1t requirect to deveJ.op aZ'ld c:cnu'i::rucn;:

~he

CO!llm\loI'lj. l:!y .b.O'J.s.Lnro zo:r: ::i:ft.y

23

Ae&vico the

24

25

(IlO I

pS:l'oent of the eDlp.l.oyeell need.Eld. to

m!l1nl:.ilin and saX'vic:e t:h. dwdl.1n9 unit and ~ho l'Lave l.nc:lQlllEl$ in !ncOlllO
el1t~'lIO:r:.:hlll :r and U.
The nurr,be<t of el1\Plcyees n9scled. to lIIa;i.nt:/ilill 111M
City

of

~e$1dential

N~ll O:r:~nanQe ~o.

unit

va~le8

baaed on ehe sise of the

B20, § 3.8.21(D)

uni~.

(11 (e).
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Plaintiff filed
3

Twenty~Five

II.

Motion tbl' SummIilY Judp.ent el.ong with a Motion to 'FiI", Brlef F..xceedi,n

('25) Pages

01.

November 20, 2006. Th.I.s CO\l1t cntsred an Order Grauting Plamtifra

Motion to Pile Brlef:&ceeding ~Flve (25) l'aaes on NOYenlber 29. 20015. On. December 6, 2006

5 the part.l.es filed II. Stipwated U1igati011 g,bedule. Defendant filed 8. Sti!mJation to &teeCQ Page Limit on
6

Felmlaxy 7, 2007. allowing 'Defendant tQ file a Response Brld in excess of the twenty-five paplimiJ;.

7

Or) May 22. 2007, this Court issued a Me.m.oranclum Deoision lII1d Order ,Oenyi!1g thl! Defendant
City of McCall's Motion for SUlXImaty J'uQgme:n~ hold;ng tbat the Plaintiff did have "'ass c:latlOlUll"

On lvIay 31, 2007, the PlIrtiflS filed a Stipulation to Ameud Litigatio

lO

starlding to

l.l.

SWdalc:. Also on Lh.at date, Pla.intifffiled all Am.e.Ilded Notic!! ofHsllri:og.

16

OlaiIll.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides thal Sl.UrlIllat'Y judgment is proper when

U

15

its

STANDARD OF RE'V'JEW

1:<

~4

nU:SUO
,,-

satisfied tha.t "there is no ge.nuh1e issue as to any material faet a:ad that the moving Party is
juasm~t

as a m.s.tter of taw." I.R-C.P. S5(c). AU disputed fQ4rts are to

b~

tltlee to

resolved and all eA90Ilable

inf'ml:lce.s dIa-wn.i:tJ. favor of the non-movinB party. See Slq/Jord 11. K/aste1'W/l:In. 134 Idsllo 20

17

P.2d 111&, 1119 (2000); Smith 1I. MBrJaSrl1! JOint Sch. Di&1. No.2, 128 Idaho 714, 719, 918 ,ld 583,
lS

u

3811 (1996). If'reasonable persons could. reach dlHerent :fi~lnes or drll.W con:tlieting inf'eretJ\:"

20

evld.s~e,

21

SmIth, 128 Idaho at 718> 918 P.2d at 587.

the rnatlon nlulrt be denied. Jordan"• .Beek.;, llS Idaho S86, S90. 21

P.~cl

908, 91 (2001);

22

The dIstrict court as tho trier of fact may draw TllIBonll.ble inferences based upon the EWjdence

2;1

before It BIld ,!lt8.)' grant 8Um1'll8J:y judgment despite the possibili'tY of cO%lflicting l.nfet'enCtl$. Kn erm~m v.

2t

JQme.~D"'!

132ldaho 910, 913. 9S0 p,2d 574,577 (Ct. App. 1999) (oiting Cameron

898,900. 9SD P.ld 1237. 1.239 (1997».

SIIB

Q}.ro Iclaho

CodeAzln. §

10~1201

'II_

Neal. lO Idaho

(2005). 'Wh.ere e maUtl

26

M\i}~tM .!)l!IC:S:tON l\JIID 0lU)~
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\

would be Uied Without II. j\U"Y. the coun: iii "free 10 arrive at tbe most prcbable inferences tAl be 41's:

2.

..from uncontroverted evldentla:y faotg," lAomf.s 1'. City ofHallr:y, 119 Idaho 434, 437. 807 P.2d 1272.

3

1275 (1991); Qccord S/einer 'II, Zisg/1il7~1'alml,.a Ltd.. 138 Idaho 238. 241,61 p.3d 595,598 (2004), T
the evidcntiozy facts are not in diapute, tIle trial ccuzt m~ grant SUl,D..IntI.ty judgment despite

~

possibility' of QQnflicting i~ces, bocau;sc: tIle court alone will be ill the position of resolvillg

6

COl'lructlu3~ attrlal. Rtver8itie Devolopm4nl Co. v. Rftchie, l03)dsho SIS, 519, 650 P.2d 6S7.

1

661 (UI82).

Il

In o'Cder to challenge the constltll1ionsllty of a statut. or a'l'd.l.!:ulnce, the plaintiifhas the burden. 0
10
11

showing the invalidity of such statute or regulation and must overcome the st:roT\g prel!1.llnplion 0

VIIl!dity. Olal:n 11. J.A, Frftsman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 709, 791 P.2d 1285, 1288 (1990); see also Wyc:.to

12

v. Board qf COllnly Commissioners, 101 Idaho la. 14. 607 P.2d 1066, 1068 (1980). '"It Is pnemll

13

pmum.ed that legislative ac:ts are constitutional, that the state legislature bas acted within i

ccnstitutioual powers, and any doubl t!oncernillg inte:rF&tation ofa statutei:l to be re.'\olvcd III t.vor 0
15

that which will re~er1he sratute qcmstitutionaJ." Olton, 117 Idaho a.t 709. 7911'.2d at 12815. The p

aS8ertipg tI. facial dlallenge to an ordlnance must demOllStrate That the "law is 1ll!Constitu.tiOl1I11. I.e. all 0
l'
1ll

i.1i applioations.•.. {And] that no

set:

of ~~ exieta under wblc:h the (law) would be VlIlld."

lJ)

Arn6l'icQn. Falla Reservoir Dist. No.2 v.ldaho Dtp't ofW4tlfr RcSDW't:eJ, 1431da40 862, _, 154 P,]

2Q

433,0441 (2007) (internal qI.Jote$ omitted.).

DISCUSSION

21

InQlusio11lllY zonms ordi:nancea appear 10 be

:t2

2:3

II.

recent trend

ill

the etforts "f loeal communi'tie$,

especill.ll.y in seasonal econoTllf-based co;mmunities, to address the needs ofpro'\liding B£fQrllable I\ousin
for the local worJd'ol'Ce.

li:1cl~&lQnruy

:a:oru.ng or iw;llJlliollSIy bous.ing ordinances gener.ally l'oqu1:c

2$

residential devetol't'!r to set aside a ,,Pecific p~centase of new Ilou!ring unlts t'Qf low or moderate ~come
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household$. Home Blilldsrl A.I'ol' 'n ofNonhal'/S California v. CIt)! ofNap", 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 60, 62 n.l

a

(Cal, Ct. App. 2001) (oiting l$n M. P!U1Wa. RejlectiolSS on '"aJusiolfD1')l Houfling and a It_newad Loo/1

at its Yiablliljl. 23 HofstraL. Rev. S39, 540 (1995»).4
\Vhile a .!lumber of' jurhdictlons have case law discussing the con.st!tu.tioC81ity

zonirlg otdlD.ar.1ce!, there ill no cue precedent wbiQll W

b~ established in Idaho.

en inehulon

Furtber.(llOt'e, there is

710 legislative authol'ity in Idaho providing fo~ iUQlusioXWy zoning provisions. Altb.oug/111l,lt cDDI:rolling,

this Court is a.ware that a Decision on Surnmllly JudJlllc::b1. was rued My 3. 2007. in Blaine Cow
8

reprding en 8.'1-appliad clJallenge to tile City of Sun Vallq-'s Workforce Housing Linkage Ordin
10

No. 364, in Scht1.fJ1jer v. City ojSun Val/fIJI. Idaho, CQC No. CV-06·882.
In the case bef'Ore this Court, there are no geJ:luine i.!sues of matertal :fact, The dispositive issue i

1.2

the purely legal question of whether Ordinauce Nos. 819 aDd 820 me propet' police !,owel: teguJations 0
till:

City of .McCQIl. This Court defe.rs to the City of McCa.Il's detennitlation of a lack: of affordable

hOl.Ull11a and to their laudable intention to address the

i~e;

the question for this Court. however. i.

whether the methods of remedying this hoUSing shortfall pass legal m.uster.
lG

In Idaho. "a lll.1.lJliclpal corporation may exercise o.llly those powers itl!lI1ted to it by eithli!,t' Ih

11

state llonstitutiO.ll or tbeJesIsllI.ture ••••n CQe8"rv. Slr;:te. l011dabo ISS, 160,610 P.ld 517,519 (1980).
19

Article 12, Seotiol1l of the Tclaho State Constitution prOvides for arty county, city, OT r.owtt to make II1l

20

enforce all such local police. swtaIy. and ather regulatlOllB which are nOi in collfliet with. its clwter

21

with lhe genera11aws. Idaho Canst, Art. 12 § 2. 'I'h= Idaho Supreme Coutt ha5 fecogni2ed that "[l]h

24

• lfo.tJ Bu.t.1d.r.s Aall'oc:-:£at.:itlll Qr Nortll",t'll Cs.1J.£'or;n.ia 111u.st~..t:"'s the t::-elld. 'tOWOl1;'
J,1\c:ll.lell.ona-.ry ICon:l.nq o:r:d1nanal;lS, e.speo1alJ.l( in e;~ifr:l]!'n:l.a I-lnere the... is e~ten51.ve
~ellillilt.l..on pll'ovic!l11g- 1:or a£:J!orda.l::lfl hO\lS.l.nq 1:n.ol;lnt1vElS.
Se.. Cal. Gov'r: Cocie
65580 ~~ ~.~.
~1s Qa&c re11BQ upon by thm Cit~ of McCall is Q£ 11ttl. . .ss~stQn~.
to court~ in X~aho w~e~e ener.e is not extensive legiSlative authority for
inolus~onary

zoninq

c~dinaMces.
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power to restrict tlle uses of property ill wi1:bhJ the police power of the sta.te, delegable to itll municip

subdivisions, Imd is not per se repugnant to the CoDStltntion oftb.c United States.:' Wlule v. City atTwi
3

Fer/Is, 81 r~ 175, 182.. 338 P.24 778. 781·82 (19S9). TI1er!ibL'e, the powel: to zone <lerives ffl)m th
police power of' the sta~ Mel looaJ. legislative entities are authorized to enact 7.onmg ordinan!:

s

t"eBU'ietin,8 the uSe of property within the coIporate limits of the legislative entity. City of Ld'Wi8lCm v.

6

KnSe/'ieln, 107 fdaho 80, 83. 685 P.2d 821, 1$24 (1984); see oU() Dr:rw~tm Enterprt.,cl, Int:.
COt/fll)!,

B/edna

'II.

98 Tdaho 506. St 1.567 P.2d 1251, 1262 (1977).

a

The L00l1.1 Land Vile Planning Act (LLUPA). at Idaho Code Section 67-6501
lO

tIt

seq., was enacte

in 1975. TluIldaho Supretne Court has fOl.U1d that under LLUPAt "'!:be legislatm'e intended to p,lve loca.!
goveming boards broad powers in the area of planning fllId zoning."

ldaho 396, 400, 80 P.3d 332, 336

Whilt! Y. BemnoIJ1c

(2003) (citing WlJl"ley Hwy. Dio5'r. v.

CfJJm

12

Ca'tHmI:;,rlo"ers, 139

13

Caunt;Y. 104 Idaho 833. 663 P.2d 1135 (Ct. App. 1~S3». Snoh z;cni:I:Ig power 18 not 1l1'ljjn~itecl, b\1t mus

bear a re4l8onable relation to the goals of the slate pursuant
lS

C11"Ubb .& .woes,
l.~\!Iixh:m

I~

v.

to

/(oOlel'lQ

the state's polJ.ce powers. SprMJillr.

City f)f HailB)" 127 Idaho 576. 583, 903 P.2d. 741. 748 (151515) (clti.os CI1.!' (1

v. Knleriflm. 107 ldaho 80.83,685 P.2d 8.21, 824 (1984);,tee also Daw§()n E7It(Jrprisli~'1

me.,

l1

98IdahQ at 511. 567 P.ld Sl 1262.

The governmental power to inte1fcre by zouirlg iegulations with the genetal. rights of the
Ia:o.d oW'l:l.Cd. by r!!Slricling the ~r of hill US!>, ill not unlimlted, and other questl.oU!1
aslde, such restr.lctio:a cannot be imposed if it does not ,,~ a. substDltial rllllt~on to the
. pubUc health. aaicty7 morals, Or gCilleral wellhre.

Duwson !mf.rprtae.v, Inc.. 98 Idaho at 511, 567 P.2d at 824 (citing OqlB-Callister Fira PraJer:lton PiS/.
a3

v. Ci/1 of BO/le, 93 Jdaho 558, 468 r.2d 290 (1970) (qllotlng Nectow

11.

Cily ,,/Cambridge, 277 U.S.

183, 118 (1927»).
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The Idaho SUpreme court bas feCognized that LLUPA i5 the e~clusfve and mandatOty source fo

1
2

s. lntlniclPaHty~1 pla.nnizle; and toning II.w:b.orl1y, Sprenpr, GrtIhb & Maoes, Int. v, City of Haile)" 133

Idaho 320, 321. 986 P.2d 343, 344 (1999). Under!het LLUPA. a goveming board, cI.'lnsisti118 of either
4

oity col.llleil or it properly delegated planning m1d 2;Onl.n$ commission,
under the lLUPA. Idallo Coda Aml, § 67..&504. Under

s~n

is,

give.n the pow=tS ll.lthorixed

61-6508. the planulng ilud zan'

oommlssion is to conduct a comprehensive plSllning process dc~igned to p~epare a. co;mp.tehen.~lve pIli
wbich outlines the desitable goals and objectives for each pl8ll1ll.l1g compo'Oent includ.i.ng in peJ1ilmn

e
part:
9

k auill)'Sls of pEOviaioJls which may be necessaty to Ula1.lta that land 'Use policies,
teS11ictloni, ccmditioXis and fees do not violate pl.i.vate property righta, adversely U31paO't
property values CIT crute tIl1I1eceasary n:clmiCallimitntiOllS all the US~ of' property ane!
lIDSlysis as prescribed under tbe declarations of pl.apose in chapter 80, title 61, Idaho

1.0

Code.s

12
3,3

Idaho Code AmI. § 67-6508(a).6 F'I.IIthemtore, the comprehcmsive piau aboLlld include a: proViliio

i
I

relating to housing ~OZltain.ing:
15

An aualyais of 'housing; conditions ~Q needs: 1l1am for 1mprovemlUlt of hGuamg
stlmda.rds. a.ad plans. fell' the provision of 1!8!e. slUlitaty, ami adsq,uate bousin£t, mol\!ding
tile 'Provision for low-cost OUn'Wlll.i.cnal ho\lSing, the sitins ofmanufacturcd h.ousing llIld
llUIbile homes in subdivisions and parks &l:I.d on individual lots which ere .sufficlcnt to
maintain iI. competit!.ve. market for each of those hO\lsini types and to ~s the needs of
the ccm,munit:y.

17

19
20

23

ldab,o Code AmI. § 67-CiS08(l).'

'The LLUPA expressly identifies the llC(;d to maintain a balBtlce

betwecll proter.;1iag property tights and provicllDg for affordable hous.ing by !ltating thnt ont of it~

• Tit:.. G7, ch<lpl:er 80 of the J;c!aho c;cG\e is lmown as the tclah ... lI.Gg'lalAl:; .. Z1 'l'aJcillqs
~~tt

which

e6teb~ishe5

a .l:eview

SuQluaQ~.itm lOll
on p~operty
P.:l.9ht$-~~an.n~ng' and
~dchQ ~eas. ~aw5 X.i. 212.

~

E'&ope,t¥

to evaluate

~GgulAto~r

takings.

d!ihtB was adc!ed in >.995. Local Land 1:1I,e

Zoni.ng
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1
2

purposes 15 "[tJo protect propetty nib-til white l'Clatdng accommodations fol" other necesslU)' types

0

development suc:b as low.cost housblg and mobile home parks." Idaho Cede Ann. § 67-6502(a).
With respect to 2:OI1ing O~S.1hfl LLUPA provides that the govermng bo:.vci shall "establlsh

3

standtris to regulaf.l! SGd restrict the height, nUDlber of' stories, size, construction, reconstruction,

s

alteration. 11!pBir or use of buildIDgs and structures; percentage of lot oOCl,lpancy,

6

and opell. spaces; -dfilIUlity of populaticD; and the location and use of bullding$ and struotures," Idaho

si~e

of coU:l~. yards,

Code Ann. § 67-5511. Furthermore, the goveminS boatd may''raquke or permit as a. QODdtuon 0
s

remnmg that an owner or d~veloper make a written commi1m!nt concerning the \lse 01' development I)
9

1Q

the subj= parcel." Idaho Code Am. § ~70.6S11A.

Tba indusio1\llIY :zoning ordinaaces 8l issue in tbis calie go well 'beyo.a.d thrJ tTl.ditioua! 20nin

11

IIU1llc18l'ds relafulg to height, silZe, COnstruJ:tioll, zoning areas, open space requirements, density, an
location. The City of McCall srguell it is regulating the use to wbic:b certain land or hoUliml may b~
by requiri.ng clevelope:ra
tl!

to

deed Nstric.t a pero011tmge of new dwelopment I!$ affordable or communi

housillg. There is no dcybt that the City oiMcCall detemlined mete exists a need for aff'ordable housiu

16

in McCall.

Although LLUPA Bpeai.fically allows a city to inalu.de within its CWlPrebensive pI

:resu.la.uen.~ afIec~8

19

property lights Mel housing eondltiODS, LLUPA does not Specifioally address

whether the City of McCall

1;)1:

all)' other city IIlll.y enaot il'lcinaionaxy zoning ordina.!lCeS.

GiVeJl,

tl\

relatively -reGent ttmd towatc1s inclusioury zoning o.«iinanc;;es sinoe LLUP A llill been enacted in Idaho,

:a

iL is n01 SUJprising That LLUPA does not sp;ci1ical!.y address inclU!fiona:y

~)ng

ottlinano09. Thus,

23

, Alllo in 19~.s. ~he t.EIIJislOl1:U:t'e inserted the lanquaqC! >:llIqa:cllll'i1 low-Clellt hCI1.le.:l.ns.
Lgc;:el. Land esa Plann1ng-.P:roperty t<.i.ghts-Planninl7 and zonJ.Il':l Co.~:i.u:1one. oh. 181.
sec. ~, S 67-6509, ~g95 Id~ho S$Cl8. L..w~ H.a. 2~2.
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l
:I

wheth~ the

City of McCall Jl1!J¥ req'Uire affordable bousing through a land. use regi.ilation ill B matter n

first. l111pression which this COUrt must d;oide.
A. Restrictil)1\J

on the City of MeCaU'. Police Powers

The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized three g811lXal restrictions on

s

So

munlciplllity's polic

p()WetSl (1) the ordinance ~ust be conilned to 1M limits of the gO"QUlmental body eus.cting the $amej
(2) such ordinan~e must 1lO~ be in colltliet with other gen.erallaws of the state; and (:3) gw:h ordi

must not be an unreasonable or arbitra.ry enactment. Hobht v. 4brama. 104 Idaho 20S. 207, 6S7 P.2
9

1073, IO'?S (1983) (citing Sl"t~ Y. Clark, 88ldaho 365, 374, 39" P.2d 955,960 (196S)).
)0

11

1. Begyltllion WMin

In Hobb&, the

me City LimiTI QfMcCa/l
QOun~

passed an ordinanoe which prohibited tho sAle of beer in ko&s In "Fra.l1kl'

CO\tnty," and also probl'bited The posseslllon of beer mkegs witlrln the ''u.Ilinco1pol.'atllld areas ofPran .
13

County." 104 Idaho at 207. GS7 P.2d alt07S, The plaitttiffin that osse O\Vl'1ed. twO busirlesscs license

14

1'0 sell beer in Fr&l:lklin, Idaho and Preston. Idaho. The Ideho Supreme CoW't held that the plaintiff d'

15
15

o.ot have stalIding to chIillenge the ordinance smce ros busin£sses were Within an incorponlted ciLy and
the CCliAty did not have the IIIUthOrity to resuls.te IICtlvities within incorporated cities. la, at 208, 657

),'/

P.2d at 1076. Slm.ilazly, in the und=riyillg case, the City of'McCall's OrdinlUlce Nos. 819 and 820 only
have power and e.f;tect wltbm th~ limits Qf'tbe City of McCall. Althou/ih the ordl.o.a.ncl!J repeatedly at!!
20

that such ordinan"s ba.ve bean implemented in parmmhip Wilh Valley Count,)', Adams County, and th

7.1

communities ofCa:loade. DonneDy, aDd New Meadows. Ordiruanca NOB. *19 aud 120 can

m regulate

land uSB pmnits In the City of McCall.' Tb=efore. Ordinmoe Nes. 819 snd 820 would u.ot apply to
laudo'WnlM who owns and wishes to subcljv.lde land located outside the ~ty limits of McICall.

2S

26

-------------------, ?u~suant to O~inance No. Bl$, it •

tne develope: is

~eqyire4

W&lMO~QK DSCr.S ION

RESPONDENT/CROSS-ApPELLANT'S BRIEF
1332095_34,10915·9

to provide

deVelg~er

~~s

p&Qvld$s commun1ey housing off-sitQ,
9crcent of th~ amount at l.nd wnich ~gul
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2. NOI in Cqn{hct w{fb Qtb.er Gslll.rfJll4wR q(rbe 8tme
1

T,Indet'the seoond prong of HDhb,r, this Court m1.1'iit detettaine whether Ot'di.llance No:!. 819 and

820

4

provide a "reasonable supply of affordable, dilled restricrtcd workforce hcusmg (colllmunity hOQs!IlSt' to

Bll:

in conflict wlth other general laws of the

state. The stated p1.U'pose

3

of ti,ese ordinances is to

"et'lSLlre that critical professional workers, essential service 'personne~ and service workers li'Je withi
p~ox!m1ty

to theiT work to provide municipal eM private sector sarvices." In 01'1ier to obtain a bail .

7

permit to subdivide land and build houses or dwel1iog UDits. a JandoW"!lal' 1'tJust desig/lllJ! CIt leest tweIl
8

pmeJ).~

10

11

of the lauCi or lots

&$ decd-~tricled

community hau5'iog under Ordinance No. B19.

F'urthemlorc, in older to build mlidential dwelling units,

&

landowner is teq'Qixecl to pAy a communi

hOTJSing fce for a building pe.tn1it under OrdinaMe No. 820.
Pl.U'9UlUlt to

J.2

Otdinam:e No. 819. upon applying for subdivision ttpptC'Va1, a developilT mUSL IlUbmi

an !rJelusklnalji &us!ng Plan whieh designates that at least twenty parce.tlt of all the lots MCl ht)L1ses !
the 81.lbdivWOll have been permanently deed-restrlc:ted9 sa conllllUIli I}' housillg and affordable to
15

households in MoCall with mod.erate or middle incomes in categories In a.t1d. IV. Ordinance No. 81

speoifically states that FOviding on-site oomm.\tI'dty housina wltb.iu. the new subdivision is the fits
17
18

puonty. However, if a landowner or developOl' is !lot able to dmpate cottlTll,u:nty hOLlSilIg within \:he

Pl'OjlOlied subdivision. the SecQl10 p,rior!ty ia for the developr:r to designate ooromunitr hOl1sitlg outsi

21

1!3

24

b"vl2 been J:'1I~:I.,nd on~6ite, if tne off .. s:l.1:E! hou.sing is "withJ.n the city U1I1its or
tbe City of ~eC:l!.ll." Al.terni!lt.L'lrely, i t the Off-aHe l'Ious!.nq b lQcat:<.d "withAl) til
alty limit!! 0: anot.h,,1i' rnunicipal..ity located ill Val,ley 0. AQsmll Ooun~Y/" tlle
QftveJ.ppec ill lOe~lrecl to 9J:'Qvide 150 percent ool: thlll &!lIClU"'!: y:hi.cm would hOI"" beat
1;'I!'I":l.r"d 01lo-::1te.
,;'0 the extent that thla City o~ MaCall. a.i:l~Qrnpt., 1:0 l:e9u:l.ste
housift~ out8:1.dc lea City 1!1I11t. suoh provis1on ts wi~hout ef~eot ~na therefore null
and void.
v

a~dinance

No,

8l'

al~o

~%ov~a~~

th6t

a~

restr.i.o:.1:.1cn, the< I:!e'l"eloper 1l\l!I;II' requ$$t tnllot \lp

an

~o

~lternattva

to

pe~mQnant

d~Qd

twenty-five perQQl'l.t of the lOh

and hou$e» be s\ll:)::!sc:t to an "Equ1t}"-a'llildezo" p;:QgrliLlII26
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the s!.\bdivlsion, or "off-site." The third priorl~ 11 for a developer to r;onvey land to the City of McCall
1

Fur C01lll11unit)' housing. Allci the fourth prj onlY is
:I

to

pa.y a fee in lieu of communltY bousi.na.

Essentially, the McCall City Council decides p~ to the priority list if on-site cOlnmunily housing Is
impractical
Under the firit

twO

priorities, a.. landowner still ~s

o~rsbip

of such cOtmrutnit)' holl5!n

unitq but ls resCtiQted regarding 6eJling or rentilll comn1\i.\llty hcusmg l.lnits. 10 l11e third and fourth
./

priorltfa ate reallWVed for silUatiOllS ill whieh it is not practical for the landowner to develop cOtllmUl'li
&

llQusing either on
10

(If

off she because the required cotnmUllity housing units results in less than On

housing 'Ullit. 11 Under the third 1Ill4 tQlIrth prlorlf,jes, the landowner either conveys llU1d calculated at
Inarket value, or pays a. fee .qual to the total S'Q.osidy amcUl'lt lOt the required oommu.uity housblg Unl'ls

Additionally. if tile number of lCquired

00l'llm'l1'l1iLy

housing lll1its .result in a &actIon under the first 0

second priority, lhe lanclQWI:lCr must pay ~ in lie'll:fee equiil to tile sub~id:v amount for that fraction.
for any commu:aity b.ousing units proVided
1.&

Ilttd~

thE! first or second priQrities. the develop

must enter into a CUm:tnllIl\ty Housing Agl'l1leltlcnt which scts forth. among a. nllInber of oth
reql.lireme.llts. the sales or rental terms and the l'llstrictlons to ensure

~h.e

pemJlllent Ilffordability end

17

l:ompUauco with the Community Housing Guidelizl.es. The McCall Planning &:. Zolling Commission lItIQ

the City COUILOll have the power to review and approve the InclusiolUUl' Housing Plan.. If the Ci
20

Council collects in lieu. fasa -pllrs'Illllnt to the fourth priority, Or fees for any fractilltlal amount 0

oommunity hous:lng, sUch funds are to be deposited into the COlnTlluntt)' I-Iol.1$ing Trust Account to b
22

13

10

25

0: r6n~c=~ must =eet the
to t;11fl11!y Eo= olIf£.,rdabllil hou61l'1g.

~Dtent1al hu~~z

blccall.

requi~~msnts e$tabl~shed

bv the

C1t~

ot

.. Because ttle clevelope.r is rGII;[i1i;J::e~ 1:;0 el!;1; i1sid.a twenty pel:"cent of th2 \~n.i.t:a aE
community houa1nQ, the m~n!m~~ numba: of un1~a a ~evelope~ must ~evelop unae: thQ
first or 'eggnd

pr~Q~1t~es

would

~e

~1V& un~ts,

of wh1cr. cne

~nit mU$~

be communit

26
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spent for plamdng'. sllbaidlzing,

Ol'

deVeloping l;ommUllity hOUlJing Ullits io. McCan. A landowner may

petition for a ref\mc1 of tho in lieu fe~ if such fees have not boc.o. e;,:pended by !:he City of McCall within
five yea:s. provided 'the City has not already ear.r:Ilarked the fimds and extended the tim!; period iUlOth
:flveyelm.

FurthennOl'o, the City of McCall may a<ijust or waive th~ requlrerue.o.t.') under Ordinancc No. R19

if the develo'Per demon.stnltos and the City Council fUlds tncre is "no reasonabJ£: relationship
7

b~en th I

housing itnplu;t at the propOJe<1 .residential. subdivil!iOll and the requlre:menta of this section." City 0
McCall OrdlMnce NQ, $19. § 9.7.10(A.)(l3)(a), Tho developer has the'burden of provIding eool,omi

10

mtotl'nB.tiol'l or data necessacy to establish. that there is 00 teaSOllBPlc relationship.

O.rdinlll1te No. 820 requires that every taDdowner seekiL1g a 'blJildiug permit Ibr a residential
ll!

dwelling unit,

Dot

oxempteci by the ordin8.lllle,l~ i$ required. to pay a o~,.'11ll1\U11ty Musing fee. Thls fe:

represents the Bubsidy Illnount requited to develop and oonstru&t c:omrnUl1ity llol.l.5io8 for fi tly perce.tl1 0
the employees :needed to maintain and SQMcc the dwellmg umt and who have low to moderate .incomes
15

in catego;ries I and 11. Suoh fees are also dsposi1:ed In the Community Housing Tnlllt AccoutLt and

similarly to Ordma.noe No. 819, s.1m1dow.t:le:L' may request a retUnd of such fees if they bave noL beClll
:1.'/

18

l\ol1!1l,ng.

Subdivil1!i"ne with leas tb,,1\ five units l)f:eraullll.oly would. be subj$ct to

19

e~ther

tni~Q ~r

20

housing :fall;

I~

'1')1"

1.

2l

2.
2J

the

fQllowinlJ

feurth pr\ar1ttes.

:o:"s:i.d.e'"ltial

;:be eClI1lIIunity

unit

a.

!<fQb11e h ..mes,

Slc:l,ll<lci, nur,s.i.nq hc.i.lit1es.

~,

)etir.~Qnt O~ aa.'~te~ liv~ng ~omQ$.
roste= and g~oup ncmes.
Community ~ou~1ng Qn1te,

7.

un11:s are eXI!l%1l,Ptllld froIl',

The ~edQvelopment, %amcdelin~, or relocation a~ a legally pre-&~1~tinq
~esident~al
prOVided nc ~ew a~ a~dittonal ~B$ldential unit is creaCeQ.
wha expanSiOn up to five h~nd="d square reet of grass floo. area at s legall
pr.e-IIHt8tinQ re4idential dwellt~g u~it.

4.

o.

Se~ CL~~

of Mocall

~d1naftQQ

No.
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~

spent within :live years unless the City has
2

~ed

su.ch :funds aild extended the time an addltloual

live years, An applioant may also apply for lI. rec1uction or waiver oftne commUllity hO'l,l6ing r. if sueh

pel'S on receives mcome within the Income Categories identified above or believes the .esidential \!IU
does notrels.teto the pUlpQS!.'! and standm:ds ofOrdinan!;c No. 820.
Plaintiff argues th Ilt Ortlinance Nos. 819 BIlQ, 820 exceed the City's zonln2 av.thorlty because Ch
nttempt to regulate ownership a.s opposed to ll:9fl Cf'thepIO,ptlty. 'Ftrrthetm¢re, Plal.n.tifrargues that sue
ordinancecs vIolate the genem1la.w5 Clf the state beClWse regulations relar.1.n~ to C01TI.lllUl1ity hOusing hav

been preempted by other
JQ

tl

8tat~

Ir-w, that such ordinances unoonstitutionally control rent, that sLlch

ordil'WlQeS lire disguised impact fee!, or thr.t they impose illegal ttl<tc!.

n. Whst/,n the AllIllDrlfJI to Impiemrlnt AlJordabls Housinglrus b6en ImpHedl)J Pl'Ilflmpted by Stl1.~
Law
,
While Article 12, Section 2 of lhe idaho COtliJ.ituiion ill & gnnt of local police powers to Idaho
cities. this police power is limited in at least two important fCllPC:cts. First. cities cmwot act in an
which il 1i0 completely covered by generellaw iI$ \10 indicate that it Is iii. matter of state concern. Seeond,
cities mllY nett act 111 an !I1'e& whete to do so wo~ud conflict wlth.lhe 8t.!l.te's ge1lerellaws. Ct/emr v. Slate,

1S

101 Idaho 158. 161, 61 0 P.:2/1517. S20 (1980). Unde.r tb.a doctrine of in:lpl1lld. prccwption, where as~te
17

has acted In an lIlCa in. .auel1 a. pervasive manne.r. it is lI$l;umed that the state int=ded to oocupy the enure
18

field cf regulation dospite the lack ot: any specific langLlage preempting regulation by local govemme.n
20

entities. ld. (citmg

Ulf£t~d

Tcn'errn Owntlr$ of PhiI~deJphia v. School /)IsI, of PhiiadelphlQ, 272 A.2

868.870 (PI!.. 1971}).
22
23

In 1967. the Tliallo Les;ill1a.tuxe enacted the lIouslng A\\tborlties !IUd COopc1."a.tiOll Law at Idaho

Code Sel:tioll. 50-1901 et ssg. By ena.:;tillg tlUII

8tatu~e. the Legislature recojpli2ed

the !'leed for sani

aud safe dwelling accommodations for persons of low income. See Idaho Code AI'1IL. § 50-1S102(a).
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EssentIally. a housil:1g authority is created as an independent public body cotporate Rltd po!itic by
1

resolution of the govewiag body of the city, bl,lt D not an agency of the city. Idaho Code Aml.. § S
3

15)05; see fJ1so IcW10 Code Ann. § 31·4205 (county housing authorities).13 The hotming authorit;y ;s

inlbued with a nwuber of pO'Wel.'S necessaxy or conveuient to cau:y out and .£tec:tuate the: purposes
provisions of the act. Specifically, a. housing authority ha:; the power to contraOl with other hGusiJ1

mu:b.o.dties for services, ueate bylaws, .n.tlll& Blld regulations, prepare. can)' out, aeqtJire. lease,
operate ho\'lSing l)tOjeots, lease or rent dwellings. esta.blis\, and revise rents, own, holel and illlprove re
8

or llt:SolUll property, WlC acquire real p;roperty through eminent domain. Ida.ho Cod.e A.rul. § So- J904(&).
10

(b), and (el).

Overall, Chapter 19, Title 50 of the Housing Authorities and Cooperation Law diSC\1Sse5 II

housing authority'S ability to own and aC!\uira real. property. Subsection (d) granti the housing au'lhorit
13

broad power with respect to leasing, l'etLting, oWDlng, purcluLsing. aoqmril1g by gift,
~ev!se,

15

gmI\t,

bequest,

or eminent domain, and sel.!in.g, exchanging, transfening, assigning, pled:!\lng or disposing ofany

real orpersonal property. Idaho Code Arm. § SO·1904(d). This is Quite di:fD:lent from any "interest" th
City of McCall may bave in a landcwner'!J real property which is requl..J:ed to hI! eurmmked.

l7

10

eommumtyhousing 1.IIlderthe:first two priorities ofOtdlrum.oe No.

81~.

This Court believes that the Ir:lilha LegislatUre has carefT.111y destgnated PI,-vVers withln a ltous
20

a\lthorlty in Cb.aptcir 19, Title so and Cbs.pter42. Title 31, of the Idaho Code (created eithcrb;yaclty Or
CO':Ulty) to a.ddress housing prol,lllilmil anc! provide for affordable hollSi.ng to low Income

hOI:l~olds.

Pursuant to those code sections, a housilla au.thorlty may aequire real propetf:y prlmarlly tiu'ol.lgh two
?o3

meah.aniS1llSJ the power of emiruml: domain and the issuance of bonds upon proper resolutfon. Idaho

34

26

u Cba,pt:er 19, 'l'itl.e !SO o£ 1:1\.. :rcraho Coc!e ..h.i.ch. '1".... l:n!I !!1.j;.!{ h~\,le.l.nq il,,'O'l1cllrh"lIe LIt
GlIunt.!.all.y ;'QlllnUcal 1:.0 ct\lI.ptl!\l: 42, 'l'Hl.e ;U gove:l::ling coun1:y bou$!.n9 aUt.horitj es.
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Code Amt. §§ SO"1914, .1916; 31-4214.0.4216, With mlch bonds, e. housing ll.utbol'h:y may pmCb.!Se 0
l.

obtain rsal prapeny.H 1\ hous.il::li authority may also ~qL1ire real property by gift. grant, bequest 0

devise. Alternatively,

iii.

housing authority may also acquire real property through loans. Idl.iho Code

Ana. §§ SO.1904(i)j 31-4204(i}.

~rthenno.re,

a city Or county may lend. 01' donate money to thll housil'l.,

1llXI:b:0.tity. Idaho Code Ann. §§ 50-1909; 31-4209.
~Qntrib\L1e or provide grantQ or
7

othc=r f11lancial assista,noe to .ho\'!Sing authorities. Idaho CCH!e Ann. §§ SO

1923; 31-4223.

e
2,0

And tlm fCderal government may alao loan,

It II city or county finds that thm iOOst ''iDsanitarr or UllSaN" dwelling accolmtlodations or th
tbere is a. shortage of safe lUld _tmy dwelling accom..tnOdations a:vailable to low ittoome h.ousehol~.

"(tJbe sO'Verning body shalJ adopt a resolution declaring that the..-e i:; ; neC(i for a housing !l.Utll0rity."
12

ldallo Code AM. §§ 50-190S; 31-4205.

A1tho~

a city Or coun1y is :not required to create a hou.sin

a\lthority, it seems appare:nt that lfthe city or county is faced with a need to address affordable llous~,
the appropriate mechanism fb: m0Viimling affCl'dable botlSi.ag ill through a no'Usil'lg authority PIJ.l'lluant to

either liBctlon 50-1901

IJt Stq., or

!!ectl.oll 91-4201 el .ieg. IS Essentially, these stfltUtes provid~ the

16

iramewotk in whiclllocal government. are to address lIff'ordahle housing.
17

21

~( :tt low il'\t:.QlIIc I\ol.lsinq is ownact by a nOI'l-p:.:ot;Lt Qr'la;g.~2atj,Otl such i!.:il a housin/J
authority, iU would be el1gihl& to De ese~t £~om t&K~~ion un~er Idaho Co~ Section
63-602GGl.
The Idaho 1mpa.c\: Il'ee Ae't, I~aho Code SIlIClt10n \i7-S201 e!: seq., alISO
a"ntain.ll en inc.entive fo;r: af.!!orclabJ.e houSin9'Looal gove.l::'11Ie:1':.11 may lVaive all 0%
part o£ any impact fees as an incenl;ive for c!lIv",lopeze to inc:lucle a£fo'l:dabl
how;.l.l'Ul' :roano Code !J 67-9204(10).
.

u By R\;\" ..,1.utol.g,n lO-O!!, Valley County and. Adem!: county o:r:eated iI county !lQudn
lIut.hQ~:!.t.y 'knoMl .t\1II VAru'lA pu.stumt to Idaho eodQ s,,"tion ~1-4:<!Oa.
Undo=" the

s4¢~ion,

lI5

26

II.

;>al1n:l:y may aut.ll.o:r:1:c:e t:l1e

c:ual::ion o£ a hOUIiI.l.fl(l ilIuthcdty,

..-ith tlle

al:>;!,,l.l!:y to t:r:aIU'Il.ct bl:ll.liness And e:Ka:r:ci:lo powers, pur!!l:Ian~ to a prOper rellolut.io
deoh:in9 1;1'\& n&ect far an author.l.ty 1;0 function.
aesol.ul;ion 10-06 WDS Acop~.ci "
JanllUy 23, 2006, $.i.9nec1 by the Valley county COlMlissionors.
WhUIlt the C!.ty (I
McCall d1~ not exp~esBly al1tnori2Q a =~t.y ho~s!n9 al1thcr.l.t~, it appears to rely on
the ti~dlngs and QKpe:eLee or. VA~HA. ~;r;.l.o~ to tbo e~&ation De VARMA. t~e City o~
McCaU p"lIIud Rcasolu1<ton 05-3,9 proV'1dlng for II Cahnun!ty !>ous1nq poliCY "Ihioh 1I00S
:li~ed by Hayor ~i~X ~. 6imere ~n SeptGmber Z2, 2005.
o~d1nanQ. NOB. B19 and a"o
~ii\1Iml~

])EC;rS:rCN

AN!)

0lUlD. .. PAG:& 1.6
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In 1m, the Idaho LegislatlrCe enadeci Idaho Cede Section 67-tSlO 1 fill seq" which created. a state
1

agenC1, the ldaho Housing and Fin8noe AuOciiti(lD, to address the issue of .£fordable hotlSlng.
Esliemially, the state hO\lslns assooiation 1s empowered to

OOnd~lc.t

it; business, make anci el(eeute

4

aue=ents or oonQ·~ta, and to le8l!l'I, sliIll. construct, finanoe, aIlyllousing projects an to estl!.l,lllsh an

s

revise rel1ts or t:!haJ:ges. Idaho Code AnD... § 67-6206(a), (b), (e), and C£). The stato 110\JS'

,

also em,powerecl to own. hold end. Improve rea! property. purcbese, lease, and obtai options UPOll.

!U!sooia.l.ion i

acqala by ~£t. grant,. bequest. devtse. eminent dDm!tin or otherwise IlllY real property

to sell, lellSe,

s
e~chaIlse.

.i.O

traneter,

BSslgrl,

pledge. or di$po&c of such propel;'f:y, Idaho Code Atm.. § 7-6206(g), (11).

Housing projeat$ are to be subject to the loc;:a.l pb.lllIling, zoning, $aJ1itary aud bui1dl.c.g la.ws. ord.i.Mnce

te~ationa applicah.le to the locality oflh.e ho1l$ins ptojcct&. Idaho Code Ann. § 6~-6109. SimUe:
housing authorities, ll"Ie state MUSing usoolatioll has the: power of eminent dolllflin ~d the power to

ancI
to

issue bonds to aelriove its puxpose o:t'providing affordable hOlisillS. Idaho Code Ann. § +-6205.

The Legislature ha5 also I:eateci the Idaho Housing Trust Fund fOr the putpos~ of providing
"continuously NllBwable resource known 3j
lG

iI.

bous!ng trust fu:od from the private andlJ public ltIoney

to ;usift low-income and v~ low-income citi2ens in Jl1.eetiag thelc basic housing nee

I

II,

and that th

17

lG

u

needs of very Iow-illcome citi.=ns shcntld be given priority." Idaho Code Atm. § 67-810 . TIle housi

trLlSt funds are to be used to !!S8ist II. varl~ of aeti'llities. iJ:Iclud\ni b~111.ot limited to:

(a) New construction, rehabilitatIon, or acqulJitl on of hctlSing units IOl' ace
fnOOl"l1e and vel:)' low-Income houadlolds:
(b) Rent aubsidiea in new construction or re'lulbilitatcd. multifamily "Units for I 'W·!ncome an
~~ low~.iaconlC bouseliolds.
\

21
22
23

I

24

raly on COIll%\!IlJ'lJ.ty Gu1d.elJones anaot:.e.d .by VAlUU\. ;lind. to tho ext.ent.

r.hl!li:.l~h..

Nc:CaJ.J.'" Il.e.. "l\lti.. ~ "1.1o,,,sCl l:hQ Oity of HOea).l to Iltnl.lct ~~Ql'U.. J.onny
Qtdinan~.s, thQ ada!n~s~~ab~9n Q~ eu~b or~inan=e~ is 9Qve:ned by VARKA. I

~CK

I

J)!lCISION MUl oaDEa -

E'AGD 1"

I

City

Q l.·

~cJ"ls.n

1
I
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(e) Adminial:nl.tLvc costs for houshl.a 8S1Ii.sta.nce groups or orgBrlizations which pro;,lde housini
when fUM gr&t\t Or lOan will 8ubstanuall)' l.ncrease tbe r=ipient's B.Qae8S to housing funds
o~er thsn. those avaUable '\ll'lIier this chapter;
(i) Acq,uilitioll of housing 'UnitS for t1.e pUl-pose of pre8e.t'VaUon as housillg f'OT J.cw-UIcome an
ve.t:y low-iacome households;

Idaho Cod.e AmI. § 67·8103 (2). Local governments and. local how;ing lI.lliliotitles Dlay receive I1Bsistanl:e
&

from the stare housing IISsoeia.1ion. Idaho Code Ann. § 67..8104. Specifically, the Iclaha Housing T
Fund Act applies to loW and very low illllome hcuseholdl.i1 iiUld defines low-J.neo[tle households as those
wi~h a median i.t:t.come

of more tb.an fii't)' percent but lesa than eighty peroent of the mediftll income of the

a-rea. and vezy-low income h01llle\lolda asc those with less tl:uu~ :My percent of the medhm income. Idaho
10

CodeAcl:L § 67·8102(9), (10).

II

The Plaintiff argues the Legislature S1lec{fically chose to addles, affOl-dmble housing in separa.

12

and. distinct statutes. The lItatut~s cited flbova do not make it au. absolute reqlliIement to build affordable
13
14
15

bowing.

Rather. the Plaintiff argues such statutes limit a looal government' $ nb.ility to provid

affordable !lousing tnIOup bonds or Imlinent domain or to otIer hlcellti.ves suoh as tax or impact fee
e:x.ernptions to

davela.l'~rs.

The City ofMcrCI\.II, on the ot.h$r hand, argul!l$ !:bat nOlle of the Qbove statutes

17

prohibit the City from pasSi:ag legi$lation to provide .for .hOUsing

28

wor.kforce. Wlult th= lI.bove statutes

111m olear is

that t1w

thJl.i

Legish~1;gIC

15 affordable to the
ena~d

has

City'S

provisions bal

thl'oU/?Jl the Idaho Housing 8JJ.ci Firlance Association as well as local housing authorities at the city l11ld
eoUJ.lty level to ~ affordable hoU3ln.g.

liowevl'l'. 'the Idsb.o Suprcm.e Collrt has held tbs.t "[aJ local QTOioance which merely go
I

further than Ii stnte statute in impostnS additional tegwtlt!on of 1\ given. c;;onduot does nut conflict with
state law." Yoyle, v. City

of Namp4. 97 Idaho 597.601,548 P.2d 1217, 1221 (1976). FutthcmlOlC,

under LLUPA, :'[wlhe.c.wer the ordi:Q~~s made under this chapter ImposB hisher I1Itanda.rc'ls tbaa. at
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..._

by "" C>tbor

1.
2;

.L '"

ebapter ahaU gO'Vem." 1

:'l

reaardini comtD.unity or

4

legislature Impliedly p .

5

provia!: the framoworI(

G

Ioool

ri,,,,,,,, ... JXOVisions of _ . nadc _

lI>

cbl

o Code: Ann. § 67-6518. Although there is exteD8ive Stil.tutory regulation
Ol"dablc housIng fOT lew income households, this Court does .I1ot find t/lat th
p~d

the entire field. of affotdable housing. While sucllJesislatloJ:l. me;

-regulations relating to affordable housing. there is uothing in these statutes
~ity :from enacting a zonmg ordinan;!:

with respect to affordable hOl.lsl1\g.

-;
I!

10
U

No. 819, if a developer cOllll1ructs commw::U.ty housing ull1ts as rentals. th

Under Ordin

.,

da'Velop1ll1' is

r~w;ed

to 1I.W1" Into Il C07;lwunity lfo1.18mg Agreement which provides the COllstructiO

speolfioati011!, sales an

r rental teans, and the restrictions placed on the units to ensure thei

'2

pe.xmanent aL'fotd.ability

compliance wIth tbe CO!l1Tll1.lllitlr Housing Guidelines. Such housing is

13

pen:nanently deed-restrl

d affordable housing subject to the regulations governing potcntial rente:ra

14

wi.tb.

1!l

q~ inconle ItOl$'

VARHA reco1l1lllClIUis .re.ntal or sale

priCI:I~ to the City of McCall,

although. the City has the ultimate IlUtbority on price Or T~ restrlctiollfil. Such deed res!rict;ollS

flI1

afftu'dable houswg classifi tion remain t'ilild to the property alld 1'11.0. with tile land to fu.tu.te owners. The
l'

Ci1¥ 01' MoCall argues it lSta.ms an i:ntorest in the deed-reatnC"ted community hOl.l&lllg through the
19

:1.1

community houling agree ent entered into by the property ownerS and thtougb the tegr.Uations whioh

Plailltlf[ arguas that such r

111

nt reauictlo.l1S Amount to II violation ofldal1o

Code S()c:tion 55·307(2).

Idaho Code Seetio 55·307 provides in pertinent part as follows:

A local govermnen: unit shall not enact. maintain, or enf'Orce an ordlnanco or 1'esolution
that would have th effect of controlling the aznount of rent chuied. for lelllol3ing private
residCl"ual propertyl 'l"hia provision does not impgir lhq dgTrf otanv legal governmelltal
ynlt to (f.ffVia,ge and ggnJrqi mtdllKt(aZl?tD!JerlV II! wIdell !he lqcaZ gov!lr'nmqatW1dniJ har
G P1'QPtV'1V tntufl~.t·l
HmIOlIANDOH D2C:CS:ot NOD OI'J)EiI. - pAGJi 19
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1

Idaho Code Ann. § 55-307(2) (cmplwis added). 'rhe stat.ute expresslY allows a loea! govemmental uru
to enact s.. rcsoll.l1ioJl that would have the effeet of controlling rent if !.be governmental

~Lt

"propeny mterest" in the. .residential property. The City argues it has an. interest in

affilrda.b[;:

SUCll

has

housing, explaining that its interest, while Itot a pOS!essoty interest, is II. regulatoty CII:Id adrninislnativ
~

iutereSt "applied through V AR.HA, to maintain. the tlPkeep end usdUJ.nsss of SlJ.ch Ilffordable l:1ou5i.n

7

uml3 and to I!l1l1UlO tbillt such u:oits are utilized only by thoBe individuals qualitYlng fOr the low income

e

homing,"

Under Idaho Code S~tion SO-1904, aeity housing authority hIlS the power to r<l..iIS~ arrent an
10
l~

ciWellings • • . embraced in any h01.'lSing .project .•. [andl to establish and revise
1h.erefQre.!~

Idaho Code Ann. § 50..1904(d); !'ee aLso

tasbe Code Ann.

~

renla or charges

§ 31·4104(d) (county haus'

12

authntlty). 'Furthermore, these provlsiorul provi<k a bOlll!;ng authority with the power to

acquire Sllch

13

teal property thr~h

c:minel)t

dommn or with :funds obtained throuih is.su8l1ce of II. bond. Sell Idaho

15

Coda Ann. §§ 50-1914. -H.l16; 31-4214, -421G. A housing authority would olearly have a "prop

H

interest" in such property and the aut]lorlty £0 control r¢llfS. See Idaho Code A.nc.. §§ 50-1$'1:) end 31.

l'

4213.. This Court. does nQt conclude that the City of McCall possesses the same interest as a housLn

1a

al.Tthority Which owns real pl'op~.

The CIty of McCall admits it lias only a. regulatory or adminlS1nJ.ti.ve interest. This CO'Ilrt i3 no
2Q

22
23

(:ol1.vlncel! that such intere:rt attlO1.U1ts to Q "property i~est" under section 55-307(2). The landowner or

cl.eveloper of afForda.ble lwusing would retain a property interest lIubject to regulation. To hold tbat
local iovemrnont entity has

III

p%Qpozty Inn::rest in:teal property when it exercises only B regulatory 0

24

admInistrative f'LIllcTJ.on WQuid e:;se.ntiIll.Uy eviscerate Idal10 Code Seotion 5:5-307, which prohibits a 10l:a.\

25

goverllDlent from cOl1trolling rent ClllU'gc4 for leasing private :re:dde.ntial. prOperty.
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Co

WAd/I8/" the Onlinances &lIct lin Ururlltllorl:ed T/r% Dr Me Dfseuued Impact Fs.u
Initially

2
3

II.

dIstinction m.ust be dta.WIl with respect to Ol'dblanoe No!. 819 and 820.

ordillanc=s II%e essentially aJ.tempting 10 JZ!IlJ!i!J! for aff'OTdable h01l8ing rathel than

~

affordable

housing. Altb.ousn the Court deters to the City 'ot McCall's findings relating tu the Il.eed for atfordabl
housing IUld. t'he Cil!y'e sincere effortS 10 provide for such, this COlll't is

bc:ms asked

to deCide

eonstitu.tionaLity of the means f.ile Clty of McCall is Iltilizing to provide fClt' flifordable })ouslng. Tho CI

ofMcCa1l hi.lS ll:I.etieu1ously engineered Q land we provlsio.ll. 'Which requires tandoWDers and d~l()p
Q

to give O'VCr $l)1Ucetbing of value in exelum.ge for the right to develop a stllldivisiO'l;! or build. a reidden .
10

Ullit.. Whil,the Ci1y of McCall e:rguIlS tllat Ordinance Nos. BIg and. 820 merely regulate the growth 0

11

resIdential housfug in McCall, it is undeniable that the _rut goals of such orcUnances lite to provide fo

12

"a reasonable supply of affQrdable, deed reWfctsd workfolCc housing (cOlIlmumty housing)." Such

13

ordinances oontemplate that in exMlUlie for approval and lssua.ncc of a. b1ll1ding permit a.land.ovmer

11,

develtlpe.t' must give over something of valulJ, whether it be an agreetnent to provide

deed~ mtricte

inc!usiollilZ)' housJng, the conveyance efland. or a fee \Illder Ordinance No!. 819 or 820. Thererore, this

Courtmu!t detemLi11c whether the City of McCall has authority for exacting such "fee. ,,16
17
l6
19
20

22

23

When the Cou.rt UBiIUi the tom ":fee" .U ill r"~errin9 to allY and. aU ot th~
priodt1elil listed unde!r' Crd.:l.l'lancs No. 819, and. ngt mer$ly 10he "in lleu fee" I,ll\der
tho fourth prio):ity_
.E'u.rche::m.Ol:B, it i& unc!.erstcod that utlde. Ordinance NO. I!~O.
the cOI1IIIIun.:l.l:.l! !'Icu,s1n!i to is a "fea'" in IIny general tIIInslI:! of the WOT-d. The Court' II
analys:l.s .:1.8 not :rel5tr.:l.cted to 'the fllot tl'l&t unt;le:", the firllt two priod'til!5 0
oy,Cl,inanoe No. 819, the landow.Qe:: ill lIlot :T:e:t..l.n.qu.:l.:ehing' oontrol over his OJ:' her
prope:~y.
~hi~ doe~ not m$lIn thAt the 1.n~owner {s nc~ in e~senQe pay1n9 a pr~ee 0=
II "Cee" to the City of Mct:aJ.l .f!o%' the pdVj,le9'~ of $~clivic:lin9' or erect11'1g
i11lprovel'Jlents Oll his or ne;:: land.
This Court :reC:"!1llizu the {a.ct tMt:: the Cjty 0

14

McCaU hIllS

eh",r~oe.eri:l;.d. .IIuch .!:'aqu.!.rOll.\ent &8

?~avisionl!

a "eIJ.b8i<i,y amount," as deJ.'inl!d by the

fez; land con_yenee iill1d the in USl.'l tee.
Sail C£!;y of "".. 01141 Ord1.nanct!
No. 019, 6 1iI,7,lOIAj(4){e) lind § 9.7.10(1'1.) (5)(b). !the):'efore, it:: i.~ appropr.1ete for
':his COUl:'t 1:.. find that the ~equ;!.=er:"mt41 under. ;my or t.he £0= pld.o:hJ.BII 1o;rclinancta No. S:l.S constitute 1Il "£ee.'"
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M\Ulicipalities I n Il.Uowea pursuant

to

the Idaho Co

tutiDn to ensct fees Dr impose taxes '10

1

the public or on paxtioula:r persons:

~

(1) by legislative en

municipality to fund. a p~ject through tb.!C assessmlmt

ot tax

wbich

speei~alJ.y

permits til

s or fees; ot' (2) p1Xt$Wll1t to the polic

= power for the collection of revenue: inoidf:ntlll to the en.fi

:t of a regulation.

Sec idaho BUil

Cot/ftacloTO Ass 'n \I. Cily ofCoeur J) ~lBns. 126 Idaho 740, 74 -43, 890 .P.2d 326, 3l8·29 (1995).
'7

Article 7, :l8ctitm 6 of the Idaho Co:ast1tutfon expr6S$ provides tnat a city has the power

a
assess IUld collect UlXos for all purposes of the citY OQ!pOra.tiO!l
10

7• .sec(ion 6 of the Idaho Conatitulion permits II. m,1.llliclpel co

ntiOI1 to

I1Ssess and collect taxes for th

11.

PI.I1.'pOSIIS oftlle corporation, that taxing authorltyis not sel:f.ex eutiug and is limited to that tIiXin& '(lowe

12

given. to 1be municipality by tho Idaho Legislature. Ii. at 742. 90 P.2-d at 32& (oiting BrewSftl' v. Ci1Jl 0

U

Pocatello, lIS ldabo 50l. 503-04. 76B 1'.211 765, 756-67 1998». :Neither party has asserted any
statutoIjl

)~

authorIty Whiob would pennit the City ofMcCsll to mpose 9. tax through Ordinance Nos. 1119

anel 820, ln fact. tile City Qf Mccall denies that the fees or costs imposed upon lauaoWl:l.el's in either

16

Ordtaance Nos. 819 or 820 constitute 4 tax. Ratl)er, the City

U$~

such fees ere 1s.'I.Vful pllt'5UlU1t to its

1;

Under Article 12, section 2 of the Idaho Constimti

19

20

a

muni~ipality

may enact reg\llation

Illll'$Uant to i1S police power far the furtherance of the pub e 'health. safety, morals, or welfare of i

residenTs. Idaho Canst. Art. 7 § 6. Pumtant to those police owers.!l. lllunieipnlity may provide for the
22

collection of revenue incidental to the ClDfo(t;;eIDent of a tcgul

1I3

Idaho at 74~..43J 890 F.ld at 328·29. However, IlUCh. municip fees 111USt bc rationa!1y related to the cos

tiOIl.

Jdaho Bldg. Contractors A.a8 'n, 12

of e.cfon..'illg the reauIation and. cannot be assessed purely as a. revenu.e-getllInlting sclum'l.e.

Br8wst~r

v.

City of !'()t!I'.I.UJlc. l1S Idaho 502. S04, 708 P.2d. 76S. 76 (1988). If the £ee or c:illll'jtc is il'l'lposeQ
2II1ZMol1lUJ)UM Dl!lC:!:S:tON

AND
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primarily for xevel'\ue raising .PU1:posts, it l$ in ~Ience , tall; 1ItJ,Q. Q'8ll only be upheld unde,r 1he power 0
laxation. rrhlv:J Bldg..

CQflII'4ClO1'S us '12,

126 ltiIWl at 743,890 P.2d lot 329.

The City ofMoCall argues ~b.at Ordinance Nos. 819 and gJO are not revenue raising meeblll'ltllJllS

3

bLlt rather 121\0 1.1Ie lesu1ati~.ns ~ted through the City's J1f11iee powers to control 2otdc.g regulation

s

within the City's jl.lrisdiction because Buch ordinances control a specific Ulje of land I!ll.d developme

&

Just as the City of Coeur 1)'Alene Elrgued ill idaho Butldln.g COlllraclars ANsociatlr:m. the City ofMoCa

7

argUQ tbBt Oldinallce Nos. 819 a.nCl &20 have bean

~ted

for the purposes of ~0lX10tittg the heel

v.relfltt'e, safety. aud morals of the residents of McCall. See Idaho Bldg. Contractors ks 'II. 126 Idaha a
9

10

743.890 P.2e1 at 329,
In Brewster, the ldah.o Supreme Catm stldressed. the validity of IU1 Qrdmance passed by the "it

of 'Pocatello abarging a 5treet restOraf;\oll and maintenance fee upon all

OVJXletS 01"

OCCtLprulU of prop

13

in the City of Pocatello pursuant to II. fonnula. re±1.ect!ng the: traffic which was estlma.ted \0 be generated

:.4

by that particular property. ld. at 50.2, 768 P.2d at 765. The Court beld that "the: revenue to be collec

15

from PocliteJlo IS meet fee hu no )lecessary rell1tionthip to the reg.ulll.'tion of travel over irs streetS. bul
rather

i~ to ie~

funds tor the non-regulatory

maintenance and repair of streets is

11

f\.!nc1iQD

of repairIng;

nod-regula.tOry fimctiOll

8Ii

QllI.'t

maintaining meets, Th

the temus apply to the 1'acts of th

ill$tam csse," [do at 504. 768 P.2d at 761. The fcc: imposed by tM otdlnanco in BrtfW81fJr effectively was
20

a general tax. ratbet than an i 1'l.c.idental reg\uato1'Y fee. '1n. iii. l1,eneral sense

21

public s~rvl~ rendered to the partioullU' consumer, whil$ a WI is

2:2

IDl'ge to meet public Deeds." ld at 505, 768 P.2d at 768.

11

II.

fee is

II

charge 3Qt a dIre

forceQ contribution by the public

Under Ordinance No. 819, tb.e sl1bsitiy c.rel!l.'ted ei'tlwr by requiring land.o'WMll to deed rl1B1ric;t a

pl:!r.l;elltu.ge of Ullits as COll'l'lUUllity howing. to eOl1\1e'y laud, or to pay an in lieu fee appe8l.'S to be

h')novlllive wuy of creating at" generating atrord&ble housing, Quit" plainly.

wet!

8l'l

the fees col1ected
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1

p\1rmant to OrdiJ:lanl:t No. 820 ere for th.e purpose of "planning. subsidi~ing, developUJa or COllstru4lti
~l')mnl\lnilY

housing." City of McCIll1 Ordmance No. 820. § :U.21(E)(4). To be: a valid fee, the

must be incidental to the GnfOlcetuent of the regulutloll lIlld bear II -reasOl'Ulble relationship to the cost
4

tmfoJ:cing such le~ulation.

Brl!'W$lBl',

11 S Idaho

lit

504, 768 P'.2d at 767; fie also It'Oftsr '8 Inc.

Y.

Bah;

Cil)l. 63 Tdab.o 201,118 P.2.d 121 (lSl41).

The City of MaCall Brg1.les it has specific
7

subsidy under 0rdinatI.ce No. 819, or

II

Sl1MoIy l1"L1fhodty

UD.der the tLtIPA

to

require

fee under Ordinance 'No. 8l0, to provide for aafe, affcrdab\

e
housmg. Generally spcakitl,g, the LLUPA. goveXl1& ionlng regulations sw:h

38

setbacks. density, an

9

10

height fegulatIona. Ss, SpreTlgsl', Grubb &0 .4.830C8.

\I.

Ctl')1

of Hailey.

127 Idaho 576.903 P.2d 741

II

(199S). However. as dlscussed previously. the LLUPA does not pl"OvidfI the City with any authority fo

l2

eMCting ordi.D.a.l:lces wnich. require tbat developer" provide aifordable bousing, let alont! authority to

l3

impose a fee or require a. sWlsldy from lSlldowll,m

to

futlhcr suoh goals. To tiw contrary. LLUPA

provides ~"C
Feu establ18h;d for purposes of lult.iga.t.ing the financial .Impacts of developtllent must
comply with the provisions of chapter 82, title 57. lda.ho Code. Deoial of Ii lIubdivision
pWJ%lit or approval of a subdivision permit 'With cond.itiotls unaceeptable to the land()'WXler
tnay be subject to the tegulatory taltinS analysis provided fo1' 'by .ectlon 67-8003, Idal,o
Code,. consisteDtwlth 'the requirements c.stabllshed thereby.

11
19

ldeho Code Aml. § 67.6513, Chapter 82 iB the Idaho Development Impact 'Fee Act,17 and provides fo
the impositiDn by ordiuance of deve10pJnent lmpa.ct fees IlS a couclirion of c:Ievelopm.ent approval. Idaho

11 'the J;cll!.hc Cevelopment: ll!lpacl: Fee 1»ct
a£.fo):d~le to .families whose l.ncQl1\es cio

c1e:t1nI!8 "affcu:-da,bl$ houlling" a.s "hQu&in\j
"(It Q>(",eecl. tl>igh'!el' polore.en'l: (1I0tl) of l!nlll

11.'1C!:Qme to%! the &el:'ilit::0 a1"O& 0): areas w1thin th.. jti:cilidic:tJ,oa. o! the
qQV'''~nmental en.titlt'.
Idaho Coda Ann. Ii 67-8203 (1) • Fw:tlle;mozolt, the liIQt de:t.ines
"develol)lIIlUlt re~\lil.riilr..ent" as ". re'l"5.r_en-e a"t'tacnec:l to .a cievelo.,msntal approva.l Ill:
otber 9cv8rnmiiln~al aQt~On apprQ~in9 or .uthori~tns a particular development p&cject
inC:.\.\I.c:U.ng, bUll not. l.ttnit:.ed. t.o, ill .l:'ez.oninq, which ):'eqW..t'liment cOlIlpels th. pallrrasnt,
ded.iC:liltion or cont.ril:n:lt1on Of goods, servic.l!Is, la)'ld, or llIoney all a condition Q:f
"P9%CllI'a1." lcl8ilCl CCde Arm. § 1$'~S:203! 10). Onclllr ,.actiao 6'1-8204.

m-Clj"liIn
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Code- AM. § 151·8204. A develo,P1'llQt impact fee is ''Payment of money Imposed as a eonditiOl.~

development approval to pay for a plQpOrticmate share of tbe

Q

of system improvements noeded to

CQ$t

serve de"e1oprnen.r." IClal10 Code Alm. § 67·8203(9). Such feet "shall net ~ceed ap!:Qportiooate mare
of the QOst of !)'steln improVmlentII." Idaho Coda Anll. § 67-8204(1).
5
/1

,
a

s
10

The critica! language in tbe tdaho DCMlopmeut Impact Pee Ac:t is that !he purpose of such ~ct 1

to proVide funds nece.llsat;Y for "pl11l'lJl.iDs1. and fitwlcillil publio facilitie3 ueeded to serve new Sl'owth an
development •.• tlecesSazy •• - to ptOlnote and aocQlUtllodate orcletly 8l'owth and development and. lo

I protect the pu.blic health, safety and gen~al welfara."
de(1llOd

a&

Idaho Cod= M»" § 61-8202. ,Public facilities liT

water woril:a, waste facilities, roads, S1l'ee1:S, and bridges, storm water oollection, parks

wen.

capital improvemenUi, sa

as ptlbUo safety facilities such

ill!

law C1l/oroem.em.

II.Il

fire; emergency

medical BltQ. rescue and street lighting facilities. lllaho Code Ann.. § 67-8203(24). Ultimately, while th
r~o

'Development Impact Pee Aot allows

I1ll

exception to imposing

So

develo-pment impaQt fee

01'

atrordllbll1l housing, the AJ:;t does not co.ntemplate the imposition ot d~valopmBnt impact fees to ens
i!Il1

adeq\:U/,te affordable houslng supply or to cU,lIe.lop such. T:berefote, this Court is uMble to cOllclude

1B
1\. c:levelClPll\ent :I.lnpact ~ee ord.inancl!! n:y 1i<X1!It\9t 6.11 or part Qf ill
pa.t'1:~cu:J,ar de'Velcpmant project f.e>m c:leve:J.cp:nent impact: £eea prov1clClc:l.

19

th~c

8UC~ prc~ect: ts dete~n4d to crG~tQ B£fc~d$ble houeinq, provi~c:I
p~l~c policy Wh~ch supports the a~mpt~on 1a cont~ineQ 1n
g'over/.llllent:al entity's clmPreh~nSiva plal'l and. prcvidQC thilt the exen\pt

tne

that the

development" SO
~hrou9h

22

a

p:rCl?ortion.!ll:e

~evenue eO~d~

sharp.

of

system

i/llprC>'lfll!menl:s

other than dovelepment impaCt

J.s

!1)nd.ec1

~ee81

ill"

;Idaho Cede S 67-a204 (l.OI •
ZssentiilLly, a. c:l.ty may p~o"'ide
,incentive tQ~ t:ne
c:reat.i.on o£ affordab.le bQus:l.nQ' by eltC!%!lpUr>g the cillve'lopma"t: impact!. fec, provide
~l1at:
l!IU~
e>:emptio:. 1&
witM.n the city' e CQlIlPrei'lanaive plan and ~hl!lt l51Jch
Ptopc~tionate ~hare of ey$~sm ~Np~ovementQ 1= funded
state or fe~eral Eundi~q of af~Q:dab~e hQUoinq.

through

~nather $o~r~e

such eQ

zf the fees imposed under O:r:dAntlnc:e: NOli. aU and BaO ere development ,1.ntpe.c.t eeea,
SQc:h

:l:ees

wg~ld

e""*'P";icm to the

of

~ilo"'4Bbl&

be

contrary 1: .. 'the Il'tIIt:&d

ilIIpQllit:l.on 01.

!lUob.

.i.nt~n~:l.on
1!ol;;

67-9204

to prQv1da

B

the davelcpmenl::

housing.

~mc PEC:l:S:EOM .li:bl1) OllDEa. -
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1

"'" "'_ ....uubsidy undw """...... No. 819, '" ...

tb.fJ Idaho DsveIopmen~ )'mpact :Fee Act.

~

0.11""". No •• 20,;' .....,.;'"

J

Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Com in IdQho BuOdlnr Contl'actors A..fSliclalioll found that the

1

fee imposed by the city's ord.i!'1a:llGe "purports to a$$ess a fee to suppon additional facilities or service
made necessary by the development,
the public at lc!tge to

~ to

snift the cost of those additional facilities and services from

the clevelopm.ent itself'," lei In IdJIho Building Contractors AS$oclaJion. the City 0

Coeur D'Alt!:Q.e htJ4 enacted an QrdinflJl(:C wbich tequifed a capitalbllWOD fee to pay for a. propoTtlO!lll.te

a

l~

share of the cost of itnprovemellts needed to serve dev~lQpmen1. The cu:pitali2ation fee wu imposed 0
all bUilding pemlits. in an atte1l1Pt to have gTowth pay fo\' growtb. Relying on tb.e analYsis in Brewster.

the Court held:
[T]he assellsment here is no different thm a oharge for the privilege of living in the Ci"ty

of COWl d'Alene.. It is a .i)rtvllege shared. by the S~ public which utilizes the same
facilities and. eervicc:s fJ& tholie p1.nciUlSIng building permits for new CXl.llSU"UClioll. 'me
in1pal;t ;fee at issue here sm-es thf purpOIS g!pyo1l!4ing fjmdWg for plio 3,§1"JtAA,£ at
lmll, B!YI nPI IQ th! indM4uql Q8lw'!g. end lherefAre tg e ts, The fact that adclltionaJ.
t,tervlol:li are nllwe necessary by growth and development daes not cl1a:Jlge the essential
nature oftbe services provided: they lire for the public at lBti,c.

15

Idaho Hldg. Contrqc%()rs Ass 'If, l.2.6Ic1aho at 744, 890 1'.2d at 330 (c:mpbasill added).
:'7

The Idaho Supreme Court digtinguislu!d taxes from. fees, stating that "t!U;cs serve. the purpose Q

1.9

19

provid~n.i iimding for publio servioes at largol

20

01' the particular servJee provided by the state to the lndividual," ld. (cit.i.u8 .4.lperr v. Saire Water Corp.,

wbereas a fee serves only the pUTpose of coverJng the COs

118 Idaho 136. 145, 795 P.2d 298,307 (1990». Quoting the Bt6W$ter Court, the lcUlho Supreme Co
22

aoknowled.gcd. its previous holdIng stating:

23

'.4

It is only re&soDable and fair to requ.irc the busiuejlll, t1"1ffic, act, ot ~g that necessitates
poIfoing to 'pay this expense. 1'0 do _0 has been Ulliformly Ulfhald by the courts. On Ihs
other hand, rhis,power l'fUlJI nOI b$ re.'CJ7tBd to a.r /'J shield ot subtel'fugfJl linder whtch to
B1I&lCr and eriforca Q l'~venuli/*rai~-ing ordinancll 01' statute.
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Id (quotlng BrBW*tB1', 115 Idtlho

lit 504,

7fJB 1".24 4Lt 767). In Idaho Building Co,m'acto!'" Associatiol1,

tho Idaho Supreme Court affirJlled the district

COUTt'5

dcciliiOIl holcling that the muniClipal ordlnanee

imposing fees was not e.uthorized by the Developmtillt Impact Fee Act and that suob fee was essentially

lax provIding :funding for public services at IBTge. Ed. at 743-44. 890 P.2d at 329-30.
Likewi$e, the City of McCslJ is

~tt=lpting to

have growth in McCIIi1 pay fot' growth.

Esseu.t1ally.landownets and developers are being charaed II premitlm, by way of either a subsidy or a fol'l,
7

to llve in tho City of McCaiI. There has been no suggestion that the Landowner or developer eAjoys some

s

bWlefit,. othel than II. benefit ostenaibly to be reaJiacd by the public
lC

building permit tee uucI~ Ordi.o.u.ncc

NOB.

819

IIlld

large, from payill3 the $ube.ic!y 0

820. 18 While the landowner or devoloper may b

teSidential Ullit if he OT she fails

11

denied a permit

12

subsidy or pa.y the.fee, the ~'benefit" he Or she: receives in subdividin& his or her land does not distingu'

to

develop a subdlVision or bulld

Ilt

II.

the subsidy or fee from a tax. A.dmittedly, the benefit p:rovidec1 is to assure

"/1

to

provide the

:teasonable &\\'pply (1

affordable, deed restricted worlctorce housing (c:om1'.QWlity housiD.g) being made IIVlIila'ble ••• [to] criticlI

protllssional wor1ters, essential senoica persol3D.el, illld
proximi~

servic~

workers" who are able 1.0 live within

to their work, Whatever b~efit the landowner reoeives 1a no diffe.tent thml a benefit reaeivt!

fIIld. shared by the pl\blic at large. The 1.sJ:)l( of affordable workforce hou.tring i!l
19

Il. PTQblem

fOT which th

public should bear the cost to rem6d), tather thau impolliog the burc:11l11l on a few landowners 0

7.0

21.
,~ 'l'h" City

of McCall atteJIIPts to nque th;l!t the blrneUt to the land.ownQ~ .lIS twofold:
el) aElIiUranCe thai: "cl:'itiaal pl:ofl!!u1onal workers, ElIIIl1I!meu,l serviCe
personnel and seu:vs.ce wo:rl\'s;r" live w.Lthil'l p.oll1mity to their work t.o p"ov.l.
municipal and pr:l.vatG seotor IlCu:vic::ee;" and {jill inc:enUvel! $I.lch as d.endty bonu~ss,
equity ~uilder p~Q9rams, and p:~¢~i~y in $swage and water bOOKU~S, The cenQfic 0
eS$ential wo~~£o:ce 8Q~viC:QS ~~ • »a~e!i~ .ha~ed »y tno p~l~c a~ l~rg@, A$ eo thQ
.\.1\~"Ilt::!.ves e lancCWl'1er recdves, sl~c:h inc:q,ntlves il;l:EI .not Qlearly Qutlinetl in tnll
ordinance!; I:hamselvQIt and i:h.ill CQ"r:!: is not pa:lOsue.o.Bd tbat tOOl'!. incantive5
prov!deri in ellcnonqc for the sUbsidy or fees paid p~r8uant ~a Ord~nanaQ Nos. 819

no.

01.1"
~n

26
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d$velopeta. therefOre, the PUIpO!lIt of the silbsiay or fee U%lder OEdinanee 'Nos. 819 and 820 is fOl' t!l~
l

benefit of publio ellnrlees at larS" ratb.OJ' tb.ez! II. benefit to the individual assessed.
The City of MoCalll.1l'ges tbs.t this CollIt'S amIysls, in d.eteml.ining whether the fe~ imposed n

3

disguised taxes. should focus on whether the funds collected a.re dlablned in accoJdSllQe with the state
5

purpose of the regulll:If.~. Howc:ver, this step in the ana.b'sis should cmne only !U!£ a determlnfttion that
tb.e City ofMoCaJ.l1,ad 8.uthorit;y to impose sueh fees. In Loomis 11. C#y oj He;.fley, 119 Idaho 434, 1107

7

P.2cl1272 (1991). and. also in Schmidt '1'. Village of Klmbdrly. 74 Idaho 48, 2S6 P.2d '15 (1953), thl1:

;lduho Supreme Court tound. that the fees impllsed. v.rere collected. pursuant to the Idl'lho Revenue Boo
10

Act. Under those ei~e6> the Court was reqa.ired to detormine whether the fees were collecte

II

under the IPlise of1he Act IiUld allooated and lIpent otherwise Oll. projects not reJated to the ordillanue.

32

Suoh is not the situation In the underlyins case. Therefore,

13

under Ord.lzlal1ee Nos. 819 and 820 lire p1'opcrly enactJ;d pursuant to the City's poUoe "owen, it need not

UnJI:S!l

the Court finds the fees impose

determine whether such ~s are bel.n.g properLy disbtrrscd in ac:corcWlCe with the stated P'"tpOlies 01

. 1. Wlterber Qrdfn/ZlJt:s Noa.{tl.9 and 820 grB Utyga.umakle orArkilWJI
17

Thll third prong 1lI1der Habbs is to detennlc.e whether:
:19

O~e No. 819 is a rcaso.nable oJ

arbitrary e.o.ae1ment. 11I.e PIain.t.i.f'.l'DI'gues that Ordinance No. 819 operates lUi a TOguJatiun of ownetsb.i.l'l

20 . rather than a lau.d use TegWation, A3 an otdiD.ance regoJating a landoW!lCr's ownership rather than use, It
21

is an 81'bitratY ami um'08sonable elteroise of tlw police powers and violates tho OOJ.lStitutioaal pt'owotion

22

given by the due process clause. Tho Plaintiff relies on 0 'Connt)r v. CUy ofMb8COW. 69 Idaho 37. 202

21

P.2d 401 (1949), for the propo!1itioJl that a :ZO\li.ng ot4inil.llcc ttlJl.y o.lll.y regulate use, oot ownership, 0
propelt)'. Ii. at 43, 202 P .2d at 404 ("A zoninB orctinsncc deal!! basically with the t.\8e, not ownersbip, c

25

'ptOPeny·")·
lP.!ENO~Ql(

IlECISJ:O)i' AND 0Rl)1'ilJ. - PAGE 28
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and second, those: wbich pmen"be the use 10 which buildings withln cettain designated disf:ricts mq b
ld. at41, 202. P.2d a.t403. The city of Moscow atteJnpted to reEtdot eertafn businesses to OM

G

pUt-II

5

gf the bJJSilles$

II

would constitute a

dis1ri~

in downtown by adopU.g an ordinanc~ that pzovld=!! any gba.:D.ge of ownership

!WW

or additional btlSiness.

Therefore. my non.-collfomting busiD.ess wbi

attempted. to sell to a lJJeW owner would be prohibi~ ftom operating such bU&iness as it was a. «new
e

additiOXllll" business.
9

10
;!.3,

ownership to be a nCW business was void u being an ar'bi1rary and llIlreaeonable exeroise of the eicy'

12

police l'ower ~la.tinS the constitutional protections giV6l1 bytbe due process clause. Ttl.

~ 43, 202 P.

at 404. ByenactlDg an orWnance relati.ug to the business district and the uses ofprope:rty within certain
14
15

limits of the city, the City of'MosCQW was regulating the use of suoh pl'O'Perties. However, attempting t
make a change in ownersbip a ''!:leW bliS'l.ness" was arbilraty and unreasonable.

16

u
:.s

residential or oomm=cW. HC)wevcr. the City of McCall'. re<l.ulJ;ement that twenty percent C1f ne

subdivisions be deed-restricted as Clommunity hollliIlg regulates mu\OhJ:l:lOn) tbar.1 a Jandawnet'i ''ue'' 0

.'2 a

lrlA or he!: property. The restri.~tions for aommllllity h01lsin,g dictate the priDe for which the property xna:

31

be solli and 10 whom the propenymay be sold. 2wn iftbe leliownor bllilds "enta1 units, the restrictions

22

that tw~1l1Y percent oftbc units be commtmity hou.sing alae tmUt hgw much rellt a landowner may charg

23

and. to whom the u.cl.t& may be: JeIl(ed. These restrictions go much faxther than merely regulating the us

114

of ~ jnsteaa. they eBse%lually regulate ownersllip of the propettY by dictating to wbom a unit

25
26
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be sold. or rented This Court concludes such "regulalion" is arbitrary and. lUmlasonable as .. land us

This Court is con.vim:ed that the bnpoaitiol1 of the su&aidy or fee reqWred. under Ordinal:lce Nas.

3

819 and 1.20 are. in reality, a ~ aDd Jlat aNgulation,

~gh suoQ. o:rc:\inaJl.ccs. the City ofMoCall

attempted to J)rOvide for Ilffords.ble housing eitber by requiting developen to P8¥ for auch by subsidl
6

7

tbe housing mad:.et or ~y reql.llrlng lanc:1owners tc pay a eott.ml\UUty bfJusin, fee for new resi4el:ltial
buUding pen:xdts. nero is noiUDg whicb regulates 1ht use oflmd. other than requirln$ a landowner to

8

lief Mh 8llbsidy or fees. Tbere:fc:e, this Court finds thll't Ordinanoe Nos.
loll

81~

and 820 i:rnpennissibl

exceed the Cif;y'$ police powers as they impose !I. tax without legislative authority aUowinS the City 0

McCllll to emu:t such we. Furthermore. to the ~ tbat aw;:h oxdillSJlcea att=pt to xegulaw ovomership
(i.e. restricting a landowner's

rlsitt

tD

sell or rent lots and Wli13 by l'stJ.\1iring affordable housing

provisions). such ordinances aro arbiulltY au4 U!I1'e3SOnable.
Given these

~luaions,

there is no need to a.ddress the rcmaming issues or challenges by the

Plaintiff of violation of tho Equal Protec:tioD. Cla.l.lSe, lha lmCortlti:tU1ional '4t.akiug" analysis, Qr the abil\~
U'

orthe City QfMcCall to COl1tract with VARHA.
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. i

'I!

.

CO~CLU~JON

For the foregoing reasons, thls Court hereby GRANTS ~: Plaintiff's. Motion for Summ

:a
3

J~dgatem, ilnding Cjty of McCall Ordinance Nos. 819 and 820 exceed' the City of McCall's poll

powers as

~

ptovide for unauthorized tB.'ltes and

IUjl,

therefore. "VOid and without force and.effect..

5

Counsel for Plaintiff aha1l Bllbmit any proposed judgm ents consistent with this deciaion, .subject to th

6

tight of Defendant' s counsel to review for fonn.

7

AND IT IS SO ORDEIUID •.

a
Dated this

111fay of. ~. 20'08.

.'
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Thomas F , Nev:il1o
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAllJNG

z·
3

I hereby cerli:1Y that on this

!:1 clay of fi..h (4 '2008, 1mailed (,erved) a true and correct

copy ot the \Vithin instt'\l£llent to:

Davld GrattOn
Ii

.,

9

V1ctcr Villops

EVANS KEANE u.P
1405 West Main
l' ,0. Box 959
Baile,ldaho 83701·0959
Tc1ephanc: (:2.08) 38+1800
Paosimile; (lOI) 345.3514

10
11

William A. Mo.ltow

1;:

Christopher D. Gabbext
Jill S, }{olinkl1

l~

WI-IrrBPBTSMON,P.A.
5700 .Bast l:Imk.Iin R.oad.. Suite 200

1(

Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901
Telephone: (208) 466-9272
Facsimile! (208) 466.4405
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ARCHIE N. BANBURY
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ey County, IdAho
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Appendix C SCHAEFER

V. CITY OF SUN VALLEY

RECEIVc:n
JUL U62007

FILE

Givens PUrsley, LLP
I

I

Jo/ynn Drage. Clerk District
Court Blame Couniy, Idaho

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JlJDICIAL DISTRlCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLATh"E

PHIL ANTI LTh"'N SCHAEFER,

)
)

Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
v.

CITY OF SUN V ALLEY, IDAHO, a
Political subdivision of the State ofIdaho

DefendantiCounterclaimant.

Case No. CV-06-882

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DECISION ON
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, Phil and Lynn Schaefer Lane Ranch Partnership
filed this lawsuit on October 18, 2007, challenging the City of Sun Valley's imposition of
an in-lieu fee on the Schaefers, pursuant to Ordinance 364, the Workforce Linkage
Ordinance. This matter came before the Court by Oral Argument on May 3,2007.
Christopher Meyer appeared for and on behalf ofplaintiffs/counterdefendants Phil and
Lynn Schaefer, and My. Rand Peebles and Geoffrey M. Wardle appeared for and 011
behalf of the defendantlcounterclaimant the City of Sun Valley. The Court has discussed
this matter at oral argument, reviewed the briefs, and conducted independent research on
the matter, and renders the following decision.
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FACTUALBACKGROD~D

TIle following facts are undisputed. On April 21, 2005 the City of Sun Valley
adopted Ordinance No. 363 and Ordinance No. 364. Both ordinances sought to address
the gwwing need for affordable workforce housing in Sun Valley. Ordinance 363 applies
to residential and multi-family deVelopment, and Ordinance 364, known as Workforce

Housing Linkage Ordinance, applies to single-family construction. Ordinance 363 is not
at issue in the present lawsuit.
Ordinance 364 provides that all applications for Design Review in the City of Sun
Valley "shall require an approved Workforce Housing Linkage Plan such that a
percentage of the employee housing demand generated by the application will be
provided as Workforce Housing Units." Sun Valley, Idaho Ordinance No. 364, § 9-9F-2.
Permit approval for residential development requires the applicant to either "develop or
ensure development of twenty percent (20%) ofthe employee housing unit demand
generated by the application either onsite or on an Eligible Site prior to or concurrent
with the issuance of any building peID1its for proposed new construction." Jd. at 9-9F4(B). The ordinance then sets forth a formula to compute the total on-site workforce
housing units a home-builder must provide. The formula is based upon the size of the
residential development, how many employees will be required, and how many
employees will reside in a unit.
Ordinance 364 also provides "[w ]here alternatives to the on-site provision of such
housing is determined to be more practical, efficient, and equitable, this Article will set
forth standards for Eligible Site housing, the conveyance ofland, or a payment in-lieu
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fee." Id. at § 9-9F-1. For instance, ifthe formula yields a fraction of a unit a homebuilder has the option to either build a full unit or pay a fee in-lieu. An in-lieu fee may
also be provided where the City Council finds on-site housing to be inappropriate or
impractical. Once collected, the fees must be deposited into a Workforce Housing Fund
and used "solely to increase and improve the supply of rental and/or for sale workforce
housing ... "
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants Phil and Lynn Schaefer owned a lot in Sun Valley
and sought to obtain design review approval and a building permit for a new home. The
City assessed an "in-lieu" fee of $11,989.97 against the Schaefers pursuant to the
Linkage Ordinance. The Schaefers filed this lawsuit and moved for summary judgment
challenging the constitutionality of Ordinance 364. Sun Valley filed a counterclaim
seeking a declaration that Ordinance 364 is a permissible constitutional exaction pursuant
to the police power of Article XII, § 2 of the Idaho Constitution.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary Judgment is proper if the "pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule
56(c), LR.C.P. Ordinarily, the Court liberally construes all disputed facts in favor of the
non-moving party, and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the
record in favor of the party opposing the motion. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541,
808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991). lfthe evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, the
trial court should grant the motion for summary judgment. Fann Credit Bank v.

Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 272,869 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1994). The fact that both parties
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move for summary judgment does not in and of itself establish that there is no genuine
issue of material fact. Kromrei v. AID Ins. Co., 110 Idaho 549, 551, 716 P.2d 1321
(1986).
The parties appear to agree that no facts are at issue.

ISSUES
In the present case the primary issue is whether, as the City of Sun Valley argues,
the in-lieu fees provided by Ordinance 364 are a proper exercise of authority under the
police powers granted to municipalities by the Idaho Constitution. In the alternative, the
City of Sun Valley argues that the Local Land Use Plauning Act (LLUPA) pro;rjdes the
City with the authority to assess in-lieu fees for the purpose of affordable housing. In
response, the Schaefers first argue that Ordinance 364 is an unconstitutional tax.
Secondly, the Schaefers contend there is no legislation that permits the City to assess the
in-lieu fee. Further, the Schaefers claim the only arguable legislation that would permit
in-lieu fees would be the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act (IDIF A). IDIFA addresses
the city's authority to assess charges on new growth and development, and importantly,
does not allow the imposition of in-lieu fees for affordable housing. Therefore, the
Schaefers claim, the IDIFA pre-empts the area of impact fee assessment.
The Court will analyze both issues in tum.
A.~ALYSIS

At the outset, a brief review of the law regarding a municipality's authority to
assess charges on the public is necessary. "Idaho has long recognized the proposition
that a municipal corporation, as a creature of the state, possess and exercises only those
powers either expressly or impliedly granted to it. This position, also Imown as "Dillon's
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Rule," has been generally recognized as the prevailing view in Idaho." Caesar v. State,
101 Idaho 158,610 P.2d 517, 520 (1980). (citations omitted).
Consequently, there are three limited methods by which a municipality may
impose charges 011 the public or particular persons. Idaho Bldg. Contractors Assoc. v.

City of Coeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho 540 (1995). Under Art. 12, § 2 of the Idaho
Constitution, a municipality may enact regulations pursuant to its police power, for the
furtherance of the public health, safety or morals or welfare of its residents. Brewster v.

City ofPocatello, 114 Idaho 502,503-504, 768 P.2d 765,766-67 (1988). Under its
police powers, a municipality may "provide for the collection of revenue incidental to the
enforcement of that regulation." Idaho Bldg. Contractors Assoc., 126 Idaho at 743, P.2d
at 329.
Also pursuant to a municipality's police power, Art. 8 § 3 of the IdallO
Constitution permits the imposition of rates and charges to provide revenue for public
works projects. Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 438,807 P.2d 1272, 1276
(1991). Under this constitutional grant of authority, the Idaho Legislature enacted the
Idaho Revenue Bond Act, which allows cities to vote to approve the issuance of revenue
bonds to finance the cost or maintenance of public works. Jd. In the present action it is
undisputed that Sun Valley did not attempt to hold an election to provide a bond to
finam;e:: affordable housing.
Finally, a municipality may assess charges on the public pursuant to specific
legislation permitting a municipality to fund a particular project through the assessment
oftaxes or fees. !d. This municipal authority arises from Art 7, § 6 of the Idaho
Constitution, which "allows the legislature to invest in the corporate authorities ... the
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power to assess and collect taxes for all purposes of the corporation." Sun Valley Co. v.

City a/Sun Valley, 109 Idaho 424, 427, 708 P.2d 147, 150 (1985). This grant of
authority however, is not self-executing. A municipality may only exercise tlus taxing
power pursuant to, and limited by the authority granted by the legislature.
The first issue of contention is the scope of authority possessed by municipalities.
The City of Sun Valley claims a municipality's authority is much broader than Dillon's
rule, whereby a city's exercise of authority is only improper if it conflicts with the
general laws ofthe state. Therefore, the City may enact Ordinance 364 so long as it does
not conflict with the state's general laws. The City cites the recent Supreme Court
decision of Plummer v. City a/Fruitland, 139 Idaho 810, 87 P.3d 297 (2004), as support
for this proposition. When considering a municipality's police power, the Court in

Plummer stated that, "the burden falls upon the party challenging the exercise of this
power to show that such an exercise is either in conflict with the general laws of the state
or that it is unreasonable or arbitrary." Id. at 813.
While the City is correct that Plummer does set forth the law for a municipality's
police power, a municipality's authority to tax requires separate authority. A City's
police power does not authorize a city to tax the public, but rather regulate the public and
in some instances assess a fee incidental to the regulation. As the Court recently made
clear in Potts Construction Company v. North Kootenai Water District, "a municipaJ
corporation's taxes on the general public require specific legislative authorization." 141
Idaho 678, 681, P.3d 8, 11 (2005). Therefore, the distinction lies in whether a city has
imposed a general tax, in which specific authorizing legislation is required, or acted
pursuant to their police power, where a broader grant of authority exists.
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The second issue that must be resolved prior to the assessing the constitutionality
of Ordinance 364 regards the difference between a tax and an exaction. The Ci ty spends
a considerable amount oftime arguing that the in-lieu fee is an exaction rather than an
impact fee. The import of this argument is two-fold; first, that an exaction is
constitutionally distinct from a fee, and second, because the in-lieu fee is an exaction
rather than an impact fee, LLlJPA doesn't apply. The City, however, cites no Idaho law
supporting these propositions and this Court can find none. The analysis is the same
whether it is labeled fee or an exaction. A municipality may regulate within its police
collect revenue if it is incidental to the enforcement of that regulation. Brewster, 115
Idaho 504. The first requirement is whether the municipality may lawfully regulate
pursuant to their police power. If the regulation fails to satisfy this requirement, then the
Court need not address whether the revenue is incidental to the regulation. Here, the
regulation is an ordinance requiring development to mitigate its effect on the housing
market. The revenue at issue is an in-lieu fee, Vlhether the revenue is labeled an
exaction or an in-lieu fee does not remove it from the requirements of a valid exercise of
police power,
With regard to the argument that an in-lieu fee is an exaction and not an impact
fee, and therefore LLUP A is inapplicable, the Court's holding is the same. The label is
not the distinguishing faG lor. The question is whether the Idaho Legislature has
specifically authorized the collection of revenue. Thus, for purposes of this analysis,
whether the charge is labeled an in-lieu fee or an exaction is inconsequential.

l.

Ordinance 364 is not a lawful exercise of the City of Sun Valley's Police
Power.
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The City of Sun Valley argues that Ordinance 364 is merely a "regulation of
development to ensure that new development adequately mitigates its effect on the supply
of affordable workforce housing," and as such, falls within a city's established police
power authority to regulate for the furtherance ofthe public health, safety or morals or
welfare of its residents.

Further, since a municipality may impose fees incidental to

police power regulation, charging an in-lieu fee is permissible. The Schaefers argue that
Ordinance 364 is nothing more than a general tax, and thus requires specific legislative
authorization.
A municipality's police power arises from the Idaho Constitution, Art. XII, § 2,
which provides:
Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce,
within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other
regulations as are not in contlict with its charter or with the general
laws.

As stated above, pursuant to a municipality's police power, a city may provide for
a fee incidental to the enforcement of that regulation. Brewster, 115 Idaho at 504, P.2d at
767. The funds generated must "bear some reasonable relationship to the cost of
enforcing the regulation." Idaho Bldg Contractors Assoc., 126 Idaho at 743, P.2d at 329.
However, jfthe regulation'S purpose is to raise revenue rather than regulate, it is a tax,
and may only be upheld under the power of taxation. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court
cautiously reviews whether the collection of revenue is incidental to the enforcement of
that regulation, to cnsure that the police power is not "resorted to as a shield or
subterfuge, under which to enact and enforce a revenue-raising ordinance or statute." Id,
Foster's Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201,118 P.2d 721 (1941).
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In BrelVster v. City ofPocatello, the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed the difference
between a fee and a tax. Generally, the Court considered a fee as revenue incidental to
police power regulations, and a tax to include ordinances enacted for the purpose of
raising revenue. See generally Brewster, 504 Idaho at 502, 768 P.2d at 676. In that case,
the Court held invalid an ordinance that imposed a charge for the restoration and
maintenance of streets on alI owners or occupants of property in the city, as an
unconstitutional tax. The charge was calculated pursuant to a formula reflecting the
traffic estimated by that particular property. Id at 502. Initially, the Court noted that the
ordinance had no terms of regulation. TIle Court compared the alleged "fee" to a fee
upheld in Foster's Inc. v. Boise City as an example of a revenue incidental to a valid
police power regulation. In Foster's, the operation of parking meters was found to be
incidental to the city's police power to regulate traffic and parking. However, the Court
found the revenue from the Pocatello ordinance had "no necessary relationship to the
regulation of travel over its streets, but rather [was] to generate funds for the non-

regulatory function ofrepairing and maintaining streets." Id. at 504.
In other cases distinguishing a fee from a tax, the Idall0 Supreme Court has placed
emphasis on the terms ofthe ordinance regarding who will benefit from the revenue
collected, whether it be the particular consumer or the public at large. In Idaho Building
Confractors A,ssoc. v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 126 Idaho 740,890 P.2d 326 (1995), the

Court reviewed a case with facts similar to the present case, where contractors challenged
an ordinance that required payment of impact fees from new builders to pay for the cost
of development as a precondition to the receipt of a building pennit. The Contractors
claimed that the City lacked authority to collect the fees without authorizing legislation,
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and the City defended its ordinance by arguing the fee was a valid exercise of police
power. In differentiating a fee from a ta.'(, the Court defined a fee as "a charge for direct
public service rendered to the particular consumer, while a tax is a forced contribution by
the public at large to meet public needs." 126 Idaho at 744, 890 P.2d at 330. The Court
held the charge to be a tax because it benefited all those who live in Coeur d'Alene
equally, yet only newcomers were responsible for the cost. Id. As the Court stated "[t]he
fact that additional services are made necessary by growth and development does not
change the essential nature of the services provided: they are for the public at large." Id.
Similarly, in Brewster, the Court viewed the street fee to be a charge on the occupants or
owners of property for the privilege having a public street abut their property, which is no
different from a privilege shared by the general public in the usage of public streets.
Bre'wster, 1151daho at 504,768 P.2d at 767.

The Court in IBCA also expressed concern that the revenues collected pursuant to
the ordinance were paid into a general fund to be used "for capital improvements
throughout the City by all residents, and not solely for the benefit of those seeking the
building permit." Idaho Bldg Contractors Assoc., 126 Idaho at 330,890 P.2d at 330.
Because those funds were not earmarked for use based on the demand created by
development, they could not possibly relate to any specific regulation, but rather raise
revenue for all public facility infrastructure.
The Idaho Supreme Court has found ordinances requiring payment for water
services to be a valid exercise of a municipality's police power. In Loomis v. City of

Hailey, the Court found fees valid under the city's police power that were segregated and
used to repair and replace water system components used by the city. 119 Idaho 434, 807

DECISION ON SUMM:ARY Ri'DGMENT - 10

RESPONDENT/CROSS-ApPELLANT'S BRJEF
1332095_34.10915-9

Page 94

P.2d 1272 (1991). Again in Potts Construction Company v. North Kootenai Water
District, the Court found the purpose ofwater and sewer districts are to "serve a public
use and promote health, safety, prosperity, security and general welfare of the inhabitants
of said district." 141 Idaho 678, 682, 116 P.3d 8 12 (2005). The Court found the fee to
be used toward the water district's system and reasonably and rationally related to the
purpose of the city's regulatory function of "insuring clean and safe water for those users
of the district's system." !d. Thus the ordinance was upheld the by the Court.

In the present case, this Court finds that the purpose of Ordinance 364 is more
similar to a general tax than a fee because its clear purpose is to raise revenue rather than
regulate. In order for an ordinance to regulate, it must exercise some control by a rule or
a restriction. Blacks Law Dictionary (ih) 2000. For example, in Foster's the Court
found that operating the parking meters was an essential part of the city's authority to
control traffic and parking. In contrast, in Brewster the Court found the street fee was not
tailored to control anything regarding streets, but raise revenue for maintenance and
repair of the streets. Similarly, Ordinance 364 is not designed to exercise control or
regulate the building of community housing, but merely generates revenue.
Sun Valley also argues that it would be inconsistent to prohibit in-lieu fees while
allowing restrictions on development with regard to off-street parking, setback and height
regulations, and provide for on-site and off-site improvements necessitated by new
growilL The Court finds nothing inconsistent with the above scenario. It is well settled
that municipalities are able to regulate development. Setbacks and height regulations are
valid regulations of a city's police power. Sprenger, Grubb and Associates v. City of
Hailey, 127 Idaho 576, 903 P.2d 741 (1995). Furthermore, municipalities have been

DECISION ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 11

RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF
1332095_34, 10915-9

Page 95

legislatively authorized to enact zoning regulations pursuant to the Local Land Use
Plru1l1ing Act. Parking restrictions are proper regulations under the city's recognized
police power to regulate traffic and parking. The in-lieu fees assessed in Ordinance 364,
as discussed above, do not assess fees incidental to police power regulations, but instead
generate revenue.
As stated above, another factor in establishing whether Ordinance 364 '5 in-lieu
fee is a tax, is determining who will benefit. As Brewster stated, generally a tax benefits
the public at large and a fee is payment by a particular consumer for a public service.
According to Sun Valley, Ordinance 364 seeks to address the lack of workforce housing
in the Wood River Valley, and its effect on local employer's ability to attract and retain
employees. Memo in Support of Sun Valley's Motion for Summary Judgment and

Memorandum in Opposition to Schaefers' Motion for Summary Judgment, pA. It is
clear that the benefit of the ordinance serves new home-builders and the general public
equally. This Court crumot distinguish this situation from the one that existed in

Brewster or Idaho Building Contractors Association, where the Court stated "the
assessment here is no different than a charge for the privilege of living in the City... "
Similar to Brewster, where the City utilized a fOffilUla to determine the amount ofthe
charge based on the traffic estimated by that particular property, the City of Sun Valley
attempts to distinguish Ordinance 364 from a general tax by including a formula to
calculate the amount of the fee for each home-builder to ensure the builder does not bear
an inordinate amount of the cost. Despite the city's effort, the problem remains. The
lack of workforce housing, like the improvement of city streets, has an effect on the
public, and thus the public should bear the cost. As the Supreme COUlt stated in Idaho
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Building Contractors Assoc., "the fact that additional services are made necessary by
growth and development does not change the essential nature of the services provided:
they are for the public at large." 126 Idaho at 744,890 P.2d 330 .

•A.s an alternative argument, the City then asserts that there is a particular benefit
received by the Schaefers, which is the relief from constructing and dedicating a
complete workforce housing unit as required by the Ordinance. By paying the in-lieu fee,
the City claims, the Schaefers are saving money by paying Sun Valley to assume the
costs associated with workforce housing. The City is likely correct. However, the City's
options really only provide one feasible selection to the average person. The alternative
options, such as on-site housing, eligible site housing or a conveyance of land to
Workforce Housing, are all unrealistic to the average applicant. For example, ifthe
formula calculating the number of units the applicant shall provide produces a fractional
number, either the applicant must build an entire unit, or pay an in-lieu fee. Further, if
the P8;Z finds on-site housing to be impractical or inappropriate, or that it would be more
practical for the requircd units to be pooled with housing units from other projects in the
City, or a more viable project may be constructed elsewhere, then an applicant may either
pay an in-lieu fee or convey another piece of property. Ord. 364, § 9-9F-4.D. However,
the conveyance of land option is only possible if (1) the applicant owns another piece of
property in Sun Valley, and (2) the property is properly zoned, (3) the valuc ofthe
property is enough to offset the City'S development costs, and finally (4) the proposal is
accepted by the Sun Valley City Council. In addition, the developer must appraise the
property, and the City may require, prior to approval, that the property contain roads,
water supply, sewage disposal, an environmental report and other basic services. Ord.
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364, 9-9F-4.D.2. Due to the numerous obstacles an applicant would confront by
choosing any other alternative options, the City has effectively required an applicant to
pay an in-lieu fee. Consequently, it is unreasonable to claim that Schaefers have received
the benefit of not being required to choose the other three options.
Sun Valley's claims that Ordinance 364 does not suffer from the same flaws as

Idaho Building Contractors Association because Ordinance 364 specifically segregates
and allocates the in-lieu fees, and limits their use to fund the workforce housing created
by the new development. The Court agrees that the ordinance does not fail in this regard.
As stated above, the Court in Idaho Building Contractors Association partially based its
invalidation of the Coeur d'Alene ordinance on the fact that the fees were accumulated
into a general fund. The Court was concerned that an impact fee could be assessed and
the benefit would go toward an unrelated public need. Here, Ordinance 364 serves only
to mitigate the portion of the demand for affordable workforce housing directly caused by
the new development. Revenue provided from in-lieu fees are to be deposited into an
interest bealing Workforce Housing Fund, and solely used to "increase and improve the
supply of rental andlor for sale workforce housing affordable to moderate and low
income households and whose income is derived from employment within Sun Valley or
when found appropriate by the City, employed in Blaine County commonly known as the
NOlth Valley, including the City of Kctchum and River Run." Ordinance, 364, § 9-9F4B.D.1. Although Ordinance 364 satisfies this one component of a valid police power
regulation, it fails on the grounds discussed above.
This Court finds, therefore, that the Ordinance 364 in-lieu is in reality an
imposition of a tax, and not a valid exercise of a municipality's police power.
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I.

The City's charge of an in-lieu fee pursuant to Ordinance 364 is not
specifically autborized by the Idabo Legislature.

As discussed above, a municipality may also impose taxes or fees on the public by
specific authorization from the Idaho legislature. Idaho Bldg Contractors Assoc,126
Idaho at 742, 890 P.2d 328. Therefore, the only proper question for this Court is whether
any specific authorization from the legislature exists. The City of Sun Valley identifies
the Local Land Use Planning Act ("LUJPA") as the source ofthe City's authority. The
Schaefers argue that Ordinance 364 is without legislative authorization. The Schaefers
further contend that Ordinance 364 is preempted by Idaho law, particularly the Impact
Fee Act.
The Schaefers' argument is two fold. First, the Idaho LegiSlature did not
specifically authority the City to assess in-lieu fees. Second, the IDIFA preempted the
area of impact fees, and therefore the City could not assess in-lieu fees. Here, the Court
need not proceed to Schaefer's second argument on preemption at this time. The
question to address is whether the Idaho Legislature specifically authorized a
municipality to assess fees or taxes for affordable housing. If so, the ordinance would be
upheld on that basis. If no Iegislative authority exists, then no preemption argument is
necessary because the state did not grant specific authorization to the city.
Furthermore, preemption generally serves as a limitation of authority granted to
municipalities by the Idaho Constitution. Caesar, 101 Idaho at 161. "The city cannot act
in an area which is so completely covered by general law as to indicate that it is a matter
of state concem. Nor may it act in an area where, to do so, would conflict with the state's
general laws." Id. For instance, a city's police power is limited in areas where the State
has either directly preempted an ordinance or preempted the field. The Schaefers appear
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to concede that the preemption argument would apply only if the Court found Ordinance
364 to be a proper exercise of a municipality's police power. Only then could it be
argued that the State has preempted the area of impact fees, and the city is prohibited
from acting in that field. Since this Court found Ordinance 364 to be outside the
authority of a municipality's police power, the Court need not dee ide whether IDIFA
preempted the ordinance. Therefore, since it is undisputed that IDIFA does not provide
the necessary authority from the legislature, the Court viilI focus on the LLUPA
The City defends Ordinance 364 by arguing that LLUP A provides the authority
necessary for a municipality to assess in-lieu fees for affordable housing. This Court
crumot find that LLUPA provides the City with any such authority.
The Idaho Supreme Court has reviewed other challenges to County ordinances
where the County defended by identifying a specific grant of authority by the legislature.
One such lawsuit, Kootenai County Property Ass 'n v. Kootenai County involved a
municipality's attempt to charge the public fees to establish, maintain and operate a solid
waste disposal system. In that case the Court upheld the assessment of fees on the basis
that the Idaho legislature permitted the municipality to fund a particular project through
the assessment of taxes or fees. 115 Idaho 676, 769 P.2d 553 (1989). The legislation at
issue was entitled Solid Waste Disposal Sites, Title 31, Chapter 44, which grrulted county
commissioners the authority "to acquire, establish, maintain and operate such solid waste
disposal systems as are necessary and to provide reasonable and convenient access to
such disposal systems by all the citizens." le. § 31-4402. Further, the statute provides
the board of county commissioners the following options to fund the waste disposal
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system: levy a tax, collect fees, use existing revenues, or collect money from any other
source, or any combination thereof. I.C. § 31-4404(1).
In contrast, the City of Sun Valley fails to point to any language in the Local Land
Use Planning Act that specifically grants authority to assess fees or taxes. It is evident
from the Solid Waste Disposal Sites Act that the legislature provides revenue collection
authority with specific language. In contrast, the City of Sun Valley cites the Court to
several sections of LLUPA as support for the legislature's broad grant of authority.
These sections provide cities with the authority to promote the general welfare of the
people ofIdaho by identifying and assessing the need for affordable housing, and
requiring cities to address such issues by implementing regulations and standards. I.e. §
67-6508, I.C. § 67-6511. Indeed, LLUPA provides a city with broad authority to regulate
in the context ofland use. However, notably absent from LLUP A is language permitting
a city to assess taxes or fees.
Further, it is not at all clear that Ordinance 364 is of the type that LLLJP A applies
to. "LLUP A establishes explicit and express procedures to be followed by the goveming
boards or commissions when considering, enacting and amending zoning plans and
ordinances." Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 119, 90
P.3d 340,344 (2004). Further, zoning regulations "are divided into two classes; first,
those which regulate the height and bulk of buildings within ccrtain designated districts,
and second, those which prescribe the use to which buildings within certain designated
district may be put." 0 'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 202 P.2d 401 (1949).
The standards listed in the LLUPA are consistent with the above definition of zoning
regulations, listing "such things as building design; blocks, lots, and tracts ofland; yards,
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courts, greenbelts, planting strips, parks, and other open spaces; trees; signs; parking
spaces; roadways, streets, lanes, bicycIeways, pedestrian walkways, rights-of-way,
grades, alignments, and intersections; lighting; easements for public utilities; access to
streams, lakes, and viewpoints; water systems; sewer systems; storm drainage systems;
streets numbers and names; house numbers; schools, hospitals, and other public and
private development." I.C. § 67-6518. The common theme of the above standards is the
regulation of land use. Ordinance 364 does not impose standards related to the
regulation ofland use, but rather seeks to impose fees upon landowners seelcing a
building permit.
In sum, the Court cannot find that the LUJPA specifically grants the City of Sun
Valley the authority to assess fees or taxes on the public. Therefore, Ordinance 364
cannot be upheld on the basis that the City of Sun Valley may assess an in-lieu fee
pursuant to specific legislative authorization.

IDAHO TORT CLAIM ACT
The Schaefers seek a refund of the $11,989.97 in-lieu fee pursuant to the Idaho
Tort Claim Act, I.e. § 6-901 to 6-929. The City claims no refund is due because the city
acted "without reckless, willful and wanton conduct as defined in 6-904C, Idaho Code."
I.C. § 6-904A. This Court carmot find that the City of Sun Valley enacted Ordinance 364
willfully or recklessly, and therefore denies any refund pursuant to this act.
Tile Schaefers also seek a refund on the basis that the state was unjustly enriched
by receipt of an unconstitutional tax. The Court in BHA Investments, inc., v. State, 138
Idaho 348, 355, 63 P.3d 474,481 (2003), acknowledged such a claim may be appropriate
where the state charges an unconstitutional fee. A claim of unjust emichment requires
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(1) a benefit is conferred upon defendant by plaintiff, (2) appreciation by the defendant of
the benefit, and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment of the value thereof.

Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746,133 P.3d 1211 (2006). In the present action, the
City collected and appreciated receipt of$11,989.97 from the Schaefers. Further, as a
result of this Courts ruling regarding the constitutionality of the ordinance, acceptance of
the charge by the City would be inequitable. Thus, this Court finds the City to have been
unjustly emiched in the amount of$11,989.97 and the Schaefers are HEREBY entitled to
a refund in that amount.

In conclusion, because Ordinance 364 is not a valid exercise of a municipality's
police power, nor specifically authorized pursuant to a specific legislative enactment, the
Schaefer's Summary Judgment is HEREBY GRA."-lTED, and thus the City of Sun
Valley's Summary Judgment is DE};1ED.
It is so ordered.

RObffl:~

District Judge
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